
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Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment

A Study of Foreign Policy

Hasan-Askari Rizvi







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Hasan-Askari Rizvi

Professor of Political Science University of the Punjab, Lahore



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Preface

The book undertakes a comprehensive study of Pakistan's Foreign policy with emphasis on the geostrategic environment. Situated in the vicinity of powerful countries like India, China and the Soviet Union, and the Persian Gulf, Pakistan is often confronted with difficult choices. The United States maintains interests and presence in and around the region, and Pakistan often seeks security by aligning with the US. Pakistan's generally strained interaction with India and frequent problems in its relations with Afghanistan, especially since 1979, when the Soviet Union resorted to military intervention in that country, have created acute insecurity in Pakistan which at times borders on paranoia. The limited economic resources, a relatively weak industrial-technological base and fissiparous tendencies in the domestic context have also shaped Pakistan's foreign policy options. Other factors which influence Pakistan's foreign policy include its Islamic identity, the growing interdependence in the international system, and the rapidly changing international environment in the wake of the current Soviet retreat from its strident role in the international system. The book examines these issues and factors and assesses their implications for Pakistan's interaction at the bilateral, regional and international levels.

Though the major focus of the study is on the post-1971 period, the relevant developments of the earlier period (1947–71) have been discussed to facilitate analysis. The first chapter sets out the parameters of Pakistan's foreign policy and the next two deal with Pakistan's interaction with the states of South Asia; India attracts the maximum attention for obvious reasons. Chapter 4 examines Pakistan's efforts to project Islam in foreign policy and its relations with the Muslim states. Pakistan's relations with the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, are the subject of the next two chapters, and the last covers Sino-Pakistan ties. The Afghanistan crisis and Pakistan's nuclear programme are also analysed in the book.

The data for this study were collected in Pakistan, the US, and the UK. Sources are given in detail in endnotes which include official documents/reports/communiques/press releases/parliamentary debates, the relevant books, articles, newspapers and journals. Throughout the book 'Bhutto' refers to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and the name of Benazir Bhutto has been written in full. The manuscript was prepared while the author was holding the Iqbal Pakistan Chair at South Asia Institute, Heidelberg University, Germany. The author is grateful to the Director and the Faculty/Staff of

SAI for their courtesy and cooperation during his stay there. Special thanks are due to Dr Inayatullah Baloch (Heidelberg) and Dr Zafar Iqbal Cheema (London and Islamabad) who read parts of the book and suggested improvements.

HAR Lahore, Pakistan

List of Abbreviations

AIG Afghan Interim Government APP Associated Press of Pakistan

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

CENTCOM Central Command (US)
CENTO Central Treaty Organization

CFL Ceasefire Line

CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

ECO Economic Cooperation Organization

FPCCI Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and

Industry

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IUAM Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen

NAM Nonaligned Movement

NIEO New International Economic Order NWFP North West Frontier Province NWFZ Nuclear Weapons Free Zone

OIC Organization of the Islamic Conference PDPA People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan

PPP People's Party of Pakistan

RCD Regional Cooperation for Development

SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organization SWAPO South West Africa People's Organization

UAE United Arab Emirates

UNTEA United Nations Temporary Executive Authority
USAID United States Agency for International Development



1 The Geostrategic Environs and Foreign Policy

The international community expanded gradually in terms of its membership, geographic expanse and cultural diversity, making its management a complex affair. The European and Christian state system, marked by cultural homogenity, began to extend over most of the globe through conquest, colonialism and European settlements, leading to their political domination and cultural-religious penetration. The first major Muslim and confrontationist actor that entered the comity of nations was the Ottoman empire. This was followed by a number of states of North and South America but these were Christian and European in the mainstream culture, although not all were white. China, Japan, Siam and Persia were the first Asian states to enter the international community.

The most rapid transformation took place in the twentieth century. The traditional balance-of-power system made way for a new international political order at the end of World War I. This was based on the political settlement under the Treaty of Versailles, the League of Nations as an instrument for conflict resolution, and the emergence of a number of states, not necessarily independent and sovereign, from the ashes of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. However, these arrangements did not prove durable because of the socioeconomic and political turmoil in Europe, attempts on the part of those who had to bear the main brunt of the Treaty of Versailles to restore their position, and the failure of the League of Nations to address itself to these pressing problems which plunged the world into World War II.

THE POST-WAR INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND ITS TRANSFORMATION

The post World War II international system was marked by the Cold War and an intense superpower rivalry. The United States entered into security arrangements with, and provided economic and military assistance to, Western Europe, Turkey, Iraq (up to 1958), Iran, Pakistan, and a number of other Asian states as a part of its strategy to contain Communism and to

keep the Soviet Union and China isolated. The Soviets consolidated their hold over Eastern Europe and endeavoured to counterbalance US policies by cultivating links with the states of Asia and Africa. The impact of the superpower rivalry on world politics was so profound that the policies of other states, especially those in Asia and Africa, were studied with references to, or from the standpoint of, the superpower policies. These states were finding it difficult to exercise individual initiative and judgement on world affairs and those attempting to stay aloof from this framework were under pressure from both sides.

This began to change in the sixties as the decolonization process brought into being independent and sovereign states in Asia and Africa. Three broad features of this process were quite significant. First, the new states entered the comity of nations quite rapidly, thereby minimizing the chances of preservation of the status quo. Second, these states diverged in colonial experience, size, resources, orientations of their elite, and culture which made the international system very heterogeneous. Its management and consensus-building called for astute diplomacy and a better understanding of the concerns of these states and the orientations of their leaders. Third, the new states outnumbered the traditional and well-established members of the international system.

The change in the international system can be appreciated from the fact that only five Asian and no African state participated in the Hague conference of 1899 and 1907. The League of Nations had only seven Afro-Asian states as original members. In the case of the UN, twelve original members came from Asia and Africa (all were not independent). However, by the mid-seventies, the new states crowded the major international organizations, created several new ones, and revived others. They constituted two-thirds membership of the UN and dominated the proceedings of the General Assembly and most of its organs (the Security Council excepted) and the specialized agencies.

Other changes of no less significance were the emergence of cracks in the American and Soviet blocs, and the self assertion of new decision-making centres and actors. These included Western Europe, Japan, China, the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). None of them could challenge the preponderance of the two superpowers in the military field, including nuclear weapons, but they made it difficult for the superpowers to dominate the international system as they used to do in the early years of the Cold War; they were now compelled to negotiate with the lesser actors rather than direct or command them.

The transformation was accelerated by the successful enforcement of the oil embargo in 1973 by OPEC and the subsequent oil price hike which the

West acquiesced in. This underlined interdependence between the industrialized and developed states and the Third World, and gave a new sense of power to the latter. The economic issues gained prominence in the international system as Third World states put forward the demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the North–South divide appeared to supplant the East-West dichotomy. A number of transnational and nongovernmental actors figured prominently at international level; the leading examples being the liberation, ideological and religious movements which operated across the territorial boundaries of states, multinational corporations, and a host of other nongovernmental bodies.

The US inability to cow-down the North Vietnamese, its withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 and the overthrow of the staunchly pro-America Pahalavi dynasty in Iran (1979) in the wake of a popular, Islam-oriented upsurge led by Imam Khomeini, showed that there was a limit to what a superpower could do for its ally in the Third World. The same could be said about Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan (1979–89) in support of a beleaguered allied regime. The persistence of civil strife in Africa and the Iran–Iraq war (1980–8) demonstrated that some conflicts and problems had local and regional dynamics which could not be regulated by the superpowers, although they have at times supported one side or another to protect and promote their own interests.

Political developments in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev further hastened the transformation of the international system. Serious economic and political crises, including the power struggle in the Kremlin, and the attempts by some republics to withdraw from the federation against the backdrop of Gorbachev's policy of glasnost and perestroika made it difficult for the Soviet Union to play its traditional role in world affairs. It could no longer pursue confrontation with the US because domestic problems were overwhelming and it needed Western economic assistance to put its house in order. This has given more room for manoeuvre to individual states, although this has also provided the US with an opportunity to take on a more active role at the international level. With the end of superpower confrontation, at least for the time being, the US currently feels less inhibited about reasserting its role in world affairs. US action against Iraq in retaliation to the latter's invasion of Kuwait is one such example, where the US resorted to 'overkill'. Some Third World states which have differences with the US are perturbed by these trends. However, given the complexity of the international system and especially Third World activism, complete domination of world order by the US appears a remote possibility.

These developments focused attention on the nature and behaviour of actors other than the superpowers. A plethora of studies supplemented the state-centric approaches with more in-depth analyses of the contextual and environmental determinants of foreign policy. They also paid attention to a large number of actors above and under the hard crest of the state and their influence on state behaviour and the international system. The new conglomerates of state and non-state actors, established in order to influence international norms and processes, also received their attention. Some academicians devoted their attention to the study of regional sub-systems as important actors in international politics, their relationship with the international system and the dynamics of regional politics.² Others examined the behaviour of small and Third World states in the international system and especially their interaction with powerful states in the region and the superpowers.³ Still others endeavoured to determine a criterion for categorizing a state as a regional/middle power, small, or micro state and defining the way these states conduct themselves in the regional and international system.⁴

These studies employed new approaches and perspectives, drawn from other social sciences, to add to the explanatory power and insight of their analyses of the changing nature of the international system. Some argued that the growing interdependence, the increasing emphasis on economic issues, and the role of transnational actors had brought about a fundamental change in the structure of world power and the sovereign character of the state.5 Other studies focussed on the making and substance of foreign policy. Whether the major determinants of foreign policy are internal or external forces? How far the orientations of the decision-makers and their perceptions of the situation and environment influence a state's behaviour at the international level? What are the major problems of policy implementation? A number of decision-making approaches concentrated on foreign policy decisions, decision makers and the decision-making process. Whether it was the application of Allison's three models (the rational actor, the organizational process, and bureaucratic politics) or psychological approaches, or different variants of the systems approach, the objective was to fully understand why the states behave the way they do.6 The emphasis on interdisciplinary perspectives, the theories and explanations of wider application, and scientific rigour enriched the study of international relations. It also helped our comprehension of the dynamics of the complex world order, and gave a due recognition to the new internal and external actors and forces impinging on foreign policy output of a state.

THE THIRD WORLD: PROBLEMS AND STRATEGIES

The Third World attracted much scholarly attention not only as an agent of change in the international system but also for two other considerations. First, there is a strong impact from the international environment on domestic political and socioeconomic conditions and foreign policy outputs of the Third World states. They find themselves increasingly vulnerable to pressures from outside their territorial boundaries which adversely affect their autonomy in world affairs. Second, the Third World is by itself a fascinating field of study and analysis. The politics within a state and at regional level, though influenced by extra-region forces, has a dynamics of its own with ramifications for the international system.

A Third World state interacts with the international system in its individual capacity as well as in collaboration with other states as a collectivity in order to protect its sovereign national identity and to accelerate the transformation of the international system. The security of sovereign identity does not exclusively pertain to the military field. It also includes the overall capacity of the state to withstand the external pressures and the promotion of socioeconomic development and internal cohesion.

The concept of a modern nation-state is alien to many parts of the Third World and therefore the state structure finds it difficult to command an overriding loyalty and identification of its citizens. The state has to compete with a host of sub- and supranational identities based on ethnic, linguistic, tribal, religious and ideological affiliations. Additionally, the state's perceived or real close association with a particular identity makes it unacceptable to other identities and groups. This undermines the efforts of a state to pursue meaningful socio-economic development which in turn reinforces, and at times accentuates, the existing fissiparous tendencies within the domestic context. The security problem is intensified if a state suffering from these handicaps develops an adversary relationship with a powerful neighbouring state willing to employ its superior military power and economic resources to restrict the policy options of the former. This gives an additional dimension to the security problem which is regional in character, emanating from the immediate environment of a state.

Such a state of affairs exposes the polity to external pressures, manipulation and intervention, and acts as a major constraint on its capacity to pursue its foreign policy goals or mould the regional and international environment to its advantage. The Third World states, therefore, strive 'to increase their room for manoeuvre, to increase their ability to stabilize

the environment in which they must function and to minimize their vulnerability' to external pressures.⁸

Interaction with the international system in an individual capacity aims at promoting coherence and socio-economic development in the polity, strengthening its military security vis-à-vis the adversary (mostly a state from within the region) through military build-up and the use of diplomacy. Most 'insecure' states obtain economic and technological assistance from external sources in order to combat underdevelopment and poverty. A number of them enter into formal security arrangements with a superpower to strengthen their position in the regional context. Such security pacts combine military assistance/arms transfers and economic aid. However, experience suggests that a formal security alignment between a Third World state and a superpower is imbalanced and unequal. It restricts rather than enhances the options available to the junior partner, i.e. the Third World state, and the senior partner develops its own grievances. Such a relationship contains 'the seeds of mutual dissatisfaction from each other's behaviour and [the] partnership tends to be uneasy'. Some Third World states obtain weapons and economic assistance from a superpower without entering into a formal security treaty. The sharing of security perspectives and the issue-oriented harmonization of their foreign policies serve as the basis of cooperation which is more informal and flexible, although periodic strains do bedevil this type of relationship as well.

The states which did not suffer from an acute insecurity endeavoured to stay clear of the superpower rivalry in the Cold War era and pursued nonalignment; some preferred to be neutral. However, with the decline of the Cold War and especially the shift of the international system from bipolarity to multipolarity, more and more states avoided direct identification with a superpower. Nonalignment became a popular strategy of political action for the Third World states but its original relevance and character were diluted. One could find nonaligned states with a strong tilt towards one superpower or another. They avoided the traditional security pacts but maintained a flexible bilateral security-related interaction with a superpower, or entered into friendship treaties with stipulation for their invocation for security matters with mutual consent.

Collectively, the Third World states have been very active at international level which manifests a paradoxical attitude towards the norms and institutions of the international system. On the one hand, they criticize them for not providing an 'equitable and fair' treatment to the Third World. On the other, they invoke them in order to protect their identities and to enhance their internal and external security. Beginning with the Bandung Conference (1955) where the newly independent states first gave collective

expression to their perspectives on world affairs, they worked through the UN organs and agencies and also a number of other international and regional forums which they established to restructure the international system. What impelled them most to do so was the growing interdependence in the international system which made it impossible for a Third World state to pursue its foreign policy goals and domestic socioeconomic development in isolation from the rest of the world. They also recognized that the existing world order was established before they entered it as independent and sovereign actors and that unless they endeavoured to restructure it, the world order would continue to protect the interests of those who created it.

The Third World states are engaged in five major activities to make the international norms and institutions more responsive to their numerical strength, needs and aspirations. ¹⁰ These include, the struggle for sovereign equality; anti-colonialism and right of self determination, opposition to apartheid, especially opposition to white minority rule in Southern Africa and support for the national rights of Palestinians; struggle against the traditionally privileged position of Europeans in the international system, including the grant of equal rights to non-whites, abolition of slave trade and other stigmas of inequality as well as a greater role for the newly independent states in the international forums; struggle against neo-colonialism and a demand for setting up a New International Economic Order (NIEO), encompassing the issues of aid, trade, debts, energy, raw materials, technology and a call for a massive transfer of resources to the Third World; and struggle against Western intellectual and cultural dominance and the assertion of local/native cultural and ethnic identities.

However, the heterogeneous nature of the Third World, divergence in their strategies to achieve shared goals, and the individual ambitions of some relatively powerful Third World states to play an active and commanding role in their region, make consensus-building on the above issues a difficult task.

The decline of the superpowers has also enabled the comparatively powerful states in the Third World to play a more autonomous and commanding role in their vicinity. In certain cases, the two superpowers encourage their friendly states to play such a role, hoping that this will promote coherence and stability in the region. However, this comes into conflict with the national aspiration of the smaller states of the region which jealously guard their right to choose their own security arrangements and foreign policy. If these states resent the 'overlordship' of the superpowers, how could they accept a regional hegemon?

The strains between a potential regional power (also described as a mini superpower) and the smaller/weaker states of the region have become an

important aspect of the politics of the Third World. The latter resent what they perceive as the overbearing policies of the former, although they may avoid a public expression of such sentiments. They cultivate ties with the extra-region states and employ bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to improve their bargaining position in the concerned region and to protect their foreign policy options. This has also produced region-specific arms races where competing states secure weapons from external sources and step up indigenous arms production to achieve their respective goals: the powerful state wishes to protect its margin of superiority and the small/ weak state wants to reduce the power disparity in the region and protect its autonomy for making foreign and domestic policies. The impact of such arms races and power confrontations parallels, even overshadows the impact of the role of the external powers in the Third World.¹¹ The aspirant regional power rejects the fears of small states of the region as unfounded. It opposes all such interaction of the small states of the region with the outside world that adversely affects its ability to play a commanding role in the region or enhances the capacity of the former to withstand its pressures. The regional power endeavours, though not always successfully, to act as a gate-keeper for the transactions between the region and the outside world.

The foreign policies of Third World states can no longer be dismissed simply as reflexes to the policies of the super/major powers. They have been instrumental in transforming the Eurocentric world into a global community and continue to influence the course of political change. Therefore, how a Third World state addresses itself to the above discussed issues and problems has no less ramifications for the international and regional system than the impact of external environment on its domestic political processes. The perceptions of a state's role in the international system, its foreign policy goals and strategies, strengths and weaknesses, human and material resources, and its interaction with the super and regional powers and other actors in the international system are interesting facets of international politics.

PAKISTAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Pakistan, like most Third World states, recognizes that it is neither possible nor advisable to stay in isolation in the present day interdependent and complex world. It needs to interact with other states, international and regional organizations and supranational actors in order to protect and promote its national interest, especially its sovereign national identity, as

well as to mobilize international support and resources for domestic socioeconomic development. The rise of the problems of global dimensions pertaining to, *inter alia*, environment, energy, population, health, refugees, and drugs, make it imperative to combat them in collaboration with the international community. Similarly, the preservation of peace and stability both at the regional and international levels requires collective efforts. Pakistan's desire to enhance its efficacy and clout in the international system and especially its effort to manipulate the immediate environment to its advantage, or at least reduce its vulnerability to external pressures, underscores the need for playing an active role in the international system.

Security

The major focus of Pakistan's interaction with the international community has been security against internal and external challenges to its national identity, territorial integrity and independence. The internal problems stem from the fragility of the politico-economic institutions and processes and their inability to command a widely shared legitimacy. The deepening cleavages based on ethnicity, language, region, economic disparities and religious sectarianism have caused alienation in the body-politic, undermining the ability of the domestic political system to perform its requisite functions in an efficacious manner.

The external dimension of Pakistan's security pertains to its immediate geostrategic environment, often described as troublesome, if not hostile. The distrust and acrimony that developed between Pakistan and India in the early years of independence, reinforced by later developments, created a fear in Pakistan that India wanted to use its size, resources, technological advancement and military superiority to reduce Pakistan to the status of a vessel state, if not eliminate it altogether from the comity of nations. Three factors intensified Pakistan's insecurity. First, Pakistan suffers from a number of security handicaps. There are no natural barriers on most of the Pakistan-India border which make it relatively easy for troops, especially heavy armour, of either side to cross the frontiers. Pakistan lacks territorial depth and the main communication lines run parallel to the Pakistan-India border. Some of the main cities are situated so close to the border that the Indian troops have to be confronted right at the border. (In the pre-1971 period the lack of geographic contiguity between the two wings was an additional handicap.) Second, India has traditionally enjoyed a clear military superiority over Pakistan in terms of manpower, weapons and equipment, industrialization, and especially defence industry. Third, India

exhibits leadership pretentions in South Asia and advocates the doctrine of regional peace and stability through India's preponderance – a perspective opposed by Pakistan.

Pakistan's security problems were intensified by Afghanistan's irredentist claims on its territory and Indian and Soviet support to such claims. However, as Afghanistan lacked sufficient military potential to mount a major offensive, India continued to be Pakistan's principal security concern. Therefore, Pakistan's search for security had two major targets. First, the augmentation of security against external threats primarily from India and secondarily from Afghanistan. Second, the counterbalancing of India's military superiority by strengthening its defence arrangements with a backup of active diplomacy.

A new and more threatening dimension was added to the security problem with the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. The buffer between the Soviet Union and Pakistan disappeared which accentuated the latter's security predicament. The increased Soviet pressures through the deployment of its troops on Pakistan's border and/or its support to pro-Soviet groups and other dissidents in NWFP (North West Frontier Province) and Baluchistan looked more credible than ever. The Soviets also had the option of applying pressure on Pakistan through India. Besides, the spillover of civil strife in Afghanistan to Pakistan in the shape of an influx of over three million Afghan refugees and the use of Pakistani territory by some Afghan resistance groups had threatening ramifications for Pakistan's socioeconomic development.

Pakistan sought security mainly through alignment with the West. Apart from the willingness of the United States to offer security-related support, Pakistan's ruling elite perceived their insecurity to be of such a dimension that they could not cope with it alone. Their pro-West orientations and especially the military support for such a relationship were decisive in shaping Pakistan's strategy of alignment. In the fifties, the weak civilian leaders and assertive top brass of the military were convinced that Pakistan must have a powerful ally to help overcome its security predicament. This led to Pakistan's participation in the US-sponsored defence pacts which made it possible for Pakistan to obtain weapons and economic assistance.

A similar strategy was adopted to deal with security problems in the aftermath of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The United States pledged to underwrite Pakistan's security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, although no new defence treaty was signed. Initially, Pakistan did maintain a discreet distance from the United States but, as the military's hold over foreign policy consolidated after the appointment of Lt.-Gen. (Retd) Yaqub Ali Khan as Foreign Minister in 1982, a clear tilt towards the United States

began to take shape. This trend became more pronounced as Pakistan and the United States began the initial spadework in 1985 on the extension of US economic assistance and military sales to Pakistan beyond 1987. Notwithstanding their differences regarding Pakistan's nuclear programme, Pakistan and the United States developed closer coordination in political and security affairs, and the former cultivated strong linkages with the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) without formally joining it.

The only instance when Pakistan avoided a close alignment with the West and pursued nonalignment as a strategy for enhancing security was in the early seventies – the immediate aftermath of the establishment of Bangladesh. The military elite had temporarily lost their political clout in the body politic and a civilian leadership with sufficient popular backing was in a position to assert independence in foreign policy. The roots of this changed perspective on security could be traced to the mid-sixties when the growing divergence in the security perspectives of Pakistan (a small state) and the United States (a superpower) built serious strains in their relationship. Pakistan therefore sought to maximize its options by cultivating Asian countries, the socialist/communist states, especially China and the Soviet Union. Bilateralism and mutually beneficial considerations were emphasized in Pakistan's interaction with other states and it adopted an increasingly independent posture towards world affairs. These trends crystallized into nonalignment in the early seventies.

It seems that Pakistan will have to pursue nonalignment and independent foreign policy more seriously in the nineties which will require a reorientation of its current security policies. The United States is no longer willing to underwrite modernization of Pakistan's defence in view of the end of the Cold War and the sharp decline in Pakistan's relevance to US strategic perspective on the region. Afghanistan is no longer a high priority issue for the US as its interests have shifted elsewhere - Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. It feels quite confident after the successful military operation against Iraq to manage the affairs of the Gulf region without seeking active support from the Pakistan military. Pakistan's traditional ally, China, continues to support it but the latter cannot substitute for the US as a source of funds and military equipment. Moreover, China does not like to alienate the US altogether for the sake of Pakistan because it needs American technology. It is, therefore, imperative for Pakistan to recognize the changing realities in the international system and reorientate its foreign policy accordingly. This requires earnest efforts to improve the regional security environment by working towards an early settlement of post-Soviet withdrawal problems in Afghanistan, fence-mending with India, and establishment of wide-ranging economic and political relations with other states

on mutually beneficial considerations. These measures can diminish Pakistan's dependence on foreign military and economic aid and it will then be easy for Pakistan to seek security by diplomatic interaction and political accommodation in the immediate geostrategic environment.

Islam

Pakistan projects its Islamic identity in foreign policy partly because of the close association of Islam with the establishment of the state, and partly due to the fact that this connection has yielded concrete gains in the diplomatic, economic and security fields. Several policy measures are a direct consequence of Pakistan's Islamic identity. These include the assignment of special importance to its relations with other Muslim states, a strong advocacy of unity of 'ummah' (community of the believers), promotion of harmony and cooperation amongst these states, and support to the causes of Muslims anywhere in the world. Pakistan played an active role in organizing the first conference of the heads of state/government of Muslim countries in 1969. It contributed to the setting up of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) on a permanent basis, and played host to the 2nd Islamic summit conference, held at Lahore in 1974.

The imprint of Islam on Pakistan's foreign policy turned more conspicious in the post-Bangladesh period. Having suffered a major national humiliation in 1971, and being confronted with a serious crisis of identity, Pakistan sought to overcome these setbacks by falling back on Islam. Domestically, the Islamic component of national identity was reaffirmed and, internationally, Pakistan sought diplomatic and financial support of Muslim countries to restore itself in the international system and to rehabilitate its warravaged economy. This coincided with an increased emphasis on Islamic identity by the Muslim states and their activism in the international system. They sought to use their numerical strength and economic clout for restructuring the international system and for helping the economically hard-pressed countries amongst them.

The Muslim states extend their support to Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity. Their position on the major Pakistan–India disputes ranges from an open support to Pakistan to neutrality and advice of restraint to the two countries. This has reinforced Pakistan's determination to withstand India's security pressures. The Muslim world helped Pakistan to deal effectively with the diplomatic, economic and security fallout of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. With the exception of a few pro-Soviet states, the Muslim states endorsed Pakistan's perspective on this problem.

International Organizations

Pakistan's disposition towards the UN and other major international bodies reflects the typical paradox of a Third World state. It is critical of the UN for its failure to effectively protect the interests of the Third World states and especially its inability to resolve the Kashmir problem. However, Pakistan views the UN as an important forum where a Third World state can appeal to the conscience of the world and mobilize international support to protect its identity and independence. It, therefore, repeatedly affirms its confidence in the UN Charter and considers the implementation of its provisions as a guarantee of international peace and stability. Pakistan participates actively in the affairs of the UN organs and agencies and has served as a non-permanent member of the Security Council during 1952–3, 1968–9, 1976–7, and 1983–4. Pakistani troops served on the UN Security Force, established as a part of the UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in West Irian (West New Guinea) during October 1962–April 1963, facilitating the territory's transfer from Holland to Indonesia.

Pakistan has been equally active in a number of regional organizations like the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) draw Pakistan's special attention.

Pakistan showed interest to join NAM in the late 1960s, as it loosened its ties with the West and declined to extend the lease of the US communication base at Badaber, near Peshawar. Yugoslavia, Nepal and Sri Lanka and a few other countries were sympathetic towards Pakistan's desire for NAM membership. However, Pakistan faced opposition from India which maintained in 1969-70 that Pakistan had not formally withdrawn from SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization) and CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), two security pacts which violated the spirit of NAM. As a result, the issue of Pakistan's membership was not raised at the preparatory meeting for the third NAM summit at Lusaka (1970). Pakistan gradually moved away from the West in the seventies by withdrawing from SEATO in 1972, and championed the cause of NIEO (New International Economic Order). Pakistan offered cooperation to Sri Lanka for the provision of physical facilities for the fifth NAM summit conference, held at Colombo in 1976. It attended the conference of NAM Foreign Ministers, held at Belgrade in July 1978, as a guest, and, in March 1979, after de-linking itself from CENTO, formally applied for NAM membership.¹² The acceptance of this request was a foregone conclusion and Pakistan was admitted to this world body on the eve of the sixth summit conference, held at Havana in September 1979.

Right of Self-determination and Africa

Being an ex-colonial state, Pakistan extended unequivocal support to the right of self determination and independence for other colonized states of Asia and Africa. Pakistan campaigned actively at the UN for the grant of independence to Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Libya and the Sudan. The Palestinian national rights have been constantly supported by Pakistan and it demanded the withdrawal of Israel from all Arab occupied territories.

Pakistan's support to the major African causes was equally resolute. It stood for the removal of the vestiges of colonialism in Angola and Mozambique as well as opposing apartheid practised by the white minority governments in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. It welcomed the setting up of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia and then its independence as Zimbabwe in 1980. Robert Mugabe visited Pakistan in May 1981 and March 1987, and Pakistan extended technical assistance for Zimbabwe's economic development. Some trained manpower was also made available: a senior Pakistani Air Force officer headed Zimbabwe's Air Force in the initial years. Pakistan recognized the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) as the representative of the people of Namibia (South West Africa) and extended limited financial assistance to this organization (i.e. Pakistani rupees 500 000 in December 1976). It supported the UN sanctions against South Africa and endorsed the UN-initiated efforts for Namibia's independence, and when Namibia finally achieved independence in March 1990, ending 106 years of colonization, Pakistan enthusiastically welcomed it as the beginning of a new era in Africa.

Pakistan's interaction with the states of Africa expanded rapidly in the seventies and its momentum was maintained in the eighties. The exchange visits of the heads of state/government and other key policy makers strengthened this interaction. Special attention was given to the expansion of economic relations and trade. Several agreements and protocols were signed for cultivating cooperation in various fields of mutual interest like technical and industrial, agriculture, telecommunication, power, highway development, education and culture. Pakistan offered training scholarships in banking, railways, medicines, pharmacy, engineering, veterinary services, agriculture, water management, business administration and commerce. A number of African countries obtained technicians, scientists, teachers and other trained personnel from Pakistan. Training facilities were also ex-

tended to the military personnel of some of the African countries in Pakistan's military institutions, and army and air force trainers were sent to a couple of them. Somalia was supplied with some weapons after its President Mohammad Siad Barre visited Pakistan in December 1977. Small arms and military equipment were sold to some African states on a commercial basis.

Pakistan's humanitarian assistance for the victims of civil strife and drought in Africa included food, medicines, clothing and other relief goods supplied directly to the country concerned or through international relief agencies. Financial assistance was also made available for the UN sponsored programmes for combating the refugee problem, hunger and poverty in Africa. Pakistan also offered interest-free loans for the purchase of machinery and equipment from Pakistan. It also contributed to the post-drought recovery programme for Africa, approved by the UN General Assembly's special session in May 1986.¹⁴

Socioeconomic Issues

The socioeconomic issues pertaining to the Third World have been figuring prominently in Pakistan's foreign policy since the seventies. It was in the first special session of the UN General Assembly in 1974 that the Third World advocated the earliest possible restructuring of existing international economic processes and institutions in a manner that facilitated the extrication of the Third World from underdevelopment and poverty. Pakistan associated itself with this demand for NIEO and maintained that unless poverty and hunger were removed, there could be no durable peace in the world. This goal could be achieved in an egalitarian international economic order which ensured an equitable distribution of resources, fair prices for raw materials, reasonable terms of international trade, loans on soft terms, and the transfer of appropriate technology to the Third World.

In 1976, Pakistan proposed the holding of a Third World summit to chalk out a strategy to achieve the above goals and to promote greater cooperation amongst the states of the Third World. Regarding sea-bed living and non-living resources, Pakistan advocated the protection of legitimate rights of the littoral states and that exploration of the high seas should be undertaken with the objective of serving mankind. It also called for international management and equitable sharing of the benefits of the resources of Antarctica; peace and security should be maintained in this continent and adequate measures should be adopted to protect its environment.

Arms Control and Nuclear Nonproliferation

Pakistan advocates a comprehensive approach to arms control, incorporating measures for arms reduction and suggestions for the peaceful resolution of international disputes and the building up of trust and confidence in the international system. The superpowers' rivalry and their efforts to expand their orbit of influence are considered the major causes of conflict and arms race. That is the reason why Pakistan welcomed the thaw between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1989–90, and the signing of the New European Charter, signifying the end of the Cold War era, by 32 European states, the United States and Canada at the Paris session of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in November 1990. Pakistan also applauded the opening up of the states of Eastern Europe and especially the unification of East and West Germany in October 1990, which removed a major source of tension in Europe.

Pakistan recognizes that international peace and stability are also threatened by region-specific arms races, caused primarily by territorial and other disputes in a region and/or the power orientations of a state within a region. As regional arms races and regional conflicts have ramifications for the rest of the world and vice versa, their containment is no less important than global arms control.

Pakistan is of the view that, in addition to global arms control, there is a need to evolve mechanisms for regulating arms races at regional level. These two sets of efforts are complementary and serve to promote peace and stability in the international system. This perspective is partly shaped by Pakistan's own security predicament, which is regional. Situated in the neighbourhood of a bigger military power, India, with whom it has several on-going problems, Pakistan feels that a powerful state with regional ambitions can cause insecurity to the smaller neighbours, thereby triggering a regional arms race.

A proposal for regional arms control, security and economic cooperation was offered by Pakistan with an eye on its confrontation with India. The proposal envisaged a number of steps, including measures to build mutual trust and confidence; resolution of outstanding disputes and removal of misunderstandings through internationally recognized procedures; promotion of economic and social cooperation on the basis of mutually advantageous considerations; a shared and coordinated position on threats from outside the region; the setting-up of an acceptable military equilibrium among the states of the region; and joint initiatives to promote regional and global disarmament.¹⁶ Pakistan's desire to reduce tension and promote peace at the regional level shaped its positive response to Nepal's proposal

for declaring that country a zone of peace. For the same reason, it endorsed the UN General Assembly resolution designating the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

The regional approach also manifested itself in Pakistan's response to the controversy about the real intentions of its nuclear programme. As the international community expressed strong doubts about the peaceful nature of Pakistan's nuclear programme, and India viewed it as a major security hazard, Pakistan offered a five-point proposal to India in the mid-eighties to establish a nonproliferation regime for South Asia, eliminating the threat of a nuclear weapons race between the two countries.

Pakistan proposed that the two countries should agree to simultaneous accession to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); concurrent acceptance of the safeguards prescribed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); mutual inspection of each other's nuclear installations; a bilateral or regional (South Asia) declaration renouncing the acquisition and manufacture of nuclear weapons; and the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in South Asia. In June 1991 Pakistan proposed a fivenation conference of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, India and Pakistan to resolve the problem of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. India's response to these proposals has been negative and it refuses to accept any restriction on its nuclear programme under bilateral or regional arrangements. However, India wants Pakistan to unilaterally cut back on its nuclear programme.

A nonproliferation policy has minimal, if any, chances of success in South Asia unless it applies equally to Pakistan and India, and it addresses itself to the security predicament of the smaller and militarily weaker of the two states, that is, Pakistan.

2 Pakistan and India:Divergent Goals andBilateral Relations

Pakistan and India are the major concern of each other's foreign and security policies, and their bilateral diplomacy is characterized by mutual distrust and an adversary relationship, although there have been periods of relative cordiality in their interaction. They successfully negotiated bilateral agreements from time to time, like the Indus Water Treaty (1960), the agreement to submit the Rann of Kutch dispute (1965) to international arbitration and then the acceptance of the award of the tribunal (1968), and the Simla Agreement (1972), which contributed to defusing tension and promoted peace in the region. However, mutual antagonism has been more conspicious in their relations.

THE ROOTS OF ANTAGONISM

There are several explanations of the antagonistic relationship between Pakistan and India. A well-known line of argument traces the roots of antagonism to South Asia's historical legacy dating back to the period when Islam challenged Hinduism's near monopoly. Islam's ability to maintain its peculiar socioeconomic and political character, trigger large scale conversions, and its rise to power caused an injury to Hinduism's sense of pride which shaped the Hindu attitude towards Islam and the Muslims in South Asia. Muslims also viewed Hinduism as their main adversary. The consequent antagonism accentuated after the establishment of British rule in South Asia because the Hindus and the Muslims had to compete with each other for access to power and material benefits, including jobs and elective offices.

An off-shoot of the historical legacy explanation is the argument that the diametrically opposed concepts of nationhood advanced by the Congress Party and the Muslim League (One nation vs. Two nations) in the pre-independence period widened the historical cleavage between the Muslims and the Hindus. For the Muslim League, the demand for a separate state for the Muslims of South Asia was a natural product of their distinctive religio-

cultural and political identity. For the Congress Party, this demand was created by a group of self-centred Muslim elite and nurtured by the British policy to divide and weaken the Indian nationalist movement. This antagonism was carried over to the post-independence period and it was reinforced by the disputes that developed in the early years of independence.

Several political analysts viewed ideological noncongruity between Islamic Pakistan and secular India as the major cause of their problems. The antagonism between these two cultural traditions shaped their approaches towards each other.¹ Some go to the extent of suggesting that, given the deep-rooted ideological and cultural conflict, India and Pakistan can never develop a durable friendship. Mutual distrust and conflict, according to this argument, are natural and inevitable. It is also argued in India that its secularism and democracy pose a threat to the neighbouring states which lack these attributes of a modern polity. Therefore, a country like Pakistan will pursue a strident approach towards India so that its citizens are not influenced by India's democratic political system.² It seems that this explanation is devised to pamper India's ego otherwise there is hardly any evidence available to suggest that Pakistan feels threatened by India's democracy and secularism.

Others have attempted to analyze the bases of distrust and conflict between Pakistan and India with reference to images and perceptions. Siser Gupta talked of the images and perceptions cultivated by the elite on the eve of the partition of 1947,³ and Stephen Cohen highlighted the role of strategic perceptions in shaping their relations.⁴ Their images and perceptions of the self, the adversary, and the regional environment shaped by their historical legacy, cultural antagonism, and their mutual interaction influenced their policies towards each other. They were also affected by the 'mirror image' problem: each one viewed itself as peaceful and cooperative while attributing all kinds of evil intentions and designs to the adversary.

Still others hold the British decision to partition the South Asian subcontinent to be the major cause of the rift between Pakistan and India. Two types of arguments are advanced: first, the British withdrew their colonial rule in a hurry without judiciously completing the partition process. Several issues were left unresolved which generated conflicting claims by the two successor states. The drawing of international boundaries in the Punjab and Bengal on the basis of the Radcliffe Award caused a lot of bitterness between Pakistan and India. Similarly, their initial problems like the disputes over Kashmir, Junagarh and Manavadar; the distribution of river water; and the massacre of the people fleeing across the newly created Pakistan-India boundary could be linked with the manner in which the British carried out their withdrawal from South Asia. The second line of argument disputes the rationality of the British decisions to partition South Asia. To a large number of Indian writers, the division destroyed the 'natural' political and economic unity of South Asia, and created an 'unnatural and absurd' Pakistani entity, which sowed the seed of conflict in South Asia.

There are those who view the Indian decision not to honour its commitment made to the UN Security Council in 1948–9 to hold a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir to determine its future as the major source of bitterness between Pakistan and India. This reinforced the distrust caused by the historical legacy, ideological conflict and political developments in the immediate aftermath of withdrawal by the British. Sumit Ganguly summed up these factors as the nature of British colonial and disengagement policy, the ideological commitments of the two sides and perceived threats to such commitments, and the strength of the irredentist/anti-irredentist claims.⁵

REGIONAL POWER STRUCTURE

These factors do explain the historical, ideological, and psychological bases of the perennial conflict between Pakistan and India. But, more important is the fact that they have over the years developed divergent perspectives on the regional power structure in South Asia. India aspires a leadership and commanding role for itself in the region because of its size, population, industrial and technological advancement, military power and defence production. Such a role is viewed in India as the fulfillment of India's historical mission. Jawaharlal Nehru visualized a major role for India in world affairs. His vision of India's role, occasionally labelled as the Nehruvian model of foreign policy, projected pacifism, cooperation in economic, cultural and technological fields, and nonalignment as its main planks. However, it soon acquired military muscles and his successors were convinced that India must have sufficient military clout to assert its leadership in the region.

India's leadership model asserted that a strong and powerful India capable of projecting its power in the region and outside is a guarantee of security and stability throughout the whole of South Asia. India's growing military power is no threat to any state of South Asia because it has nothing against them. Rather, its military and industrial might will be employed to counter any threat to them from the outside. They should therefore coordinate their foreign and security policies with New Delhi so that it could play its role as the guarantor of regional security and stability in an effective manner. According to this model, any interaction between a South

Asian state and a non-region state must be reconciled with the imperatives of India's centrality to the region. Such ties should be established within the parameters acceptable to New Delhi. In case a state of the region is confronted with any problem, it must first approach India before seeking support from elsewhere.

Political turmoil in any state of South Asia is a matter of concern for India as it exposes that country as well as the region to extra-region penetration, which in turn adversely affects India's ability to deal with the regional affairs. As the custodian of regional security and stability, India can seek a role for itself in the management of internal strife in the neighbouring states. (India's role in Nepal 1950–1, Sri-Lanka since 1987, the Maldives 1988.)

The insulation of South Asia from external penetration and the maintenance of India's military preponderance are two major attributes of India's dominance model. India also insists that the bilateral problems between it and other South Asian states should be dealt with strictly at the bilateral level – direct and bilateral negotiations without the involvement of any other state or international organization. India expresses strong displeasure over the efforts of Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal to raise the subject of their bilateral problems with India (Kashmir, river-water, and trade and transit respectively) at the international forums.

The Pakistani leadership – civilian and military – is averse to the Indian dominance model and strongly believes that the model cannot serve as a basis for durable peace in South Asia. A New Delhi centred regional system, it is argued, comes in conflict with the national aspirations of other states of the region. It also lacks flexibility to accommodate the divergent perceptions of peace and security held by the smaller states of South Asia. Pakistan asserts that peace and stability in South Asia can be promoted by a strict observance of the principle of sovereign equality of all states, respect for each other's national sensitivities, and recognition of the right of each state to freely conduct is foreign and domestic affairs. This point of view is shared by other smaller states of South Asia which are also nervous about the notion of regional peace and stability through India's preponderance.

India dismisses the fears of the neighbouring South Asian states as unfounded. It is argued in India that the root cause of the problems between India and its neighbours, especially Pakistan, is the unwillingness of the latter to acknowledge India's status. If they abandon their efforts to seek support from the states situated outside of South Asia, there will be no cause of fear and apprehension. In reply to a question about the doubts which the neighbouring states entertained about India, Indira Gandhi said, 'Well, I do not think that their fears are genuine and when you talk to them, they do not

sound genuine . . . this is just a put-on thing; they have no grounds otherwise.' Rajiv Gandhi held similar views and regarded the complaints of India's neighbours as exaggerated and unjustified. Such an attitude could not be helpful to promoting understanding with the neighbouring states.

The wide discrepancy in the foreign policy perspectives of Pakistan and India, especially Pakistan's strong abhorrence of India's commanding role in regional affairs, proved a major obstacle to evolving a framework for amicable settlement of their bilateral differences and problems. The military debacle in 1971 shattered many Pakistani myths of superiority vis-à-vis India and made Pakistan more pragmatic in its approach towards India. However, Pakistan's tenacity to protect and promote its national identity continued to be as pronounced as was India's determination to assert its leadership in the region. This buttressed the deep-rooted distrust and acrimony in their interaction.

DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS

While pursuing mutual interaction, the governments of Pakistan and India are generally watchful of the domestic reaction to their policies. Mutual distrust is widely shared in the two countries and it is reinforced by the media which generally projects a negative and distorted image of the other country. There are a number of groups in the two countries which are either opposed to cultivating friendly ties or advise caution. They often qualify the need of friendly relations between Pakistan and India with terms like 'with honour', 'at what cost', and 'no lowering of guards', etc. They act as a constraint on their governments to pursue friendly relations or take bold initiatives. The two governments are not prepared to adopt a course of action that they cannot justify domestically and they are particularly sensitive to the charge of capitulation to, and appeasement of, the adversary. At times, the two governments also mobilize these 'go slow' and 'anti' lobbies to justify the slowing down of their bilateral interaction and to show that such a policy enjoys popular domestic support.

Domestic politics impinges on their bilateral relations in another manner. Both Pakistan and India are confronted with a host of dissident and separatist movements which dispute the legitimacy of the politicoeconomic arrangements of their respective states. When such challenges intensify, the relations between Pakistan and India are adversely affected because they usually manifest negative interest in each other's domestic problems, and, at times, endeavour to cash in on them. This often leads to

an exchange of charges of intervention in domestic affairs, thereby accentuating distrust and making mutual reconciliation an uphill task.

FROM CONFRONTATION TO RECONCILIATION

The 1971 war between Pakistan and India produced many important changes in South Asia. India demonstrated its military superiority in the region by humbling its traditional adversary with whom it had earlier fought three inconclusive wars in 1947–8, April 1965, and September 1965. Pakistan's military debacle in December 1971 brought an end to the long drawn-out bloody civil strife in its eastern wing and led to the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent and sovereign state – a goal shared by India and the Bangladesh nationalist movement.

Pakistan passed through a very difficult time in the aftermath of the 1971 War. It had lost East Pakistan and 91 634 military and paramilitary personnel, and civilians were taken prisoners of war there by India. The performance of the military on the western front was far from satisfactory. Pakistan lost about 5139 sq. miles of its territory on the international border in Sind and the Punjab, and across the Ceasefire Line (CFL) in Jammu and Kashmir. It captured only 69 sq. miles of Indian territory, mostly in Jammu and Kashmir. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who assumed power on 20 December 1971, four days after Pakistan's surrender in East Pakistan, was confronted with the challenging task of finding solutions to the problems arising out of the 1971 War in such a manner that they could not be viewed in Pakistan as representing a total sell-out or capitulation to India. Peace with honour and dignity was what Pakistan looked for. Three major issues were critical to achieving this goal. First, the return of the POWs without letting Bangladesh put them on trial on account of their alleged war crimes. Second, the rehabilitation of people uprooted from their homes when the Indian troops captured territory in the Punjab and Sind. They could not return unless the troops of India and Pakistan withdrew to their respective sides of the international border. Third, when should Pakistan extend recognition to Bangladesh?

The leaders of India and Pakistan issued hawkish statements during the first 4-5 weeks after the war. The Indian leadership urged Pakistan to recognize the 'new realities' in South Asia as a pre-condition for peace. This meant that Pakistan should formally acknowledge India's dominant position in the region and extend recognition to Bangladesh. It was also suggested by India's Defence Minister that the CFL in Jammu and Kashmir

should be made an international boundary after making some necessary adjustments to it. The response of Pakistan was quite terse and the government declared that it would not enter into any kind of dialogue with India if 'pre-conditions' were imposed. There were also differences between the two countries as to whether any preparatory talks at senior officials' level were needed prior to the meeting of heads of governments.

Tough talking and differences on the modalities of the dialogue soon gave way to moderation and the two countries began to explore the prospects of starting negotiations to settle their outstanding problems. They realized that they could not continue with the state of high tension and that, unless a peace agreement was signed and their troops were withdrawn to pre-war positions, the threat of another armed conflict would haunt them; the precarious nature of the ceasefire was clearly demonstrated by the frequent exchanges of fire between their troops. From the Pakistani standpoint, a peace agreement was urgently needed to secure the repatriation of POWs as well as to recover the territory under India's occupation. Without achieving these goals, it was felt by Pakistan's official circles that the government could neither devote attention to its domestic problems nor extend recognition to Bangladesh. India needed peace for its own considerations. Its main objectives – the humbling of Pakistan and the establishment of Bangladesh - had been achieved. Therefore, there was no use continuing with the state of war. India had been arguing since the outbreak of civil strife in East Pakistan in March 1971 that it had no aggressive designs against Pakistan but it supported the nationalist struggle of the oppressed Bengalis. Once Bangladesh was established, India could show to the world by signing a peace treaty that it wanted to live in peace with Pakistan. Moreover, after the military debacle and loss of its eastern wing, Pakistan was no longer a threat to India, and thus India could afford to be generous toward it. The POWs and the territory could not be withheld indefinitely as such an action involved a high economic and diplomatic cost for India. In addition to enhancing their prestige in the international system, the Indian leadership expected to secure recognition of Bangladesh by entering into peace arrangements with Pakistan. Moreover, they were convinced that the events of 1971 had discredited the Two-nation theory which would facilitate a final settlement of the Kashmir problem.

The Third World states, especially the Muslim states, and the major powers were favourably disposed towards peaceful resolution of the problems between India and Pakistan. The Soviet Union, which extended diplomatic and material support to India during the 1971 war, advised the Indian government to normalize its relations with Pakistan. Similar advice was

given to Pakistan when Bhutto visited Moscow in early March 1972. The United States also favoured the normalization of relations between the two countries. China endorsed Pakistan's plea for the restoration of normalcy in South Asia. The joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the eight-day visit of the US President Richard Nixon to China in February 1972 specifically supported the normalization of the situation in South Asia.¹⁰

It was in mid-February that Pakistan and India expressed their desire to initiate a dialogue. Bhutto communicated to the UN Secretary General's special representative, Vittorio Guicciardi, who was on a visit to Pakistan, his government's desire 'to start talks with India any time on the question of immediate repatriation of prisoners of war and other matters'. India made a similar offer in a letter to the UN Secretary General, suggesting 'direct talks with Pakistan at any time, at any level and without preconditions to ensure durable peace and stability in the Sub-continent'. Indira Gandhi despatched Foreign Minister Swaran Singh to Moscow for consultation, and it was after this visit that Mrs Indira Gandhi suggested to Bhutto a meeting between their emissaries for undertaking groundwork for the summit conference. These talks, held from 26 to 30 April, produced an agreement on the agenda for conference between Bhutto and Indira Gandhi.

The Simla Agreement

The Bhutto-Indira Gandhi, summit conference, held at India's summer resort, Simla, from 28 June to 2 July 1972, produced an agreement, known as the Simla Agreement. It set out principles for the resolution of their immediate as well as long term problems, represented a spirit of accommodation on the part of the two countries. It was a midway house between the demand for a package deal and the step-by-step approach. India did achieve some of its goals, i.e. changes in the Ceasefire Line in Jammu and Kashmir, respect for the Line of Control resulting from the ceasefire on 17 December 1971, and a commitment to the non-use of force which bordered on a non-aggression pact. However, the terms of the agreement were not harsh for Pakistan and Bhutto could satisfy his people that the Simla Agreement offered peace with honour.

The Simla Agreement was a purely bilateral arrangement between Pakistan and India. Unlike the Tashkant Declaration of January 1966 which set the peace process in motion after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, no outside power was involved in any way in the negotiation process at Simla, ¹³ although the major powers and other countries counselled India and Pak-

istan for normalization of their relations. Some of them (i.e. the Soviet Union and Sri Lanka) did facilitate communication between India and Pakistan prior to the holding of the official level talks in April. There were suggestions that Indo-Pakistan talks should be held outside South Asia. Other suggestions named Colombo (Sri Lanka) and Moscow as possible venues for the talks but India turned down such proposals. ¹⁴ Pakistan went along with the Indian suggestion of holding their talks in India or Pakistan.

Declaring their determination to put an end to 'conflict and confrontation' in the region, Pakistan and India pledged in the Simla Agreement to work towards promoting a 'friendly and harmonious relationship'. Several measures were suggested to achieve this goal, including the conduct of interaction on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations; respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; peaceful co-existence; and an end to hostile propaganda against each other.

India's preference for dealing with the Pakistan-India disputes on the bilateral level was reflected in a provision whereby the two sides agreed to resolve their differences by 'peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them.' However, India and Pakistan gave divergent interpretations to this provision. The Indian leadership argued that the Indo-Pakistan problems, especially Kashmir, could not be raised on any level other than bilateral. Speaking on the Simla Agreement in the Lok Sabha, India's External Affairs Minister, Sardar Swaran Singh, argued that the Agreement had abandoned the idea of involving 'third parties or outside agencies' for resolving their disputes.¹⁵ Indira Gandhi maintained that they had 'agreed to bilateralism' for dealing with all questions.16 This viewpoint was not shared by the Pakistani leadership which maintained that if the bilateral approach did not resolve a problem, Pakistan could take it up at a multilateral forum, including the United Nations or any other international organization. Addressing the National Assembly on the Simla Agreement, Bhutto declared: 'If our bilateral negotiations fail, there is nothing to stop us from the processes of the United Nations.'17

India was favourably disposed towards signing a no-war declaration but Pakistan was not prepared to make such a commitment. The Agreement adopted the 'middle of the road' approach. It provided that as long as any problem was not resolved, neither side would 'unilaterally alter the situation', and that 'in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations', they would avoid the 'threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other'. Thus, India obtained what was quite close to a no-war declaration, and Pakistan could argue that this clause was

operative within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations which recognized the right of self defence.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir was mentioned at two places in the Simla Agreement. Clause 6 suggested that the representatives of Pakistan and India would meet in the future to discuss, *inter alia*, 'a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir'. A more significant arrangement was outlined in Clause 4 (ii) which read:

In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease fire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line.

The Simla Agreement therefore allowed Pakistan and India to retain the territory they captured during the war across the CFL in Jammu and Kashmir. This went in favour of India because its territorial gains in Jammu and Kashmir were larger and more significant than those of Pakistan. India captured territory in Tithwal region and at Kargil, whereas Pakistan succeeded in penetrating the Indian-administered part of the valley mainly in Chhamb. The Line of Control which resulted from the ceasefire on 17 December 1971, replaced the CFL of 1949 as the dividing line between the two parts of Jammu and Kashmir. However, this was not an absolutely new dividing line because, with the exception of the areas where the two sides had made some territorial gains, it synchronized with the original CFL. The Line of Control was not accepted as an international border but the two sides agreed not to alter it unilaterally by threat or use of force. This amounted to a de facto acceptance of the status quo in the valley but the insertion of an exception-clause that the Agreement on the Line of Control did not change 'the recognized position of either side', made it possible for them to hold on to their official positions on this issue.

The Simla Agreement also provided that Pakistan and India would progressively normalize their relations by taking a number of steps which included (i) the resumption of communication – postal, telegraphic, sea, land, air and overflights; (ii) promotion of travel facilities; (iii) resumption of trade and economic cooperation; (iv) exchanges in the fields of science and culture; and (v) the revival of diplomatic relations. It was also provided that the troops of Pakistan and India would be withdrawn to their sides of the international border within 30 days from the date of the Agreement became effective, following the exchange of Instruments of Ratification between the two governments. So far as the repatriation of the POWs and

civilian internees was concerned, the Agreement did not put forward any specific formula. It merely suggested that the representatives of Pakistan and India would meet 'to discuss further modalities and arrangements' for the repatriation of POWs and civilian internees.

The Withdrawal of Troops

Senior military commanders of the two countries were assigned the tasks of settling the modalities of troop withdrawals and the demarcation of the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. The dialogue on these issues, resumed on 10 August 1972, soon ran into difficulties due to a number of differences in their perspectives which left no choice but to extend the original deadline of 30 days. It was not until the first week of December that their differences were resolved and they withdrew their troops by 20 December, after a delay of about three and a half months.

A number of factors contributed to this delay. First, a major Indian goal during this period was to secure the recognition of Bangladesh from Pakistan. As Pakistan was unwilling to do this while the issue of the POWs was not resolved, India pursued the negotiations rather slowly so as to keep Pakistan under pressure. A delay in the withdrawal of troops did not cause much problem to India because it had lost approximately 69 sq. miles of its territory to Pakistan. However, Pakistan had lost over five thousand square miles of its territory which displaced thousands of people from their homes. They could not be rehabilitated without the withdrawal of Indian troops and the return of territory.

Second, the actual demarcation of the Line of Control in Kashmir was a cumbersome process as it involved on-the-spot joint inspection and a survey of the proposed Line of Control. At places, it passed through very difficult terrain. The problem of demarcation could be appreciated from the fact that the northern areas were so snow-bound in November-December that the demarcation of the Line of Control in this region had to be post-poned.¹⁸

Third, Pakistan and India developed differences on the issue of linkage between the demarcation of the Line of Control in Kashmir and the withdrawal of troops on the international border. Once the two sides made conflicting territorial claims which held up the demarcation of the Line of Control in Kashmir, India declared that the withdrawal of troops on the international border could not take place as long as there was no agreement on the Line of Control. Indira Gandhi categorically stated that Indian troops would not be withdrawn from Pakistani territory 'before arriving at a decision on the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir'. ¹⁹ Pakistan main-

tained that the demarcation of the Line of Control and the withdrawal of troops on the international frontiers were two separate issues and these could not be linked together. Addressing the 27th session of the UN General Assembly in October 1972, the leader of the Pakistan delegation, Raja Tridev Roy, said that the view that the troops' withdrawal was 'in any manner conditional on the prior delineation of the Line of Control in Kashmir [was] not warranted by the letter and spirit of the Simla [Agreement]'.²⁰

The divergence in their perspectives cropped up soon after the signing of the Simla Agreement. In his first statement on the Agreement in the Lok Sabha, Swaran Singh categorically stated that withdrawal on the international border and the delineation of the Line of Control in Kashmir would have to be undertaken 'simultaneously'.²¹ But the Pakistani point of view, as presented by Bhutto in his address to the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, stressed the absence of any linkage between the two.²² However, they did not play up the non-congruence in their interpretations nor sought any clarification from each other.

The Pakistan-India talks on the withdrawal of troops were spread over four months, August-December 1972. Most of the work was completed in nine rounds of talks at senior commanders' level, held alternatively at the border posts of Suchitgarh (India) and Wagah (Pakistan). The contentious issues were referred to the Chiefs of Army Staff of Pakistan and India who met twice at Lahore in November and December.

The first round of talks between the senior commanders (Lt.-Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan of Pakistan and Lt.-Gen. P. S. Bhagat of India) held on 10-12 August 1972, produced an agreement to direct sector commanders to complete demarcation of the Line of Control in Kashmir within 15-20 days. However, some differences began to surface on the demarcation of the Line of Control in the course of the second and third rounds of the talks, and by the time the fourth round was concluded in mid-September, the talks were partly deadlocked. The main dispute pertained to the status of Thako Chak. India maintained that Thako Chak was on the international boundary, running south from Jammu towards the Punjab, and, therefore, Pakistan must withdraw its troops from this small strip of territory. Pakistan asserted that Thako Chak was situated in Kashmir and that it should be covered by the new Line of Control, which meant that Pakistan was not bound to vacate this area. As the senior commanders could not settle the problem, it was referred to Generals Tikka Khan (Pakistan) and Sam Manekshaw (India), who held two rounds of talks in November and December and resolved the problem. Pakistan agreed to accept India's interpretation regarding the location of Thako Chak, and India accommodated Pakistani claims on some

small pockets of territory on the Indian side of the CFL, thereby facilitating the delineation of the Line of Control on the basis of the positions of troops of the two countries in Kashmir on 17 December 1971, when the ceasefire was enforced.

The delineation of the Line of Control enabled India to gain 341 sq. miles of territory on the Pakistani side of the now defunct CFL. Out of this, 324 sq. miles of territory was situated in the extremely high altitude mountainous terrain of northern areas of Kashmir. Pakistan secured 65 sq. miles of territory on the Indian side of the now defunct CFL. Most Pakistani territorial gains were in the Chhamb areas.²⁴

Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees

The most intractable issue arising out of the 1971 war pertained to the repatriation of prisoners of war (POWs) and civilian internees. The unnecessary delay in their repatriation reinforced the already existing resentment against India in Pakistan and it adversely affected efforts to bring about an early normalization of relations between India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.

The exact number of Pakistani military and paramilitary personnel and civilians who surrendered in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in December 1971, is not known. The government of India declared in March 1972 that 74 615 Pakistani POWs were in India's custody.²⁵ It seemed that this figure did not include civilians. Six weeks later, Jagjivan Ram, Defence Minister, told the Lok Sabha that 91 634 Pakistanis surrendered in the eastern sector and were kept in 50 camps in 14 locations in India.²⁶ The most often quoted figure in Pakistan ranged from 91 to 93 thousand; at times, the term 'over ninety-thousand' was used. The government of Pakistan never disclosed their exact number even after the completion of their repatriation.

Pakistan and India also captured each other's military and paramilitary personnel in the western sector, i.e. the West Pakistan-India border and the CFL in Kashmir. Their repatriation did not cause any problems. At first, they exchanged seriously wounded and sick personnel.²⁷ In December 1972, Pakistan repatriated 617 POWs to India and got back 542 Pakistani POWs.

Additionally, two other categories of people sought repatriation. First, the Bengali military personnel and civil servants posted in West Pakistan and their families, numbering about 122 000, wanted to return to Bangladesh. Second, most non-Bengalis living in East Pakistan (described as Biharis) wanted to be repatriated to Pakistan. As they had invariably supported Pakistan during the civil strife, the Bengalis targeted them for re-

venge after the establishment of Bangladesh: they lost their immovable assets and means of subsistence, and were shifted into camps.

Their repatriation was complicted by an Indo-Bangladesh threat to put some of Pakistani POWs on trial. The issue was first raised by India within a fortnight of the surrender of Pakistani troops when it talked about the possibility of Bangladesh holding war trials.²⁸ Pakistan's reaction was swift and sharp. Its spokesman declared that any move to put Pakistani POWs on trial was a violation of the Geneva Convention and the UN Security Council resolution of 21 December 1971, and that it would hold India responsible for the protection of the POWs and civilian internees in its capacity as the 'occupying power'.²⁹ By March 1972, the positions of the two sides on the war trials issue hardened. Bangladesh, with India's encouragement, expressed its determination to go ahead with the trials. Initially, the Bangladesh government talked of putting 1500 persons on trial, but, later, it settled down with the figure of 195.30 Another disturbing development was the killing of Pakistani POWs in Indian camps by fire from India's security guards. Fifty-one POWs were killed in such incidents (1972: 37, 1973: 14);31 120 died due to sickness and other natural causes.32

India defended the right of Bangladesh to hold such trials,³³ and argued that as the Pakistani troops had surrendered to the joint command of India and Bangladesh, as they were shifted to India with the consent of Bangladesh to ensure their personal safety, and as they continued to be in their joint custody, India could not unilaterally release them.

Pakistan described the notion of joint Indo-Bangladesh command as a fiction and argued that the POWs were 'the exclusive responsibility of India' because Dhaka 'fell to the Indians as a result of an invasion by India, and not to the Mukti Bahini'.³⁴ If Pakistani troops had committed any excesses in what was then East Pakistan, Pakistan maintained, only Pakistan could investigate the complaints and take appropriate action against those found guilty. In September 1972, Pakistan did make an offer to set up a military tribunal to hold the trials of persons accused of resorting to excesses in East Pakistan, provided Bangladesh supplied a list of the accused persons and charges against them.³⁵ India and Bangladesh did not take this offer seriously.

Pakistan moved swiftly on the diplomatic front to mobilize support for the release of POWs. This issue was raised on all international and regional forums; Pakistan's diplomatic missions lobbied in their accredited countries and most of the good-will/diplomatic delegations sent abroad during this period talked about, *inter alia*, the agony of POWs in Indian detention. Pakistan also approached a number of friendly countries to seek their cooperation for resolving the POW problem. Subsequently, Pakistan filed

an appeal before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for restraining India from transferring Pakistani POWs to Bangladesh.

India and Bangladesh made a conciliatory gesture on the POWs issue in the Indo-Bangladesh Declaration issued on 17 April 1973 at the conclusion of the visit of Bangladesh's Foreign Minister, Dr Kamal Hossain, to New Delhi. The Declaration delinked POWs wanted by Bangladesh for trials from the rest of POWs by expressing willingness to repatriate the latter to Pakistan. In return, they wanted the repatriation of all Bengalis from Pakistan and non-Bengalis from Bangladesh. Additionally, Bangladesh insisted that it would not enter into a dialogue with Pakistan on these issues 'except on the basis of sovereign equality'.³⁶

Pakistan extended a cautious welcome to the Declaration and suggested that the representatives of India and Pakistan should meet to discuss its implications. It also repeated the offer to set up 'a judicial tribunal of such character and composition as [would] inspire international confidence to try persons charged with the alleged war crimes'.³⁷

Two rounds of talks were held at Islamabad (July 1973) and New Delhi (August 1973)³⁸ which produced a formula for the resolution of the hitherto intractable POW problem and other humanitarian issues concerning Bengalis and non-Bengalis stranded in Pakistan and Bangladesh respectively. The agreement, known as the Delhi Accord, 1973, provided that, with the exception of 195 POWs required by Bangladesh for war trials, all POWs and civilian internees would be repatriated simultaneously with the repatriation of all Bengalis stranded in Pakistan to Bangladesh and 'a substantial number' of non-Bengalis (Biharis) from Bangladesh to Pakistan. They also agreed that the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and Bangladesh or their representatives would later meet to decide the additional number of non-Bengalis who could be repatriated to Pakistan.

As far as the 195 POWs were concerned, the agreement provided that they would neither be handed over to Bangladesh nor put on trial during the entire period of repatriation. The representatives of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh would meet at an appropriate time to 'settle the question of 195 Prisoners of war'. However, Bangladesh made it clear that it would not enter into any direct dialogue with Pakistan except 'on the basis of sovereign equality'. Representatives of its Swiss government and any international humanitarian organization associated with the repatriation process were to be given 'unrestricted access at all times to Bengalis in Pakistan and to Pakistanis (non-Bengalis, Biharis) in Bangladesh'.

The three-way repatriation which began on 19 September 1973 under United Nations supervision, was a major diplomatic breakthrough in South Asia. Several factors contributed to the compromise on the POW tangle.

First, despite India's spirited defence of its policies, the delay in the repatriation of POWs was an embarrassment for India. Pakistan was able to evoke a widespread sympathy at the international level for its case and India often found itself on the defensive. The continued detention of POWs was also an economic burden for India. By the end of January 1974, the cost of their maintenance in detention camps had cost Indian Rs 320 million.³⁹ Thus, their continued detention turned out to be a financial and diplomatic liability for India.

Second, Pakistan made it absolutely clear that it would not extend recognition to Bangladesh as long as it insisted on war trials. Third, Bangladesh realized that its desire to become an active participant in the international system could not materialize without settling the POW problem. The Chinese veto in the UN Security Council on Bangladesh's application for admission to the world body, and the passing of two inter-related resolutions on this issue by the UN General Assembly in 1972 made it abundantly clear to Bangladesh that the stalemate on the POWs would adversely affect its role at international level. Moreover, a number of Muslim states, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey and Libya had withheld their recognition pending a political settlement between Pakistan and Bangladesh. Other Muslim states were urging Pakistan and Bangladesh for a political settlement.

Fourth, Bangladesh had gained sufficient confidence by the summer of 1973. A new constitution (1972) was enforced and the general elections, held in March 1973, confirmed the overwhelming support enjoyed by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and his party, the Awami League. This made it possible for the government to work towards a political settlement with Pakistan. Fifth, there was a widespread sympathy in Bangladesh for the Bengalis stranded in Pakistan and the leaders of public opinion were urging the government to bring them home at the earliest opportunity. This pressure increased after Pakistan threatened to put some of them on trial as a retaliation against the proposed war trials by Bangladesh. Moreover, Bangladesh wanted to get rid of as many non-Bengalis/Biharis as possible which could not be done as long as the POW issue was not settled.

The 195 Pakistani POWs not covered by the Delhi Accord did not cause much problem. Pakistan extended recognition to Bangladesh in February 1974 on the eve of the second Islamic Summit Conference, held at Lahore, thereby making it possible for Sheikh Mujibur Rehman to come to Lahore as head of the Bangladesh delegation. 40 On 9 April, the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh signed an agreement (Tripartite Agreement) in New Delhi which provided for the repatriation of the 195 POWs charged with war crimes by Bangladesh along with other Pakistani POWs.

The three-way repatriation was completed on 30 April, when all Pakistani POWs (excluding those reported missing) returned to Pakistan. The Bengalis stranded in Pakistan (numbering approximately 122 000) were sent back to Bangladesh. Over 119 000 non-Bengalis (Biharis) were airlifted from Dhaka and Khatmandu (Nepal) to Pakistan. This massive movement of people was undertaken under the supervision of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and several countries provided funds to cover the cost of their transportation.

The problem of Biharis in Bangladesh was not completely resolved, although Pakistan continued to accept them even after the winding up of the UNHCR-supervised repatriation. The government of Pakistan maintained from the beginning that it could not accept all Biharis; it accommodated three categories: those who were domiciled in the Former West Pakistan and their families; the employees of the federal government and their families; and the members of the divided families. The tripartite agreement (1974) provided that Pakistan would be prepared to review the cases of those Biharis who provided new information, entitling them to fall into the specified categories for repatriation.⁴¹ A good number of them were also allowed to come to Pakistan as hardship cases. By 1982, Pakistan had received 169 000 Biharis.⁴² Besides, some of them were quietly allowed to come to Pakistan in the eighties. A small number of them either came to Pakistan on a visit but did not return or they entered illegally.

No exact figures were available as to how many Biharis were still living in sub-human conditions in camps in Bangladesh. The unofficial sources claimed as of early 1989 that approximately 250 000 Biharis were still waiting for their repatriation to Pakistan.

Recognition of Bangladesh

Pakistan was not in favour of extending recognition to Bangladesh soon after its establishment. Its policy of withholding recognition was shaped by the fact that the Indian troops were still stationed in Bangladesh and that the resolution on ceasefire approved by the UN Security Council on 21 December 1971, was not yet implemented – withdrawal of troops and repatriation of POWs. It also argued that other states should hold back their recognition to give time to Pakistan to enter into a dialogue with the Bangladesh leadership. As a gesture of goodwill, Pakistan released Sheikh Mujibur Rehman on 8 January 1972, who had been in Pakistan's detention since March 1971. However, this did not help much and Bangladesh insisted on recognition as a pre-condition for any dialogue. India endorsed this point

of view and argued that the acceptance of the 'reality' of Bangladesh by Pakistan would be conducive to removing tension in the region.

Pakistan reacted sharply against the countries which recognized Bangladesh in January 1972.⁴³ Describing this as an unfriendly act, it severed diplomatic ties with some of them, i.e. Poland, Mongolia, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Cyprus.⁴⁴ When Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand recognized Bangladesh, Pakistan retaliated by withdrawing from the Commonwealth.⁴⁵

By the time the Simla Agreement was signed between India and Pakistan, Bhutto had come to the conclusion that Pakistan would soon have to recognize Bangladesh. However, two factors delayed the decision. First, a number of political groups on the right of the political spectrum in Pakistan opposed the recognition of Bangladesh. Second, the delay in the repatriation of Pakistani POWs and especially Bangladesh's threat of war trials made it difficult for Pakistan to extend recognition. Pakistan's policy of not recognizing Bangladesh before all POWs were released unconditionally was strengthened when Bangladesh's bid to join the UN was foiled by China's first veto in the Security Council in August 1972. China did so in consultation with Pakistan.⁴⁶ Pakistan was not 'irrevocably' opposed to Bangladesh's membership of the UN but it argued that Bangladesh's application should be taken up when the conditions laid down in the Security Council resolution of 21 December 1971 had been fully realized, that is, the POWs were released and repatriated to Pakistan.⁴⁷

When Bangladesh's admission issue was raised in the UN General Assembly, an intense lobbying by interested members produced an agreement that the General Assembly would approve two interdependent resolutions. The first resolution expressed the desire that Bangladesh would be admitted to the UN at 'an early date'. ⁴⁸ The second resolution urged the parties concerned to adopt all possible measures' in a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect' to settle the pending issues and take steps 'for the return of the prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1949 and the relevant provisions of the Security Council resolution 307 (1971)'. ⁴⁹

In order to strengthen its position on the recognition issue in the domestic context as well as in its interaction with India and Bangladesh, the government of Pakistan approached the Supreme Court for its opinion on this issue. The Supreme Court in its unanimous advisory opinion, ruled in July 1973 that Pakistan's National Assembly was competent to adopt a resolution authorizing the government to accord recognition to Bangladesh 'at a time when, in the judgement of the government, such recognition would be in best national interest'. Subsequently, a government-

sponsored resolution on these lines was approved by the National Assembly on recognition of Bangladesh. It emphasized the release and repatriation of the POWs and civilian internees 'without any further delay' as a prerequisite for normalization of relations.⁵¹

The Muslim countries sympathized with Pakistan on the post–1971 war problems, especially the POWs issue. The Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Hasan-al-Tohemy, was actively engaged in talks with the leaders of Bangladesh on war trials. It was during his visit to Bangladesh in February 1974 that Bangladesh leaders indicated their willingness to drop the trials of 195 POWs in return for recognition. From Dhaka, Tohemy flew to Islamabad, and, after seeking Pakistan's blessings, a seven member OIC delegation comprising the Foreign Ministers of Kuwait, Lebanon and Somalia, the representatives of Algeria, Senegal, the PLO and the Secretary General of the OIC, was sent to Dhaka to invite Sheikh Mujibur Rehman to participate in the OIC Summit Conference which was due to begin in Lahore in a day's time. In the meanwhile, Pakistan announced on 22 February its decision to extend recognition to Bangladesh. On 23 February, Mujibur Rehman arrived in Lahore as head of the Bangladesh delegation to the OIC Summit Conference.

Other Steps for Normalization of Relations

The settlement of the war trials issue created enough goodwill between Pakistan and India to enable them to initiate several other measures for the normalization of their ties. This process was initiated on the eve of the tripartite conference in April 1974, when Pakistan and India also signed a bilateral agreement on normalization of their relations. They decided to open negotiations for resuming postal and telecommunication links, and for restoring travel facilities, especially for visits to the shrines in the two countries. They also agreed to make efforts to locate the missing military and paramilitary personnel as well as to release and repatriate the nationals of either country detained prior to the 1971 war.⁵²

The follow-up talks, scheduled for June 1974, were called off by Pakistan as a protest against India's nuclear explosion on 18 May 1974, described by India as a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE). Pakistan, which felt threatened by the explosion, argued that 'the atmosphere [had] become unfavourable for a successful outcome [of the talks]... in the wake of the Indian nuclear test.'53 This revived tension in their relations, and Bhutto's assertion that India was embarking on a 'grand design' to 'intimidate' Pakistan⁵⁴ led to acrimonious exchanges between the two countries. India

maintained that Pakistan had over-reacted to its PNE which was undertaken to 'promote scientific and technical advancement'.

The leaders of India and Pakistan soon realized that they would not be able to resolve their bilateral problems if they went on trading charges and counter charges. An exchange of letters between the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries on this subject in July-August 1974 revived the negotiation process. ⁵⁵ A meeting of the senior officials in September 1974 produced an agreement to resume postal and telecommunication links. They also agreed to grant group visas for visits to religious shrines in either country. ⁵⁶ It was not until mid-October that postal and telecommunication links were actually revived. A telex link was established in November. Subsequently, the scope of postal and telecommunication facilities was extended and in 1985, direct dialing was introduced between India and Pakistan.

A protocol signed in New Delhi on 30 November 1974 lifted the embargo on bilateral trade, imposed in 1965 at the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan war, although a very limited trading activity was carried on in the post-war period which tapered off by 1971. The trade protocol provided that the trade ban would be lifted from 7 December and that they would extend the 'most favoured nation treatment' to each other in accordance with the provisions and decisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Specifying seven commodities⁵⁷ for immediate trading, they decided to undertake this on a government to government basis.⁵⁸ A fully-fledged trade agreement was signed in January 1975;⁵⁹ they also signed a protocol on resumption of shipping services. In July 1976, the private sector was allowed to engage in trade through the government controlled trade agencies.

Railway service between the two countries across the Wagah–Attari border was resumed in July 1976, which re-established the railway link between Lahore and Amritsar after a gap of 11 years. Air links and overflights were restored in July 1976. Diplomatic relations were also revived during the same month.

The reciprocal visits of their Foreign Ministers (Atal Behari Vajpayee: February 1978; Agha Shahi: April 1978) resolved the dispute over India's decision to construct Salal hydroelectric dam near Riasi on the River Chenab in Indian-administered Kashmir. They agreed on the specifications of the dam relating to its full pondage, dead storage level and capacity, immovable crest level of the spillway, number and height of the spillway gates, and outlet work. India accepted the conditions that it would not make any change in the specifications except with mutual agreement.

THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM

Pakistan and India diverged in their response to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, which had ramifications for their bilateral relations. Soon after the induction of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, Pakistan approached India in order to explore the prospect of adopting a joint posture on Afghanistan. But, as the Indian government was passing through a transitional period of general elections, its Foreign Secretary expressed his inability to visit Pakistan until the last week of January. ⁶¹ Pakistan could not wait so long for consultations and, by mid-January, the two governments adopted divergent positions on the Afghanistan crisis.

The Congress (I) government headed by Indira Gandhi, which replaced the Janata government after winning the general elections in January 1980, was sympathetic towards the Soviet perspective on Afghanistan. Declaring that India was opposed to interference and intervention in any country's internal affairs, its leadership projected Soviet military intervention as benign and charitable: an act undertaken on the request of the Afghan government in order to counter the US, Chinese and Pakistani active support to groups opposed to the Kabul regime. It joined the pro-Soviet states like Cuba and Vietnam in deflecting criticism of Soviet action in the major international forums.⁶²

What perturbed India most was the decision of the United States to bolster Pakistan's security. This was viewed by India as a more disturbing development than Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Therefore, the major thrust of its Afghanistan policy was on dissuading Pakistan and the United States from reviving their security ties.

Pakistan and India discussed their differences on Afghanistan on four occasions in 1980: the visits of India's Foreign Secretary, R.D. Sathe, and India's Special Envoy and a former Foreign Minister, Sardar Swarn Singh, to Pakistan in February and April respectively; a brief meeting between Zia-ul-Haq and Indira Gandhi in Salisbury, Zimbabwe, in April, where they participated in Zimbabwe's independence celebrations; and Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi's visit to India in July. However, they were unable to harmonize their perspectives. Another unsuccessful bid to reduce their differences on Afghanistan was made when India's Minister for External Affairs, Narisimha Rao, visited Pakistan in June 1981. He reaffirmed India's desire to continue with the process of normalization of relations and the joint communiqué acknowledged each other's sovereign right to acquire arms for self defence. But, they diverged on what constituted legitimate self-defence.⁶³

NO-WAR PACT/TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP

India advanced several arguments against the US arms supply to Pakistan. First, it exposed South Asia to superpower rivalry and converted the region into a 'theatre of great power confrontation and conflict.'64 Second, this would make it difficult for the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. Third, these weapons would make Pakistan very adamant in its interaction with India and it would be less inclined to find peaceful solutions of its problems with India. Fourth, it constituted a security threat to India because Pakistan could use its enhanced military potential either to invade India or to extend active covert support to dissident groups in the bordering Indian states of Punjab and Kashmir. An Indian analyst claimed that whenever 'Pakistan was excessively armed, on whatever pretext, India had to bear the brunt and face a war with that country'.65 Fifth, the USsupplied weapons were beyond the legitimate security needs of Pakistan and, as their use could not be restricted to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, Pakistan would deploy these on the Pakistan-India border, thereby forcing India to spend more on defence. An American decision to supply F-16 aircraft to Pakistan was bitterly criticized by the Indian leaders who felt that this 'would tilt the delicately poised balance in the region in favour of Pakistan'.66 Similarly, the supply of Harpoon missiles was described as a 'new threat' to India.⁶⁷ Commenting on these arms supplies to Pakistan, Indira Gandhi said, 'I am told we cannot possibly object to America giving Pakistan what it is in need of, but we feel [that] they are being armed to an extent which is well beyond their need.'68

In order to neutralize India's objections to arms procurements, Pakistan offered negotiations on fixing a mutually acceptable level of their armed forces. This proposal was made first to the Janata government but it showed no interest. It was repeated to Sardar Swarn Singh who visited Pakistan as India's Special Envoy in April 1980. Zia-ul-Haq proposed that the military experts of the two countries should make a joint and comparative study of their military strength and then suggest if any reduction in their troop strength and equipment was needed.⁶⁹ This issue was again taken up when Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi, visited India in July 1980. He proposed that India and Pakistan should explore the prospects of evolving a mutually acceptable formula for adjustment of the level of their military forces. The Pakistani leadership repeated this offer on a couple of other occasions. However, India brushed aside these proposals by arguing that Pakistan and India should first build mutual trust and confidence.⁷⁰

Pakistan made another attempt to overcome India's objections to its decision to obtain weapons from the United States by offering to sign a no-war pact with India. While accepting America's offer of economic assistance and military sales on 15 September 1981, Pakistan reaffirmed its resolve to continue to work towards developing a relationship of mutual trust and confidence with India and offered to negotiate 'mutual guarantee of non-aggression and non-use of force'. The concluding section of the Pakistani statement read:

If India is inclined to banish its unfounded fears and is ready to grasp the hand of friendship which we extend, it shall not find us wanting in establishing good-neighbourly relations.

On our part, we are prepared to enter into immediate consultations with India for the purpose of exchanging mutual guarantee of non-aggression and non-use of force in the spirit of the Simla Agreement.⁷²

A month later, Pakistan's Foreign Minister repeated the non-aggression/ no-war pact offer which was formally communicated to India on 22 November 1981.⁷³

Pakistan's offer took the Indian leaders by surprise because, given Pakistan's aversion to a no-war pact in the past, they did not expect Pakistan to make such a move. They doubted the genuineness of Pakistan's proposal and argued that Pakistan's efforts to obtain weapons from the US betrayed its proposal. India's Minister for External Affairs attempted to side-track the Pakistani proposal by suggesting that India adhered to its 1949 offer of a no-war pact with Pakistan with 'no exceptions, no conditions and no variations'. A comprehensive response was handed over to Pakistan by India's ambassador to Pakistan, Netwar Singh, towards the end of December 1981, which laid down certain conditions for any meaningful negotiations on Pakistan's offer. These included, *inter alia*, a solution of the problem caused by Pakistan's procurement of sophisticated weapons, confinement of the Kashmir issue to the bilateral level, and no offer of bases to any foreign power.

These exchanges served as the basis of the first bilateral dialogue on Pakistan's no-war offer in the last week of January 1982, when Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi, visited New Delhi. There were two significant developments during Shahi's visit. First, India's Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, proposed the establishment of a permanent joint commission to review and promote their bilateral relations. Pakistan accepted this proposal in principle. Second, while talking to Pakistani newspaper correspondents accompanying Shahi, Indira Gandhi offered to sign a treaty of friendship with Pakistan.⁷⁶

Pakistan's offer of a no-war pact had limited scope as it proposed a renunciation of the use of force in settling their disputes. India's proposed treaty of friendship denied Pakistan the right to raise any bilateral problem at the international forum. It was suggested that no third party offices could be employed for the resolution of their problems. India also insisted on the inclusion of an article in the treaty disallowing the signatories from granting military bases to any foreign power. These suggestions were not acceptable to Pakistan. First, it did not want to surrender its right to invoke other internationally recognized methods of solving problems if there was a deadlock at the bilateral level. Secondly, the Indian proposal did not emphasize the non-violability of several well-established principles of international conduct, i.e. non-intervention and non-interference in internal affairs, sovereign equality of the states; and not seeking hegemony over others. Thirdly, Pakistan was not favourably disposed towards the stipulation denying the right to the signatories to grant foreign bases. It argued that such a decision should be made by a state as 'a voluntary act in the exercise of a sovereign right.'77 Pakistan was also not in favour of liberal exchanges in the field of culture.

Though India and Pakistan acknowledged the spirit underlying the two draft proposals they could not evolve a mutually acceptable text of a single treaty incorporating their main principles. In 1985, Rajiv Gandhi categorically declared that the Pakistani proposal of a no-war pact was not acceptable to India,⁷⁸ which stalemated the talks. Zia-ul-Haq's death in August 1988, and the statement of Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in December 1988 that her government was not interested in the no-war pact,⁷⁹ shelved the issue, at least for the time being.

HOT AND COLD DIPLOMACY

The rapprochment which characterized Pakistan-India relations during 1982 and the early part of 1983 began to unravel in August–September 1983, when the top Indian leaders issued statements sympathizing in a rather blunt manner with opposition agitation in Pakistan. Unless they had come to the erroneous conclusion that the government of Zia-ul-Haq was about to collapse, the statements were incomprehensible. On 26 August, Indira Gandhi expressed her regrets about the efforts of the Pakistan government to suppress the agitation launched by the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), a nine party opposition coalition dominated by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). She also expressed concern over the 'torture' of Mrs Nusrat Bhutto by the military regime and demanded the release of

Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan.⁸⁰ These views were orchestrated by India's Minister for External Affairs. Narasimha Rao, and India's ambassador to Pakistan, K. D. Sharma. The latter declared that the Indian leadership had simply conveyed the sentiments of the Indian people on developments in Pakistan and that if the rights of the people were violated in the neighbouring country, India could neither stay quiet nor turn a blind eye towards such developments.⁸¹

The Congress Party organized anti-Pakistan rallies in New Delhi in October, and a Congress-sponsored World Sindhi Congress was inaugurated by Indira Gandhi during the same month. As the World Sindhi Congress was held against the backdrop of anti-government agitation in the Pakistani province of Sind, and the general tenor of the Congress was sympathetic towards the dissident groups in Pakistan, the government of Pakistan interpreted these actions as India's interference in Pakistan's internal affairs, ⁸² and made several formal protests to India. The government-owned daily *Pakistan Times* organized a well-publicized symposium in Lahore on the subject of 'Indian Policy of interference in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries'. India was subjected to harsh criticism in the symposium and the participants urged the government to expose India's 'evil designs and machinations'⁸³ to the international community.

The drift in their relations was accelerated by several other developments: India's objection to the dinner hosted by Zia-ul-Haq for the Islamabad-based diplomats at Gilgit (November 1983); India's charge that the Pakistani authorities had kidnapped two domestic servants of an Indian diplomat in Islamabad but they were found to be in New Delhi after a couple of days (January 1984); reciprocal expulsion of airline employees based in Lahore and New Delhi (February 1984); public reaction in Pakistan to the hanging of Maqbool Butt, a Kashmiri leader, in India (February 1984); and the postponement of India's Information Minister's visit to Pakistan (February 1984).

The foreign secretaries of Pakistan and India met briefly in February at Udaipur while participating in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) meeting, but it was not until the May meeting of the two Foreign Secretaries at Islamabad that an attempt was made to retrieve the dialogue.⁸⁴ They signed a protocol on group travel, and three important visits were scheduled; India's Information Minister, H.K.L. Bhaghat's once postponed visit to Pakistan, 7–11 July; Pakistan's Foreign Secretary's visit to India, 18–21 July; and the 2nd meeting of the Pakistan-India Joint Commission at New Delhi in the first half of August.

However, only Bhaghat's visit could materialize because a new crisis erupted when, after dislodging militant Sikhs from the Golden Temple,

Amritsar, through military action, India accused Pakistan of active involvement in the Sikh movement. There were polemical exchanges between the two governments, and they engaged in troop movement in September–October 1984, coupled with news through Western sources that India was planning to launch an air-attack on Pakistan's nuclear installations. The consequent escalation of tension generated fears in Pakistan that if something was not done to reverse these negative trends, the two countries might be plunged into another armed conflict. While the two governments were still not sure about a course of action for defusing tension, the assassination of Indira Gandhi on 31 October 1984 halted the escalation process. Zia-ul-Haq participated in the funeral and assured India's new Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, of 'full support of the government of Pakistan in efforts to build a relationship of trust and confidence' between the two countries.

It was after an informal meeting between the Foreign Secretaries of the two countries on the eve of the SAARC meeting at Male, the Maldives, in February 1985; a brief meeting between Zia-ul-Haq and Rajiv Gandhi in March 1985 at Moscow while they attended the funeral of the Soviet leader Chernenko; and a detailed meeting between the two Foreign Secretaries at Islamabad in April 1985, that the bilateral dialogue was revived. The joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the April talks reiterated the desire of the two sides to forge a peaceful and cooperative relationship on the basis of the principles enunciated in the Simla Agreement. They also agreed to adopt various measures to 'diversify and strengthen' cooperation in various fields as well as 'to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence, harmony and trust'.87

These positive sentiments were reinforced by the Pakistan Foreign Minister's two visits to India, in April 1985, to participate in the NAM ministerial meeting, and in July 1985, for the 2nd meeting of the Joint Commission. Zia-ul-Haq and Rajiv Gandhi met four times during October–December 1985: October: New York; November: Muscat, Oman; December: Dhaka and New Delhi. The last of these meetings – a stopover in New Delhi on Zia-ul-Haq's way back from the Maldives – proved most fruitful, although it was kept as a low key affair with the Pakistani President being neither received nor seen-off at the airport by India's President – a courtesy normally extended to visiting heads of state. Zia-ul-Haq and Rajiv Gandhi agreed in principle for the expansion of trade and economic relations, and decided to reopen dialogue on the contentious political issues. They also made a verbal commitment not to attack each other's nuclear installations.

As a follow-up to the Zia-Rajiv parleys, a number of positive developments took place in January-February 1986 which included five high-level meetings: Finance Ministers 8–10 January; Defence Secretaries 11–12

January; Foreign Secretaries 17–19 January; two Subcommissions (Nos. 3 and 4) of the Joint Commission 2–5 February. An agreement was signed to open telephone circuits between Lucknow and Lahore, Delhi and Islamabad, and Delhi and Lahore. They also agreed to resume negotiations for the reopening of the Khokhrapar–Munabao route (Sind-Rajasthan).

The finance ministers' meeting produced an agreement in principle to allow the private sector to trade in 42 items. The two sides agreed to strengthen telecommunications, telex, air links and shipping arrangements. The defence secretaries discussed the Siachen Glacier issue and the related matters. The foreign secretaries exchanged views on the no-war pact and the treaty of friendship, text of the treaty for not attacking each other's nuclear installations, and the overall framework of their relations.⁸⁸

Despite these positive developments, they continued to diverge on a number of issues. Pakistan's acquisition of weapons from the United States perturbed India most. Another major irritant was Pakistan's alleged role in the Sikh agitation in East Punjab (Indian Punjab). India accused Pakistan of providing weapons and training to the Sikh militants, and also that it facilitated their links with the pro-Khalistan Sikhs living in North America and Europe. These charges were made with greater persistence after the militant Sikhs, led by Sant Bhindaranwala were dislodged from the Golden Temple, Amritsar, through a military action in June 1984. Subsequently, every new spurt of violence in the Punjab brought fresh Indian charges of Pakistan's involvement. The hijacking of two Indian aircraft by Sikh extremists to Lahore in July and August 1984 also adversely affected their relations. The July hijacking was brought to a quick end by the intervention of the Pakistani authorities. But the second hijacking gave India a cause for irritation when the hijacked aircraft was allowed to take off to another destination. India alleged that the Pakistani authorities supplied weapons to the hijackers.89

The incidence of scuffles between the diplomats/officials of India's Islamabad embassy and the visiting Sikh pilgrims at their holy places in Pakistan led to angry exchanges between Pakistan and India. A group of visiting Canadian Sikhs assaulted an Indian official in a Sikh shrine in Lahore in November 1984. A similar incident took place one year later (November 1985) at Nankana Saheb which evoked a strong Indian protest. It was after the third incident at Nankana Saheb in June 1986 that India devised a strategy to respond to such incidents: a Pakistani diplomat was beaten up by some unidentified persons in New Delhi. Another incident, involving Sikh pilgrims and an Indian diplomat, took place in November 1986 when the former would not let the latter address their meeting and

raised anti-India and pro-Khalistan slogans. Indian response came within a couple of days when a group of Indian youths forcibly entered the Pakistan pavilion at the World Trade Fair in New Delhi and raised anti-Pakistan and anti-Khalistan slogans.⁹⁰

In February 1986, India suspended the bilateral dialogue declaring that it had obtained conclusive evidence of Pakistan's active support to the Sikhs agitating for Khalistan, and that as long as Pakistan pursued such a policy, India could not carry-on the bilateral talks. 91 Though there was nothing new in these charges they were made in a very harsh tone because, given the deterioration of the situation in the Punjab following the failure to implement the Rajiv-Longowal Agreement in January 1986, the government of India wanted to deflect pressure and discredit the Sikhs by playing up the external factor. Moreover, India was also annoyed by Pakistan's expression of concern about anti-Muslim riots in India in June, July 1985, and February 1986, and described Pakistani statements as a 'blatant interference' in India's internal affairs.92 Another factor which influenced India's decision to suspend the on-going dialogue was its displeasure over Pakistan's criticism of India's assistance, including military training facilities, to the Kabul regime. 93 Subsequently, India got even with Pakistan by expressing resentment about the latter's provision of military training facilities to the Sri Lankan government in the backdrop of the escalating Tamil-Sinhala conflict in that country.94

A new row developed between India and Pakistan over the assault made by Pakistan's army personnel on the hijacked PAN AM aircraft in which had landed in Karachi in September 1986. As some of the passengers killed in the operation were of Indian origin, Rajiv Gandhi accused the Pakistani authorities of handling the situation in an extremely callous manner. The dust of this incident had hardly settled when another crisis erupted following Rajiv Gandhi's statement implicating Pakistan in an unsuccessful attempt on his life in October. A new dimension to the worsening Pakistan-India relations was added when, in November 1986, India embarked on a massive military exercise, code-named Brasstacks, along the Pakistan-India border in the Rajasthan and Punjab sectors. Interpreting this as India's convenient excuse to concentrate its troops on the border in a state of combat readiness, Pakistan placed its troops on alert and decided to undertake its own military exercises.

The situation took a turn for the worse when on 23 January 1987, India demanded that the Pakistani troops should be withdrawn to peace-time locations. This was followed by India's decision to seal its border in the Punjab sector. The Indian troops took up forward positions along the

Pakistan border and the Army and the Air Force were put on full alert. The concentration of troops and heavy armour was especially heavy in the Rajasthan-Sind sector, the soft underbelly of Pakistan.

Pakistan offered consultations for de-escalating the situation when Junejo had a telephonic conversation with his Indian counterpart, Rajiv Gandhi, ⁹⁷ followed by a contact between the director generals of military operations of the two countries. These contacts saved the situation from reaching the point of no return, and facilitated bilateral talks at foreign secretary level. Two rounds of talks between the foreign secretaries, held at New Delhi (31 January–4 February) and Islamabad (27 February–2 March), ⁹⁸ produced two agreements for not attacking each other and that they would exercise restraint and avoid provocations along their borders. Though the controversial military exercises were not abandoned, they agreed to a phased withdrawal of their troops to peacetime positions.

India's decision to construct the Wuller lake dam on the river Jheulim in Kashmir was contested by Pakistan in 1985-6 on the grounds that its planned water-storage capacity violated the Indus Water Treaty. 99 In broad terms, this issue was similar to the Salal dam dispute which the two government settled in 1978. The Wuller lake dam issue was first taken up at the level of the Permanent Indus Commission, which decided in 1987 to refer the matter to the two governments for negotiations. Several rounds of talks were held over the next two-three years but the deadlock persisted. However, India suspended work on the project pending a settlement. Another problem pertained to the Siachen glacier in Ladkh-Kashmir. Situated at an altitude ranging from 17 000 to 21 000 feet, this mass of ice measures about 87 kilometers in length and five to ten kilometers in breadth. The climate and terrain are extremely inhospitable for human life and military operations or permanent military presence. Therefore, neither India nor Pakistan stationed its troops on the glacier. However, when in 1984 India moved its troops in a bid to control the entire region Pakistan responded by despatching its troops, thereby escalating tension in the area. As India had gained the upper hand by moving its troops first to the higher points. Pakistan could not dislodge them, resulting in human losses on both sides, not to mention the victims of frostbite and other hazards at such a high altitude. After some bickering over the conflicting claims and intermittent exchanges of fire between their troops in the area, the two governments decided to resolve the problem through negotiations. Their defence secretaries thoroughly discussed the problem in January and June 1986, May and September 1988, but they could not reconcile their differences.

The assumption of power by Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan was viewed in India as a positive development that would facilitate the improvement of

Pakistan-India relations. Rajiv Gandhi's first message to Benazir Bhutto was couched in polite terms and expressed his desire to work with her for ensuring 'peace, prosperity and a great and glorious future for both our countries'. Goodwill and cordiality marked Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Islamabad in the last week of December 1988 in connection with the 4th SAARC summit conference. He stayed on after the summit conference and had a detailed dialogue with his Pakistani counterpart which produced three agreements on non-attack on each other's nuclear facilities, avoidance of double taxation, and cultural cooperation. India also withdrew its objection to Pakistan's re-admission to the Commonwealth which made it possible for Pakistan to rejoin this body in September 1989.

The home secretaries of Pakistan and India agreed in May 1989 on a number of steps to contain terrorism, drug trafficking, smuggling and illegal border crossings, as a follow-up to their earlier meeting in 1988. The fifth round of the defence secretaries' talks on the Siachen issue, held in June, produced an agreement for evolving a comprehensive and peaceful settlement based on the redeployment of forces to the positions they held under the Simla Agreement, 1972, and avoidance of the use of force. ¹⁰² The task of determining the troop positions in 1972 was assigned to the army authorities of the two countries, subject to its final approval by the two governments. ¹⁰³ However, the army authorities showed little interest in an early completion of the assigned task.

These meetings were followed by Rajiv Gandhi's official visit to Islamabad in mid-July.¹⁰⁴ The two prime ministers reiterated their desire to promote friendship and cooperation so as to overcome 'historical inhibitions and doubts'. They agreed to a comprehensive settlement of the Siachen problem 'based on the redeployment of forces to reduce the chances of conflict and avoidance of the use of force.'¹⁰⁵ The visit facilitated the convening of the third meeting of the Joint Commission at Islamabad (earlier meetings were held in 1983 and 1985). The euphoria generated by Rajiv Gandhi's visit could not cover up the hard realities of Pakistan-India relations. The two prime ministers publicly disagreed on the nuclear issue and Kashmir. Similarly, India's complaint regarding Pakistan's involvement in the Sikh agitation and Pakistan's distrust of India's regional leadership persisted.

The change of government in India in December 1989 engendered new hope for further improvement in their relations as the new Janata Dal-United Front Prime Minister Viswanath Partap Singh, quickly distanced himself from his predecessor's hawkish policy towards the neighbouring states. However, he had hardly settled down in his new job when he was confronted with a powerful nationalist agitation in Indian-administered

Kashmir. As always, anti-India agitation in Indian-administered Kashmir evoked strong sympathy and support in Pakistan and the Pakistan-administered Kashmir (Azad Kashmir), where the Pakistanis and the powerful Kashmiri community took up their cause. Emotions ran high as violence intensified in Indian Kashmir and thousands of refugees poured into Pakistani Kashmir, bringing stories of brutalities and suppression by India's security forces. The government of Pakistan, which championed the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir, extended diplomatic support to their cause and raised the Kashmir issue, especially the use of brute force by India's security forces on the people of Kashmir, at international level. Domestically, the government of Pakistan found itself under strong pressure to extend tangible material support to the Kashmiris.

These developments soured Pakistan's relations with India as the latter accused Pakistan of extending material assistance, including weapons, to the nationalists in Kashmir. The visits of Abdul Sattar, Pakistan's special envoy, and Yaqub Khan, Foreign Minister, to New Delhi in January 1990, did not help to defuse tension between the two countries; India persisted in its demand that Pakistan should stop training, arming and infiltrating people into Kashmir.

Tension escalated as the two countries moved their troops close to the Line of Control in Kashmir and the international border, and hawkish statements were issued by their top leaders. India's Prime Minister, V. P. Singh, went to the extent of calling upon Indians to get ready 'psychologically' for a war with Pakistan, 106 and warned Pakistan that the 'cost' of its 'interference' in Kashmir would be very high and that India had 'the capability to inflict this cost.' 107 As the threat of war began to loom large, the two superpowers advised restraint and called for an amicable settlement of their differences on Kashmir. A meeting between the foreign ministers of Pakistan and India, held in New York in April 1990, followed by the meetings of their foreign secretaries at Islamabad (July) and New Delhi (August), produced an agreement to adopt measures to reduce tension and to maintain a regular contact between the two governments, especially between their military authorities.

The change of governments in Pakistan and India in November 1990 did not alter the practice of periodic high-level consultations on their bilateral problems. Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif (Pakistan) and Chandra Shekhar (India) had their first meeting on the eve of the 5th SAARC summit conference at Male in November, and the two foreign secretaries met at Islamabad in December to review their bilateral relations, especially their divergent perspectives on the nationalist agitation in Kashmir and troop deployments. The Ayodhya affair began to figure prominently in their

bilateral relations as Pakistan's official and unofficial circles expressed deep concern on the efforts of Hindu militants to demolish the Babri mosque and urged the Indian government to ensure adequate protection of the rights of its Muslim citizens.

The follow-up meetings of the foreign secretaries were held in April (New Delhi), August (New Delhi), and October 1991 (Islamabad) and all bilateral issues, especially Kashmir, the Siachen glacier, the Wuller lake, the nuclear question and allegations and counter-allegations of interference in each other's internal affairs, came up for discussion. These differences could not be resolved but the talks helped to defuse tension and facilitated a better understanding of each other's points of view on these contentious matters.

Given the long history of acrimonious relations, deep-rooted mutual distrust, divergence in their foreign policy perspectives, and the fact that some of their bilateral disputes are still unresolved, normalization is going to be a slow process, with periodic interruptions and reversals. However, if Pakistan and India continue to talk on the contentious issues at the bilateral and multilateral/regional levels, one can be cautiously optimistic that their efforts will in the long run strengthen cordiality and trust in South Asia.

3 The Smaller States of South Asia

Pakistan's relations with states of South Asia other than India manifest cordiality and a broad-based sharing of views on major international and regional issues. They neither perceive each other as adversaries nor pursue opposing goals. There are no territorial or other serious disputes between Pakistan and these states, and whenever some differences arise, they either settle these amicably or do not play these up. Pakistan and Bangladesh were entangled in a host of bilateral problems in the early seventies, but they gradually resolved most of them and developed very cordial relations.

Given their geographic proximity and an overlapping cultural heritage, with no serious bilateral disputes, it was natural that they would work towards promoting cooperation and positive interaction. These states view each other as partners in their struggle against under-development and poverty, and they hope to benefit from each other's experiences.

These states also share a varying degree of fear of Indian domination. They are nervous about the notion of peace and stability through India's preponderance. Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka experienced problems with India from time to time. The Maldives, being situated away from the South Asian mainland, may not have similar experience with India but a too close security relationship (against a backdrop of India's help for countering an attack on the capital city, Male, by mercenaries in 1988) or close identification with India can come into conflict with the Maldives' nationalism and their Islamic identity. Bhutan can also face problems if it endeavours to push hard its role in world affairs in defiance of India.

It is reassuring for Bangladesh, the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka that Pakistan has the capability to withstand India's pressures, and adds to their room for manoeuvre. Pakistan also encourages them to assert their national identities in international and regional affairs by emphasizing the principle of sovereign equality of all states irrespective of their size, population, resources and military power.

BANGLADESH

Pakistan and Bangladesh developed normal diplomatic interaction rather slowly. It was after the settlement of major problems caused by the 1971

episode that the two countries expressed their desire to cultivate mutually advantageous bilateral relations. By 1974–5, there was a widespread acceptance of Bangladesh in Pakistan and the desire to develop friendly relations with Bangladesh gained ground. After all, Bangladeshis had contributed to the establishment of Pakistan and they lived together with Pakistanis in that state for 24 years. Similarly, Bangladesh found nothing wrong in interacting with Pakistan on an equal footing. Pakistan and Bangladesh recognized that they could engage in trade, cooperate for solving their socioeconomic problems and promote peace and stability in South Asia. This was also to win for Bangladesh the goodwill of a number of Muslim states which favoured a normalization of relations between the two countries.

However, three major problems delayed the growth of relations after Pakistan extended recognition to Bangladesh: the division of assets and liabilities, the repatriation of the Biharis stranded in Bangladesh to Pakistan, and Sheikh Mujibur Rehman's personal antipathy towards Pakistan and his pro-India disposition. Bangladesh's demand for its share (approximately 56 per cent) of the pre-1971 Pakistani assets was first made to Pakistan in the Tripartite Conference of the foreign ministers of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, held at New Delhi in April 1974. They decided to take up the issue later at bilateral level and did not make any reference to the issue in a joint statement issued at the conclusion of the conference.

The question of assets and liabilities and the Bihari issue figured prominently during Bhutto's visit to Bangladesh on 27-29 June 1974.² Bangladesh's demand of assets included what the Bangladesh government claimed to be the former East Pakistan's share of united Pakistan's international trade returns, aid, federal installations, including the establishment of capitals first at Karachi and then at Islamabad, military assets, and liquidity assets.3 They demanded that the readily quantifiable assets (gold and other liquidity assets) should be divided and transferred to Bangladesh as a first step towards the overall settlement of assets and liabilities. Pakistan rejected the suggestion and described the Bangladesh figures as 'absurd.' In order to resolve the deadlock, they appointed a committee to prepare an agreed figure of assets and liabilities. As Pakistan showed lukewarm interest in the matter, hardly any progress was made towards its resolution. This issue was briefly taken up during General Ziaur Rehman's visit to Pakistan in December 1977. A 'Joint Working Group' on the division of assets and liabilities was set up when Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Riaz Piracha, visited Dhaka in October 1980. Subsequently, this issue was discussed on a number of occasions (e.g. the Bangladesh Foreign Minister's visit to Pakistan in February 1983, and Pakistan's Foreign Minister's visit to Bangladesh in August 1983) but the deadlock could not be resolved. However, they did not allow this to adversely affect their bilateral relations. There was no evidence available to suggest that this issue was discussed during President H. M. Ershad's visit to Pakistan in July 1986, although the Bangladesh press raised this question. Bangladesh recognized that it had no leverage to pressure Pakistan to transfer assets as demanded by them. Pakistan argued that the issue of assets could not be taken up without settling the question of liabilities, including compensation for the material losses suffered by the federal government and West Pakistani business and industry in the former East Pakistan.

The Mujibur Rehman government insisted in 1974 that Pakistan should repatriate all non-Bengalis (Biharis) who had opted for Pakistan. This was not acceptable to Pakistan which maintained that it would accept the Biharis on the basis of the 1974 formula or as hardship cases,⁵ and that Bangladesh should also accommodate them as equal citizens. The non-resolution of the assets issue and the Biharis question disappointed the Bangladesh government, and Bangladesh's Foreign Minister, Dr Kamal Hosain, described Bhutto's visit as a failure.⁶ Pakistan's offer of initiating trade and diplomatic relations was ignored by the Bangladesh government.

Mujibur Rehman's personal antipathy towards Pakistan delayed the normalization of relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh. The close links that the Bangladesh policy-makers maintained with New Delhi, going back to the pre-independence (1971) period, was also a restraining influence. Except for a couple of days before and after Bhutto's visit, Bangladesh radio engaged in harsh criticism of Pakistan and the Awami League leaders, including the cabinet members, often made negative comments on Pakistan.⁷ In his Independence Day address to the nation in 1975, Mujibur Rehman sharply criticized Pakistan for not reciprocating Bangladesh's gesture of not holding war trials by returning the wealth Pakistan had earlier 'plundered'. Thus, only a limited interaction took place between Pakistan and Bangladesh during the Mujib era. They did make two positive gestures: Pakistan offered 150 000 maunds of rice and 2 000 000 pounds of cotton yarn for flood relief in Bangladesh (August 1974), and Bangladesh donated US \$10 000 for the relief of earthquake victims in the Swat and Hazara districts of Pakistan (January 1975). However, this did not moderate Bangladesh's insistence on the settlement of the assets issue and the repatriation of all Biharis as a pre-condition for normalization of relations.

The 1975 Coup

It was after the coup and assassination of Mujibur Rehman in August 1975

that Pakistan-Bangladesh relations began to improve. Pakistan extended recognition to the new regime within hours of its installation, and, as a gesture of goodwill, Pakistan despatched 50 000 tons of rice and 15 million yards of cloth to Bangladesh. Pakistan also called upon members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Third World states to recognize the new government in Bangladesh. A directive was issued to Pakistani ambassadors posted abroad to approach their host governments for that purpose. The new Bangladesh President, Khandakar Moshtaque Ahmed, acknowledged Pakistan's gestures and expressed the hope that a 'new chapter' would soon open between the two countries involving 'the normalization of relations and the forging of friendly and brotherly ties'. 12

Without changing Bangladesh's position on the division of assets and the Bihari issue, the new government did not insist on their solution as a pre-condition for the normalization of their bilateral ties. Pakistan's Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Aziz Ahmad, and Bangladesh's Foreign Minister, Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, met in New York in October 1975 and agreed to resume diplomatic relations between the two countries. 13 The ambassador-level relations were established in January 1976 when Mohammad Khurshid and Zahiruddin assumed their assignments on behalf of Pakistan and Bangladesh respectively. A host of other steps were taken in 1976 to give an impetus to the normalization process. These included telecommunication links (February), airmail service (March), the visit of a trade delegation from Bangladesh (April), first trade agreement and a Memorandum of Understanding on shipping (April), a Memorandum of Understanding on banking (May), and the opening of Pakistan's Habib Bank branch at Dhaka (July). 14 The national airlines of the two countries resumed air services, with the aircraft of Bangladesh's Biman Airlines making its inaugural flight to Karachi on 7 July.¹⁵ Pakistan's first trade delegation visited Bangladesh in July and discussed arrangements for resuming trade and economic relations. They agreed to establish a joint committee for the promotion of trade and to exchange trade delegations.¹⁶ Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Agha Shahi, led a three member goodwill delegation to Bangladesh in the same month. The two sides discussed all aspects of their bilateral relations and the regional and international situation.¹⁷ The Trading Corporation of Pakistan signed an agreement for the import of newsprint from Bangladesh in November. Pakistan donated 3000 tons of rice for the flood-affected people in Bangladesh (July), and Bangladesh reciprocated by donating 50 000 pounds of tea to the flood-affected people in Pakistan (September). Pakistan's Communication Secretary visited Bangladesh in October and the two countries agreed to expand the existing postal and telecommunication links, including the establishment of a telecommunication link via satellite.¹⁸ Pakistan gave a Boeing 707 aircraft and 28 railway wagons in November.¹⁹ The first Pakistani cargo ship sailed for Chittagong in the last week of December.

Two important visits from Bangladesh in 1977 accelerated the momentum of their bilateral relations. The visit of the Foreign Secretary, Tabarak Hossain, in August, showed that they shared views on major international and regional issues. These shared perspectives were reiterated during President Ziaur Rehman's visit to Pakistan in December. He emphasized the bonds of Islam, culture and history, and their shared desire to improve the quality of life of the people as the 'firm basis for close cooperation' between Pakistan and Bangladesh.²⁰ The two sides expressed satisfaction at the pace of development of their bilateral ties and agreed to take more steps to expand bilateral trade and collaboration in all fields of mutual interest. They decided in principle to set up a Joint Ministerial Economic Commission to strengthen economic cooperation. The two Presidents expressed a unanimity of views on a number of regional and international issues, including the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, South Asia as a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ), the strict adherence to the Charter of the United Nations, the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied Arab territories and the acceptance of the national rights of Palestinians in their homeland, struggle against colonialism and apartheid in Southern Africa, and the New International Economic Order. They also reaffirmed their commitment to the OIC and stressed the need of solidarity and cooperation among the Muslim states.21

These principles were re-endorsed during the visits of Bangladesh's Foreign Minister, Mohammad Shamsul Haq, and a Bangladesh parliamentary delegation in December 1978 and July 1979 respectively. Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Riaz Piracha's visit in October 1980, followed by the visit of a Pakistani ministerial delegation, led by the Interior Minister, Mahmood Haroon, in July 1981, strengthened cordiality. The Foreign Ministers of Bangladesh and Pakistan, Shamsud Doha and Yaqub Khan, visited each other in February and August 1983 respectively. The August visit produced the first visa agreement which formalized the procedures for the grant of different categories of visas to their citizens.²²

Bilateral cooperation in the field of education, culture, tourism, and media expanded gradually through reciprocal visits, agreements and protocols signed between the two countries. They expressed solidarity by offering relief goods and medical supplies whenever either side was hit by a major natural calamity, i.e. cyclone, flood, and earthquake. In June 1985, Zia-ul-Haq undertook a special visit to Bangladesh²³ to offer sympathy and support to the cyclone-devastated people of Urrichar. Pakistan established the Bang-

ladesh Relief Fund-1985 and relief assistance, including a mosque and forty houses, were donated to the affected area. In September 1988, when heavy floods caused a widespread devastation in Bangladesh, Pakistan rushed medical and relief supplies and a new Bangladesh Flood Relief Fund-1988 was instituted by the government of Pakistan, and the people were encouraged to donate liberally to this Fund. Similarly, relief goods were supplied for the tornado victims in Bangladesh in May 1989.

Pakistan and Bangladesh held similar views on the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Bangladesh, like Pakistan, condemned it and demanded the pull-out of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.²⁴ It played a leading role in initiating the resolution on Afghanistan in the OIC in 1980, and a similar interest was maintained in the deliberations of the UN General Assembly on Afghanistan where it voted in favour of the resolution calling for, *inter alia*, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. President Hossain Mohammad Ershad condemned Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan during his visit to Pakistan in July 1986.

Pakistan and Bangladesh also interacted within the framework of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Pakistan responded favourably to Bangladesh's original proposal for setting up a regional organization for cooperation.²⁵ It extended all possible assistance for setting up SAARC and maintained an active interest in its activities. In July 1986, President Ershad visited Pakistan as the chairman of SAARC.²⁶ Three agreements were signed during this visit on bilateral trade, cultural exchanges, and reciprocal exchange of plots of land in Islamabad and Dhaka for constructing buildings for their diplomatic missions. Pakistan assured all possible assistance to Bangladesh in the field of education. including the exchange of student delegations and scholarships. Emphasizing the traditional, Islamic, cultural, intellectual and emotional bonds between the two countries, the two Presidents not only expressed satisfaction on cooperation in the fields of education, culture, communication, trade and commerce but also vowed to strengthen these ties. The two countries reiterated their commitment to SAARC, demanded an early Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and expressed agreement on major international issues.²⁷ Ershad was conferred Pakistan's highest civil award, Nishan-i-Pakistan, as a tribute to his contribution towards the establishment of SAARC, promotion of friendly ties between Pakistan and Bangladesh, and his leadership.²⁸

Bangladesh observed a three-day state mourning on the demise of Ziaul-Haq in August 1988. Bangladesh President Ershad visited Islamabad in December 1988 to participate in the 4th SAARC summit conference which provided the two countries with another opportunity to discuss their bilateral relations. Pakistan's Minister for Religious Affairs, who visited Bangladesh in March 1989, reiterated Pakistan's goodwill for Bangladesh and hailed Bangladesh's decision to designate Islam as the state religion.²⁹

Benazir Bhutto's visit to Bangladesh in October 1989 produced mixed results. No progress was made on two contentious issues – the assets and liabilities, and repatriation of Biharis – which disappointed Bangladesh and the Biharis. However, this stalemate did not have any negative impact on their bilateral relations. Benazir Bhutto offered Pakistan's friendship and cooperation in all walks of life 'without any reservations or qualifications' and said that 'like two brothers who set up separate homes', they remained 'members of the same family, each always caring about the future, well being, and security of the other'. Ershad described their bilateral relations as 'excellent'. They reiterated their shared perspectives on major regional and international issues like the zone of peace for the Indian Ocean, South Asia as a NWFZ, or SAARC, and Palestinian rights. They signed a three-year cultural protocol for promoting collaboration in a number of areas.

The reciprocal visits of Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Yaqub Khan (March 1990) and Bangladesh's Foreign Minister, Anisul Islam Mahmud (September 1990) enabled them to review bilateral and SAARC affairs. Yaqub Khan outlined Pakistan's concern on India's efforts to suppress the nationalist agitation in Kashmir and the dangers inherent in the escalation of tension between Pakistan and India on this question.³³ President Ershad in a public statement deplored the killings of Muslims in Kashmir and asked India to put an end to such acts of repression. He also called upon Pakistan and India to exercise 'maximum restraint' so as to defuse tension on the Kashmir issue.³⁴ The two Foreign Ministers discussed, *inter alia*, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and its negative economic ramifications for the two countries during their September meeting.³⁵

Pakistan and Bangladesh also developed interaction in the defence sector. Two Bangladesh naval ships undertook a good will port call to Karachi in March 1989. The Chief of the Pakistan Air Force, Air Chief Marshal Hakimullah, visited Bangladesh in January 1990. The chiefs of Bangladesh's navy and air force, Rear Admiral Sultan Ahmed and Air Vice Marshal Mumtazuddin Ahmed, paid visits to Pakistan in May and December 1990 respectively; both were conferred Pakistan's military award 'Hilali-Imtiaz'. These exchange visits established a personal rapport between the defence authorities of the two countries and enabled them to review matters of their shared professional interest. Pakistan would be favourably inclined towards building an active relationship in the security field, involving goodwill visits, consultations on security affairs, sale of small arms and weapons, transfer of arms-production technology, and military training

facilities. However, any active security-related interaction between Pakistan and Bangladesh would be viewed with deep concern and suspicion in New Delhi.

Pakistan-Bangladesh economic relations, initiated in 1976–7, developed rapidly in subsequent years. A host of agreements were signed in 1977–9 for expanding their trade and economic relations, including shipping.³⁶ The Joint Economic Commission, as agreed to during General Ziaur Rehman's visit to Pakistan in December 1977, held its first session in July 1979. The agreed minutes of the meeting stressed the need of organizing displays/exhibitions of each other's goods,³⁷ and urged the two governments to facilitate contacts between their businessmen and traders. They explored the possibilities of cooperation in administrative training, railways, telephone and telegraph, rural development and local government, horticulture, agriculture, forestry and poultry.³⁸ Three agreements were signed during the same year, which covered air services (January), cultural and technical cooperation (July), and the avoidance of double taxation (October).

The Pakistan-Bangladesh Joint Committee on Trade (established in July 1976) also held its meetings from time to time to discuss trade relations and suggest means for their expansion. In the private sector, Federations of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry of the two countries established a joint committee on trade, economy and industry in July 1984.³⁹ Two years later, a special trade agreement was signed for exchanging goods and commodities worth \$40 million through their trading corporations. A delegation of working women and a trade delegation from Bangladesh visited Pakistan in March and December 1986 respectively.

Subsequent meetings of the Pakistan-Bangladesh Joint Economic Commission held in April 1987 and July 1989 produced a number of decisions to expand their trade and commercial relations. In the field of industries, they decided to encourage joint ventures in steel-based industry, engineering, paper board and packing, power generation, communication and electronic industry, and fibreglass.⁴⁰ They also agreed to cooperate in small-scale industry, especially training and transfer of technology; and closer cooperation between machine tool and electrical equipment manufacturing enterprises of the two countries.⁴¹ The desire to initiate joint ventures was also reiterated during Bangladesh Planning Minister, Air Vice Marshal (Retd) A. K. Khandkar's visit to Pakistan in October 1986.⁴² Pakistan offered a loan of \$50 million to Bangladesh for the purchase of machinery and equipment, including coaches, buses, and road rollers. Pakistan also agreed to supply 100 000 tons of cement and 30 000 tons of sugar, 43 and expressed willingness to accept payments in local currency up to \$40 million for their imports.44

They established two committees in Dhaka and Islamabad for closely pursuing the implementation of their decisions. Bangladesh agreed to give a favoured nation treatment to Pakistan for the import of jute, and Pakistan agreed to make a long-term agreement for its purchase. Bangladesh committed itself to import 100 000 bales of cotton per annum over a long period of time.⁴⁵

SRI LANKA

Pakistan's relations with Sri Lanka are characterized by cordiality, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and support to each other for overcoming their internal problems. There are no bilateral disputes and they have a broad sharing of views on major international and regional issues. Though their interaction goes back to the early years of independence and their high ranking officials, including the heads of government/state, visited each other, their ties expanded rather slowly. Sri Lanka pursues a non-partisan policy on Pakistan-India disputes and urges them to resolve their differences amicably.

Their interaction expanded rapidly in the seventies and eighties due to a number of reasons. First, they helped each other to surmount internal difficulties. In February 1971, when India disallowed Pakistani aircraft to fly over Indian territory on the way to Dhaka, Sri Lanka agreed to grant overflight and refueling facilities at Colombo. This helped Pakistan to maintain an air link with what was then East Pakistan during the crucial days of civil strife. Pakistan reciprocated by making military supplies, including helicopters, available to Sri Lanka when the latter was confronted with the Maoist JVP-led internal uprising during the same year. Second, Pakistan was looking for new markets after the loss of East Pakistan. Sri Lanka not only purchased Pakistani goods but also supplied tea and some other items Pakistan used to procure from its eastern wing. Third, Pakistan's policy of nonalignment and an outspoken support to disarmament, denuclearization and the New International Economic Order brought the two countries closer to each other. Sri Lanka actively supported Pakistan's request for admission to the Nonaligned Movement which was accepted by the organization in 1979. Fourth, the setting up of SAARC has also increased their interaction as their diplomats meet frequently in connection with SAARC-related activities.

The major principles outlined in the joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of Sri Lanka's Prime Minister, Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike's visit to Pakistan in September 1974 could be described as the bedrock of

their bilateral relations. The prime ministers of the two countries expressed solidarity with people of the Third World and extended full support for the elimination of racism and colonialism. They demanded the withdrawal of Israel from all Arab occupied territories and restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people. They also underlined the need for observance of the UN Charter, mutual respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-interference in internal affairs in the conduct of relations between the states. Sri Lanka and Pakistan shared views on the designation of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, but, while avoiding a specific endorsement of Pakistan's demand for declaring South Asia as a NWFZ, Sri Lanka joined Pakistan in calling upon the littoral and hinterland states to work together for realization of 'their commitment to a policy of denuclearization' that entailed 'the permanent renunciation of a nuclear weapon option and the use of their territories, territorial waters and air space to nuclear weapons of other states.'

The two Prime Ministers expressed satisfaction at the pace of development of their relations which reflected what they described as 'the earnest desire of the two countries to widen the area of good neighbourly cooperation . . . based on a commonality of their fundamental interests.'47 They established a Pakistan-Sri Lanka Joint Economic Committee to promote bilateral economic cooperation.

These principles were reaffirmed during Bhutto's return visit to Sri Lanka in December 1975. In addition to endorsing the views expressed in 1974, the joint communique specifically mentioned that the establishment of NWFZ in South Asia and the Middle East was complementary to the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. It also called for 'general and complete disarmament' in order to enhance international security. A review of their bilateral relations produced an understanding for the rapid expansion of trade and Pakistan offered the facility of deferred payment for the import of manufactured goods from Pakistan. They recognized that their cooperation could be extended to the development of water resources, animal husbandry, gemmology, shipping and tourism.⁴⁸

These two visits, coupled with exchange visits of the foreign secretaries (1973, 1975, 1977), senior officials and trade delegations increased interaction in the economic, trade and cultural fields. The periodic meetings of Pakistan-Sri Lanka Joint Economic Committee reviewed these relations and suggested ways to improve them. Pakistan continued to procure a large quantity of tea from Sri Lanka despite the establishment of trade relations with Bangladesh.⁴⁹ The liberal import policy introduced by Sri Lanka in the late seventies and the 1984 Pakistan-Sri Lanka Trade Agreement helped to boost their bilateral trade and economic ties, Pakistan offered a loan of

50 million Pakistani Rupees to Sri Lanka in 1987 for the purchase of Pakistani products. Sri Lanka supplied coconut plants for plantation in coastal areas of Baluchistan, and obtained *Neeli Ravi* buffalo for breeding purposes, mango plants and wheat seeds from Pakistan. It showed interest in cooperation with livestock and horticulture. Pakistan offered technical services in hydraulics, irrigation and dam building.

Ethnic Strife

Pakistan's attitude towards the ethnic strife in Sri Lanka was shaped by four major considerations. First, Sri Lanka's unity and territorial integrity must be preserved. Second, the ethnic strife was Sri Lanka's internal matter which should be settled by Sri Lankans themselves. Third, Pakistan did not approve of the efforts of India to influence the outcome of the conflict in Sri Lanka. It argued that if there were differences in the perspectives of the two countries on the developments in Sri Lanka, these should be settled by a strict adherence to the principles of sovereign equality of all states, respect for territorial integrity and political independence, and non-interference in internal affairs. Fourth, the rights of the Muslim minority (Tamil Muslims, Moors) in Sri Lanka should be protected.

Pakistan extended unqualified support to Sri Lanka's unity and territorial integrity as ethnic strife deepened in that country. The joint communiqué on President Jayawardene's visit to Pakistan in March–April 1985 contained such a commitment and Pakistan hoped that the efforts of the Sri Lankan government would produce a political settlement of the ethnic conflict 'within the framework of a unitary Sri Lanka'. These views were reaffirmed during Zia-ul-Haq's visit to Sri Lanka in December 1985, who expressed complete solidarity with Sir Lanka and declared that no country could be allowed to be destroyed from within. He said, 'We must support each other to maintain integrity. If it is Sri Lanka today, it may be us tomorrow. Sri Lanka is a member of the UN, NAM and SAARC with us. Besides we have bilateral relations. What is the use of all this if we cannot support each other.'51

Pakistan exported weapons and small arms to Sri Lanka and extended training facilities to its security personnel. Though Sri Lanka used to send its personnel to Pakistan for military training long before the outbreak of civil strife, it began to make a greater use of these facilities after the escalation of civil strife. Indian sources claimed that Pakistan's military trainers and missions were sent to Sri Lanka in 1985, and some personnel of its National Auxiliary Force were trained in Pakistan which also supplied

armed helicopters to Sri Lanka.⁵² Pakistan denied the existence of any new security relationship with Sri Lanka.⁵³

Sri Lanka's Prime Minister (President since 1989) Ranasinghe Premadass visited Pakistan in March 1987. There was a general agreement between the two countries on the major international and regional issues. They reaffirmed their support to each other's independence and territorial integrity, and vowed to extend the scope of their bilateral cooperation in all areas of mutual interest.⁵⁴

Pakistan observed with concern India's efforts to pressure Sri Lanka to settle the Tamil-Sinhala conflict to its satisfaction. On the one hand India played a mediatory role in the dispute, on the other, it allowed its territory to be used as a base of operation and conduit for arms supply for the Tamils working for independence from Sri Lanka. India's decision to air drop relief goods and medicine for besieged Tamils in the Jaffna peninsula in June 1987, in complete disregard of Sri Lanka's sovereign rights, showed that India would not allow Sri Lanka a free hand to deal with the Tamil dissidents. From Pakistan's standpoint, even if India's rationale was accepted that it was extending humanitarian assistance, the method adopted for that purpose was 'objectionable' and it established a 'dangerous precedent' in the region.⁵⁵

Pakistan's response to the despatch of Indian troops to Sri Lanka in pursuance of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, July 1987, was cautiously negative. Describing the stationing of Indian troops as Sri Lanka's internal matter, Pakistan expressed 'apprehensions' because it had created 'a precedent which might be used to perpetrate intervention in neighbouring countries.' Pakistan's unofficial circles made vocal criticism of India's military presence in Sri Lanka. They generally viewed it as a part of India's strategy to impose its will on the intra-state disputes of neighbouring states. It was felt in Pakistan that India managed the situation in such a manner that Sri Lanka was left with no option but to accept India's demand of its military presence in the strife-torn region. 57

A row developed between Sri Lanka and India in June 1989, when President Premadasa demanded the withdrawal of Indian troops by the end of July (second anniversary of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord). As India refused to oblige, Sri Lanka declined to participate in the meeting of SAARC Foreign Ministers. Pakistan, being the chairman of SAARC for 1989–90, engaged in active diplomacy to defuse tension between India and Sri Lanka and to salvage SAARC. Its Foreign Minister visited Colombo with Pakistan's Prime Minister's message which urged Sri Lanka to participate in the meeting and expressed the hope that Sri Lanka and India would settle

their difference 'on the basis of equity and justice.' Sri Lanka, later, agreed to attend the SAARC ministerial meeting at Islamabad but no summit conference could be convened in Sri Lanka in 1989.

The Muslim minority in Sri Lanka (Tamil Muslims, Moors) who live mainly in the eastern region are not generally involved in the Tamil struggle for *eelaam*. Conscious of their religio-cultural identity, the Moors, who are also Tamils, distinguish themselves from other Tamils who are predominantly Hindus. These Muslims evoke interest in Pakistan; Zia-ul-Haq visited them during his official trip to Sri Lanka in December 1985, and urged them to be supportive of Sri Lanka's unity and territorial integrity.

The Tamil militants often subjected the Muslims to violence which caused much concern at unofficial level in Pakistan. The issue was raised on a couple of occasions in Pakistan's parliament where members urged the Sri Lankan government to protect its Muslim citizens. The government of Pakistan, sharing concern about the safety of the Muslim community, avoided comments that could be interpreted as interference in Sri Lanka's internal affairs. However, it maintained contact with the Sri Lankan government on the issue and expressed confidence publicly in the ability of that government to provide adequate protection to its Muslim citizens.

NEPAL

Nepal's relations with Pakistan cannot be understood without taking into account its major foreign policy dilemmas caused by geography, economy, and the realities of power politics. Situated between two bigger states, China and India, Nepal's landlocked geography limits its foreign policy options. More so, because it suffers from underdevelopment and poverty which make it impossible for any Nepalese government to deal with these problems without seeking external cooperation. After the consolidation of British power in India, Nepal virtually depended on them for trade and economic relations. This began to change slowly after the withdrawal of the British from South Asia. However, independent India continued to be Nepal's major economic and trade partner. Nepal cultivated some economic ties with third countries but most of its trade had to rely on the transit facilities offered by India. This gave India a leverage which it periodically used for Nepal's arm twisting. India's position was also strengthened by the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the follow-up aide-mémoires and agreements which impinged on Nepal's right to conduct its foreign and security policy on its own. Above all, India viewed Nepal as an integral part of its security parameters and wanted its policy-makers to pay due attention to India's security sensitivities while devising their policies towards other countries.

Nepal's policy-makers were confronted with the difficult task of maintaining a balance between nationalist sentiments which demanded an assertion of national identity and sovereignty in foreign relations and the dictates of *realpolitik* which underscored the need for harmonious interaction with India. Thus, without downgrading their relations with India, they began to open up to the rest of the world within the framework of nonalignment and mutuality of interests. The major thrust was on improving ties with China, assertion of the principle of equal friendship with India and China, and a cultivation of political and economic interaction with many other states. This policy often produced strains in Indo-Nepal relations and India viewed the principle of equal friendship as a violation of the spirit of the 1950 Treaty and a potential threat to India's security interests.

The development of Pakistan-Nepal relations was also a part of Nepal's efforts to maximize its foreign policy options but the fear of India's annoyance kept its pace slow. In April 1956 Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Hamidul Haq Chaudhury, participated in the coronation celebrations of King Mahendra and expressed Pakistan's desire to establish diplomatic relations. However, it was only in May 1960 that they agreed to do so, and later, their ambassadors in New Delhi were accredited to each other.

The sixties witnessed the development of their bilateral relations. Pakistan, having been alienated from the West-sponsored alliances, was cultivating new ties. Nepal was also facing problems with its traditional ally, India. As a confrontation developed between Nepal and India on King Mahendra's December 1960 decision to dismiss the Prime Minister and assume powers directly, Nepal began to respond more favourably to Pakistan's gestures. King Mahendra's visit to Pakistan in September 1961 marked the beginning of an active interaction between the two states. A number of agreements for trade and economic cooperation were signed during 1961-3, coupled with Ayub Khan's visit to Nepal in May 1963. Other important visits which strengthened these relations included Nepal's Prime Minister and King Mahendra's visits in January 1966 and April 1967 respectively; Pakistan's President Yahya Khan's trip to Kathmandu in September 1970; and a high-powered delegation, led by Vice Admiral S. M. Ahsan, represented Pakistan at the wedding of Crown Prince (later King) Birendra in February 1970. A couple of agreements envisaging cultural exchanges and technical assistance were signed. Pakistan offered transit facilities through East Pakistan (via Chittagong port) but Nepal could not avail of this offer as India did not agree to a new transit route through its territory between Nepal and East Pakistan.

While cultivating these relations, Nepal did not want to create the impression that it viewed Pakistan as an alternative to India. Any such attempt would have been futile because Pakistan had no territorial contiguity with Nepal and it was not in a position to substitute India's long-established and multifaceted economic ties with Nepal. Therefore, Pakistan's gestures were responded to in a cautiously positive manner. Nepal maintained a neutral position on major Indo-Pakistan problems, although a tilt towards India was often visible for understandable reasons.

Nepal accommodated Pakistanis who sought refuge there after the outbreak of civil strife in East Pakistan in 1971. Later, these refugees were airlifted to Pakistan. An impasse developed in their relations when Pakistan recalled its ambassador after Nepal recognized Bangladesh in January 1972.

It was in 1974-5 that Pakistan and Nepal took steps to rejuvenate their relations. An air services agreement was signed in June 1974; Nepal's Foreign Minister visited Pakistan in January 1975; and Pakistan's President, Fazal Illahi Chaudhury, led Pakistan's delegation to the coronation of King Birendra in February 1975 which placed their relations on an even keel.

Pakistan extended full support to the proposal declaring Nepal a zone of peace. This suggestion was first made by King Birendra while addressing the 4th NAM summit conference at Algiers in 1973, who elaborated it in some detail on the eve of his coronation in February 1975. The concept of Nepal as a zone of peace reflected Birendra's view that the interests of Nepal could be best protected if it stayed away from the power politics of India, China and other neighbours. Nepal should neither involve itself in their conflicts nor allow any state to drag it into any inter-state conflict, and its borders should be respected by all states. Therefore, Nepal sought international guarantees for its independence, sovereignty and neutrality in war and peace. Pakistan declared its support to the proposal in 1975, and Pakistan and China jointly endorsed it in 1976 in the joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of Bhutto's visit to China. Pakistan reiterated its support when Nepal's Foreign Minister, Krishna Raj Aryal, visited Pakistan in January 1977. Subsequently, this commitment was repeated time and again.

Nepal was equally supportive of Pakistan's proposal for making South Asia a NWFZ. It voted in favour of Pakistan's resolution on this subject in the UN General Assembly and argued for banishing nuclear weapons at all levels in order to strengthen peace and security.

Nepal and Pakistan had shared views on Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. On 1 January 1980, Nepal described the developments in Afghanistan as a 'danger to peace and stability'. Asserting 'the inviolability

of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their right to determine and chart their own destiny themselves without foreign interference,' Nepal demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.⁶⁰ It voted in favour of the UN General Assembly resolution calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and maintained the position that the Soviet move 'constituted a threat to international peace and security, and [that] unless eliminated immediately, [it] would have a far reaching negative impact' on the region and beyond.⁶¹

King Birendra, who visited Pakistan in November 1980,⁶² had detailed discussions with Zia-ul-Haq on the Afghanistan crisis, the Gulf war, the Nonaligned Movement, other regional and international affairs, and their bilateral relations. They expressed unequivocal support to the right of the Afghan people to settle their political future and called for the preservation of the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and the nonaligned character of Afghanistan by withdrawing Soviet troops.⁶³ Pakistan reiterated support for Nepal's peace zone proposal, and Nepal affirmed its continued support for Pakistan's initiative to establish a NWFZ in South Asia as well as the demand to give security guarantees to non-nuclear weapon states.⁶⁴

They expressed satisfaction at the development of bilateral relations and acknowledged the possibilities of expansion of cooperation in trade, agriculture, aviation, tourism, culture, technical training and education. They also agreed in principle to explore the prospects of joint ventures in mutually agreed sectors and that the Foreign Offices of the two countries should consult each other more frequently on all international, regional and bilateral matters.⁶⁵

A major review of their bilateral relations was undertaken in 1983 when Nepal's Prime Minister, Suriya Bahadur Thapa, and Pakistan's President, Zia-ul-Haq, visited each other's capital in February and May. King Birendra made a brief stopover at Karachi on the way to Saudi Arabia in September, and met with the Pakistani President. The 1983 visits produced a reaffirmation of their faith in the UN Charter and the principles of NAM. There was broad agreement between the two countries on major international and regional issues, including the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and Kampuchea, the Middle East problem and especially the national rights of Palestinians, the need for holding negotiations to resolve the stalemate in the North-South dialogue, regional cooperation in South Asia, Nepal as a zone of peace, and Pakistan's proposal for a NWFZ in South Asia.

Their bilateral relations were also strengthened by these visits. They agreed to exchange delegations in order to make maximum possible use of

the prospects of cooperation in trade, joint ventures, agriculture, health, education, research and training, and communication. A Joint Economic Commission was set up in May to suggest means for achieving the goal of greater economic cooperation between the two countries.⁶⁶

In April 1983, Pakistan's national airline, PIA, resumed a direct airservice to Kathmandu in pursuance of an air agreement signed a month earlier. PIA used to have a direct Dhaka-Kathmandu service until 1971. The Nepalese Royal Airlines was permitted to pick up passengers and cargo from Karachi on the way to Dubai. Two trade protocols/agreements were signed in July 1982 and November 1984. The former envisaged encouragement of visits of businessmen or trade-delegations, and holding of trade exhibitions and fairs. This agreement permitted Nepal to make use of warehouse facilities and sea and airports at Karachi for its trade with other countries. The latter agreement was the outcome of deliberations of the Joint Economic Commission which sought expansion of their bilateral trade. The Joint Economic Commission also suggested a host of measures for widening the scope of their bilateral economic cooperation. A delegation of Pakistan's Export Promotion Bureau visited Nepal in October 1985.

SAARC provided Pakistan and Nepal with another forum to maintain a regular rapport with each other. The senior officials of the two countries often discussed bilateral issues informally before or after a SAARC-related meeting. King Birendra made a brief stopover at Islamabad on 29 September 1988 and held discussions with Pakistan's President, Ghulam Ishaq Khan. He again visited Pakistan in December 1988 to participate in the 4th SAARC summit conference.

Pakistan sympathized with Nepal as India restricted trade and withdrew most transit facilities in March 1989 after the failure of the two states to revise and extend existing trade and transit treaties. Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Yaqub Khan, who travelled to Kathmandu in June, expressed Pakistan's 'growing concern' over the dispute because it was causing 'severe economic hardship to Nepal' with whom Pakistan maintained 'close friendly cooperation'. While promising to extend 'all possible assistance' to Nepal, he told his hosts in Kathmandu that Pakistan was in contact with India for the resolution of this dispute 'in the spirit of SAARC and good neighbourliness'. A promise of support was reiterated by Pakistan in the course of the meeting of the Joint Economic Commission in July, coupled with a credit facility of \$1 million to Nepal for importing electronic and other goods from Pakistan. The loan was repayable in 25 years, with a grace period of five years, at two per cent per annum rate of înterest. While appreciating Pakistan's gesture, Nepal showed interest in extending co-

operation in industry, agriculture, technical, civil aviation and tourism; joint ventures in textiles, leather, light engineering and consumer goods; and sought an alternative market for its goods in Pakistan⁷⁴ as a part of its desperate effort to reduce dependence on India. A Nepalese trade delegation visited Pakistan in September–October for that purpose.

THE MALDIVES

Pakistan maintains cordial relations with the tiny island republic of the Maldives. The shared heritage of Islam serves as a strong bond and the two states are active members of the OIC. They have an identity of views on major international and regional issues and are supportive of designating South Asia as a NWFZ. The Maldives, like Pakistan, demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and expressed solidarity with the Afghan struggle for the restoration of Afghanistan's independent, non-aligned, and Islamic character.

The Vice President of the Maldives, Amir Abdul Sattar, visited Pakistan in June 1976 to establish a regular rapport. It was during the visit of the Maldives' Foreign Minister, Fathulla Jameel, to Pakistan in May 1979 that they reaffirmed their conviction that Islam provided 'a solid foundation for the fraternal ties' between the two countries. A number of measures were agreed to strengthen these relations which included the supply of publications on Islam, making training facilities available to each other, and the exchange of experts in the fields of education and health. Several follow-up agreements were signed to formalize their bilateral cooperation in the above-mentioned and other sectors of mutual interest. For example, an air services agreement was signed in 1981; a visa abolition accord in 1982; and an agreement on cultural and educational cooperation in 1983.

The Maldives-Pakistan relations received a boost with the first visit of President Mamun Abdel Gayyum to Pakistan in January-February 1984. The two sides expressed their shared views that the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan 'posed a serious threat to security in the region, with far-reaching implications for global peace and security'. The Maldives expressed sympathy for the Afghan refugees and appreciated Pakistan's humanitarian assistance to them. They reaffirmed the resolutions adopted by the OIC which called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and a negotiated settlement of the problem. The two Presidents called for a 'just and lasting' solution of the Middle East problem involving the withdrawal of Israel from all occupied territories, including the city of Jerusalem, and the restoration of the rights of the people of Palestine for self determination and

independent statehood under the PLO leadership. Other important international and regional issues which received their joint support included, *inter alia*, the efforts for the establishment of NIEO; south-to-south cooperation; withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea; general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament; effective guarantees for non-nuclear weapon states; the Indian Ocean and other regions as NWFZ; and SAARC.⁷⁶

Pakistan and the Maldives agreed on a number of measures to expand their bilateral cooperation. A trade agreement and a two-year cultural exchange programme was signed during this visit. Gayyum invited private investment from Pakistan and expressed his government's desire to benefit from the Islamization process, especially Islamic legislation, in Pakistan in order to bring about similar changes in his country which already applied some Islamic laws.⁷⁷

A five-member Maldivian trade delegation, headed by the Minister of Trade and Industry, Ilyas Ibrahim, visited Pakistan in April 1984; followed by the Maldivian Deputy Minister for Agriculture, Mohammad Umar Manik's visit in July. They were assured of full Pakistani cooperation and assistance in all spheres of trade. Pakistan's Agricultural Research Council offered cooperation for improving farm productivity and a better management of livestock, poultry and fisheries. It was decided during the Maldives' Foreign Secretary's visit to Pakistan in August to set up a Joint Commission on Trade to regularly work on the expansion of their trade ties. Its meeting, held in October 1985, identified cotton and textiles, rice, fruits, vegetables, poultry and shipping as areas for the promotion of trade and suggested measures to overcome difficulties in the existing trade ties.

Pakistan is a member of the Aid-to-Maldives Consortium under the aegis of the World Bank. In its session in 1984, Pakistan for the first time gifted 2000 tons of rice, 2000 tons of wheat flour, and medicines worth Pakistani Rupees 100 000 to the Maldives. Pakistan and the Maldives signed an extradition agreement during Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Yaqub Khan's visit to that country in July 1984.

Zia-ul-Haq's visit to the Maldives in December 1985 helped to further strengthen their bilateral relations. Zia and Gayyum reaffirmed the cordiality and the unanimity of views on the major international and regional issues they had expressed in January–February 1984. They agreed on further expansion of trade and economic relations, and cooperation in culture, education, sports, civil aviation, tourism and shipping. Pakistan offered additional educational scholarships and training facilities to the Maldives and an agreement for economic and technical cooperation was signed.

Pakistan provided an interest-free loan for the purchase of rice, wheat flour, medicines, cement, machinery and steel products. It also agreed to make training facilities available in medicine, nursing, foreign service, public administration, banking, legal affairs and sports. Technical assistance for water purification was also offered.⁸²

Gayyum's government faced a crisis when, in November 1988, a group of Tamil mercenaries, apparently recruited in Sri Lanka, attacked Male, capital of the Maldives, in a bid to overthrow the government. The attempt was foiled by Indian troops which intervened on Gayyum's request. Pakistan was happy over the failure of the bid to dislodge the Maldives government but it felt uneasy as the incident provided India with another opportunity to project its military power in another neighbouring state after Sri Lanka. The reports in December 1988 of dialogue between India and the Maldives for making permanent security arrangements gave additional worries to Pakistan. However, given the cordiality between Pakistan and the Maldives, the former's official circles did not criticize Gayyum's decision to invite Indian troops, and avoided comments on the possibilities of security cooperation between India and the Maldives.

Gayyum visited Pakistan in December 1988 to participate in the 4th SAARC summit conference, and made a day's stopover at Karachi in July 1989 when he described the Maldives-Pakistan relations as excellent and cordial. His visit to Pakistan in August 1991 produced an understanding to explore more avenues for extending the scope of bilateral cooperation. Pakistan offered a grant of Rs 45 million for the parliament building under construction in Male, the capital of the Maldives.

BHUTAN

Pakistan had hardly any direct interaction with Bhutan until recently. The Kingdom of Bhutan kept itself aloof from the world and, under the 1949 Treaty with India, it was obliged to accept the latter's advice on foreign policy in return for India's non-interference in its internal affairs. In 1971, Bhutan, with India's permission and support, joined the United Nations and gradually began to open up to the international system. It developed interaction with Pakistan within the framework of SAARC. King Jigme Singye Wangchuck (king since 1972) visited Islamabad for the first time in December 1988 to participate in the 4th SAARC summit conference. Earlier in the same month, Pakistan and Bhutan agreed in principle to establish diplomatic relations and exchange ambassadors.

4 Islam and Foreign Policy

Pakistan projects its Islamic identity in foreign policy and pays special attention to promoting unity amongst, and forging ties with, Muslim states. The close association of Islam with the establishment of the state and the emotional fervour which developments in the wider Muslim world generate amongst the people of Pakistan have led to a strong ideological imprint on foreign policy, although as this chapter will show, other considerations have also reinforced Pakistan's projection of Islam in foreign policy. Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, outlined clearly the relationship between Islam and foreign policy:

Pakistan came into being as a result of the urge felt by the Muslims of the sub-continent to secure a territory, however limited, where Islamic ideology and the way of life could be practised and demonstrated to the world. A cardinal feature of this ideology is to make Muslim brotherhood a living reality. It is, therefore, part of the mission which Pakistan has set before itself to do everything in its power to promote closer fellowship and cooperation between Muslim countries.¹

He also declared that 'our relations with the Muslim countries should not only be friendly but brotherly, and that they should be made stronger everyday because the mission of Pakistan [could] achieve its success only when we make other Muslim countries join it.' Similar views were expressed by successive Pakistani governments and their spirit was reflected in all the permanent constitutions of Pakistan which underlined the need for strengthening the bonds of unity amongst Muslim countries.

Based on the Islamic concept of *umah* (a community of believers), the Muslims of South Asia have a long-established tradition of maintaining spiritual bonds with, and sympathy for, Muslims living elsewhere. They expressed solidarity with the Ottoman Empire on several occasions: the Russo-Turkish War (1877), the Greek-Turkish War (1897), the Italy-Turkish War (1911), the Balkan War (1912). Soon after the conclusion of World War I, the prospects of Turkey being stripped of all its territorial possessions by the Allied Powers caused political agitation amongst the Muslims of South Asia which ultimately led to the Khilafat Movement and the Hijrat Movement. Since 1933, the Muslim League repeatedly passed resolutions in support of the Palestinian cause *vis-à-vis* the Jews and the British.

THE INITIAL POLICIES

In the post-independence period, the government of Pakistan championed the cause of Muslims anywhere in the world. It supported Indonesia, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria against their colonial rulers and identified with their struggle for independence. Similar support inside the UN and outside was extended to Libya, Sudan, Eritrea and the Palestinian national struggle. It moved aggressively in the early fifties to promote harmony and cooperation amongst the Muslim states and endeavoured to lay down the necessary infrastructure for a permanent organization representing all Muslim countries.

The response of most Muslim states to Pakistan's efforts to promote unity amongst Muslims was discouraging because the Pakistani leaders, in their enthusiasm for projecting Islam in foreign policy, and being fully convinced of the righteousness of their cause. did not take into account the political realities that obtained in the Muslim world in the fifties.

Islam did not play the same strategic role in the nationalist movements of most Middle Eastern states as was the case in Pakistan. Muslims were not a minority in the Middle East and did not feel that their social, political, and economic interests were threatened by a non-Muslim majority. Thus, Islam did not figure prominently in their nationalist struggles. Iran and Turkev were preoccupied with the Stalinist policies of the Soviet Union in the aftermath of World War II. Most Arab states were confronted with a host of challenges posed by Western colonialism, efforts of the imperial powers to carve out their spheres of influence, and the establishment of Israel with the support of colonial/imperialist powers. These developments shaped political dynamics in the Middle East more than anything else but the intensity of Hindu-Muslim conflict in South Asia in the pre-independence period conditioned the perspective of Pakistani leaders in such a manner that they could not appreciate them fully. Moreover, there were personality, dynastic, territorial and ideological conflicts in the Muslim world which made the achievement of unity and harmony as desired by Pakistan a difficult goal.

Pakistan's decision to enter into security arrangements with the US and to join two West-sponsored regional security pacts, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (CENTO), in the fifties adversely affected its ties with a number of Muslim states. Many Arab states evaluated Pakistan's ties with the West in the backdrop of their problems with the West and wondered how a Muslim country like Pakistan could develop such close ties with their adversaries and still regard itself a friend of these states. A conservative

state like Saudi Arabia described Pakistan's participation in the Baghdad Pact as 'a stab in the heart of the Arab and Muslim states.' Others, especially Egypt, were more vocal in their criticism of Pakistan's pro-West policies. Many Arab states thought that Pakistan was promoting the cause of Muslim unity at the behest of the Western powers in order to neutralize those Muslim states which did not see eye to eye with the West.

Pakistan's efforts to promote harmony in the Muslim world created an erroneous impression that Pakistan was aspiring to the leadership of the Muslim world. Gamal Abdul Nasser was not favourably disposed towards Muslim unity. He felt that any such forum would be detrimental to his concepts of Arab Nationalism and Arab Socialism and that his leadership within the Arab world (not to speak of the Muslim world) would be threatened. His criticism of Pakistan became more pronounced after it adopted an ambigious policy towards the Suez crisis, 1956.

Pakistan was thus disappointed by the lukewarm and/or negative response to its proposal for Muslim unity. What hurt Pakistan most was that Afghanistan made irredentist claims on its territory and some Muslim leaders including Nasser found greater identity of views with India's Prime Minister Nehru. As a result, Pakistan began to put greater emphasis on cultivating relations with individual Muslim states at bilateral level. Its ties with Turkey and Iran developed into a strong and multi-dimensional relationship and they worked together in CENTO and the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Indonesia also developed close bilateral relations with Pakistan. These states came out openly in support of Pakistan during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war; other Muslim states either showed a tilt towards Pakistan or adopted a neutral posture.⁵

TRANSFORMATION OF ENVIRONMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY

The projection of Islam in forc gn policy was facilitated by several changes in the international system in general and the Muslim world in particular in the late sixties and early seventies. Three sets of developments were noteworthy. First, there was a gradual shift in Pakistan's foreign policy from alignment with the West to an independent and nonaligned disposition. Therefore, the states which suspected Pakistan's bona fides as the champion of Muslim unity in the past, began to respond favourably towards Pakistan's gestures. Second, a number of developments in the Muslim world created a strong feeling of insecurity amongst Muslims. These included the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and occupation of more Arab territory

by Israel; the burning down of parts of the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem in 1969 by Israeli militants; and the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971 at the hands of the Indian military. The Muslim leaders, including the Arabs, felt that if they did not pool their resources and harmonize their policies, they might have to suffer more humiliations. Nasser dropped his opposition to the establishment of an all-embracing Islamic platform which made it possible to hold the first summit conference of heads of state/government of the Muslim countries at Rabat in 1969. This was later converted into a permanent body, named Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) with its headquarters at Jeddah. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia played a key role in promoting harmony in the Muslim world and worked for strengthening the OIC.

Third, the gradual shift in the international system from bipolarity to multipolarity enhanced the relevance of other actors to the international process. It was in this context that the 1973—4 oil embargo and the ability to raise oil prices without evoking any retaliation from the West gave Arab countries a sense of power. They used this newly discovered power to protect and advance their interests in the international system. The enhanced petroleum prices brought enormous funds at their disposal which they used to modernize their societies and to contribute to the economic development of other Muslim states.

The transformed political environment facilitated the projection of Islam in the international system by the Muslim states – something Pakistan always desired, and in fact, attempted to do in its early years of independence. By the early seventies, Pakistan was once again very active in promoting harmony in the Muslim world with the objective of making it a political force to reckon with.⁷

Pakistan's increased identification with, and pursuance of Islam in foreign policy was also a part of an overall effort to overcome the trauma caused by the separation of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971.8 It fitted in squarely with the renewed interest in Islam in the truncated and demoralized Pakistan to address the question of national identity, and thus, enjoyed popular support. At international level, it aimed at rehabilitating Pakistan's image with support from the Muslim states. In other words, the use of Islam in foreign policy did not merely satisfy the ideological dimensions of Pakistani identity, it was also conducive to the achievement of Pakistan's political, economic and security goals.

THE DIPLOMATIC DIMENSION

The dismemberment of Pakistan and the establishment of Bangladesh was a major political, military and psychological set-back to Pakistan. In such a difficult situation, Pakistan looked towards Muslim states, especially those in the Middle East, for moral, political, and economic support. Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and Sudan reiterated their support for Pakistan and the Shah of Iran paid a six-hour visit to the Pakistani capital in the second week of January 1972 to assure Iran's support to Pakistan. The Crown Prince of Jordan who visited Pakistan during the same month, expressed similar views. In May 1972, the President of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Foreign Minister of Indonesia travelled to Islamabad and expressed solidarity with Pakistan.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visited Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey in January 1972. Later, in May–June 1972, he undertook a whirlwind trip of fourteen Middle Eastern and African countries which included Abu Dhabi (UAE), Ethopia, Guinea, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan and Turkey. The major goal of these visits was to thank these governments for their support/sympathy for Pakistan during the 1971 East Pakistan crisis and the war with India, and to mobilize their support for resolving problems arising out of the 1971 episode. Most of these states called for the resolution of the India-Bangladesh-Pakistan problems in accordance with the resolutions of the UN General Assembly (7 December 1971) and the Security Council (21 December 1971).

The conference of foreign ministers of the Muslim countries (OIC), held at Jeddah in March 1972, appointed a committee comprising Algeria, Iran, Malaysia, Morocco, Somalia and Tunisia to approach Islamabad and Dhaka in order to promote reconciliations between the leaders of the 'two wings of Pakistan'. This effort was not welcomed by Bangladesh as it upheld the concept of a united Pakistan, but it clearly demonstrated the support of Muslim states for Pakistan. Subsequently, the OIC members attempted to facilitate a dialogue between Bangladesh and Pakistan and they were favourably disposed towards Pakistan's contention that Bangladesh could not put Pakistani POWs on trial.

The delay in recognition of Bangladesh by the Muslim states made it clear to the Bangladesh leadership that it could not gate-crash into the Muslim world without normalizing its relations with Pakistan. Indonesia and Malaysia recognized Bangladesh in February 1972, and the first Middle Eastern state to extend recognition was Iraq which did so in July 1972, after the signing of the Pakistan-India peace agreement at Simla. Most others like

Afghanistan (February 1973); Lebanon (March 1973); Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia (July 1973); Egypt, Syria (September 1973); Cameroun, Guinea, Jordan (October 1973); and Kuwait (November 1973) waited till the peace process was well under way. Iran, Turkey, Libya, Bahrain, Nigeria, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and a few others waited till Pakistan itself recognized Bangladesh.

The decision of the Muslim states to hold the second OIC summit conference at Lahore, in February 1974, aimed at boosting Pakistan's morale, and underlined the importance the Muslim world attached to Pakistan. It was through their initiative that Pakistan extended recognition to Bangladesh on the eve of this summit conference; followed by a tripartite agreement involving India, Bangladesh and Pakistan in April 1974 for the unconditional repatriation of all Pakistani POWs.

The widespread support of the Muslim countries helped to restore Pakistan's crisis of confidence and strengthened its role in the Third World, enabling it to be active on various international forums. These Islamic and Third World ties helped Pakistan 'to resist Washington's pressure on limiting Pakistan's nuclear programme [and] . . . made it enormously more difficult for the French to renege on their contractual agreement to supply a nuclear reprocessing plant' to Pakistan.⁹

The diplomatic support of Muslim countries for Pakistan in the aftermath of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan was critical to reinforcing Pakistan's determination to withstand Soviet pressures. The two meetings of foreign ministers of the OIC held in Pakistan in January and May 1980 demonstrated their support for Pakistan. The resolutions of subsequent meetings of the OIC Foreign Ministers and the summit conferences of heads of state/government reiterated their support for Pakistan's Afghanistan policy. A number of Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, donated funds and supplies for the uprooted Afghans living in Pakistan.

In 1990, Pakistan sought the support of Muslim countries for a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir problem in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations. Such a move was necessitated as a nationalist movement engulfed Indian-administered Kashmir, and India blamed Pakistan for engineering the agitation. As tension mounted between Pakistan and India on this issue, they mobilized their troops. Benazir Bhutto visited Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, North Yemen, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia in mid-May, and Iraq, Kuwait, Morocco, Algeria and Bahrain in July. Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia supported the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir, 10 while the positions of others ranged from a demand for a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute to its resolution in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations. King Hussain of Jordan offered to

mediate between Pakistan and India on the Kashmir issue.¹¹ These and other diplomatic efforts enabled Pakistan to secure a resolution on Kashmir in the 19th conference of the OIC foreign ministers, held at Cairo on 31 July–1 August, which was favourably disposed towards Pakistan's perspective. The resolution called for the peaceful settlement of the Kashmir problem in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the UN and as agreed upon in the Simla Accord. It also called upon India to 'redeploy' its troops and offered to send an OIC delegation for facilitating an amicable resolution of the problem.¹²

The interest of Muslim countries in the stability and solidarity of Pakistan could be gauged from the fact that they were perturbed by the political stalemate between the Bhutto government and the opposition alliance, the PNA, in the wake of street agitation launched by the latter in April-July 1977. The OIC foreign ministers' conference, held at Tripoli in May 1977, expressed concern over developments in Pakistan and emphasized the urgent need of restoring national harmony. The Islamabad-based envoys from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Libya and the PLO offered their good offices to defuse the domestic crisis in Pakistan. They met with the leaders of the two sides to evolve a formula for political settlement. The decision of the two sides to discuss Pakistan's internal crisis with the Arab envoys showed their desire not to alienate the friendly Arab states. Bhutto himself undertook a trip to Saudi Arabia, Libya, the UAE, Kuwait, Iran and Afghanistan in mid-June 1977 - two weeks before he was overthrown in a coup - to muster support for his tottering regime. But, the sands of time had run out for him.

Pakistan reciprocated the support of the Muslim states by upholding their causes and demands. It called for protection of the rights of Turkish-Cypriots and Muslims in the Philippines.¹³ It also sympathized with the Turkish government on the question of Turkish-Muslims in Bulgaria and favoured an active role by the OIC for the protection of the rights of Muslim minorities in non-Muslim states.

Pakistan identified with the Palestinian struggle for the restoration of their national rights and extended more support to the Arabs during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war than was the case in 1967 and 1956. Soon after the outbreak of the 1973 war, Bhutto expressed solidarity with the Arabs and met with Arab ambassadors based at Islamabad to assure them of Pakistan's full support to their cause. Special messages of sympathy and solidarity were sent to the Presidents of Egypt and Syria. A telegram was addressed to the UN Secretary-General, outlining Pakistan's position on the outbreak of hostilities with a demand that the Security Council should adopt 'imme-

diate measures to have occupied Arab territories vacated without further delay'. He also undertook a hurriedly-arranged trip to Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia to discuss the situation arising out of the war. He also consulted the chiefs of Pakistan's Army, Navy and Air Force for providing assistance to Egypt and Syria, and subsequently, Pakistan did extend what Bhutto described as 'systematic, organized and effective' as well as 'tangible support'. Its details were not revealed but unofficial sources claimed that Pakistan provided limited military assistance, including Pakistanipiloted military aircraft and Air Force technicians to Syria. The non-military assistance included two mobile surgical teams comprising the required staff, surgical equipment and supplies.

Pakistan was actively involved in the OIC from its earliest days and endeavoured to make it an important forum for dealing with the problems of Muslim countries and for projecting their point of view to the rest of the world. Pakistan's role was acknowledged by OIC members when, in 1980, they designated the President of Pakistan to address the UN General Assembly on behalf of the OIC. Sharifuddin Pirzada, a former federal minister and Attorney General of Pakistan, served as Secretary-General of this organization for a term from 1985 to 1988.

THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION

There has been a rapid expansion of economic ties between Pakistan and the Muslim world, especially the Middle East, since the early seventies. A host of factors have contributed to this trend; first, the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War caused a serious economic dislocation in Pakistan and when its government approached the Middle Eastern states to secure their cooperation for the rehabilitation of its war-shattered economy, their response was encouraging. Second, the rapid rise in oil prices since 1973-4 placed enormous funds at the disposal of oil-rich Arab states which they wanted to use for the modernization of their societies as well as to help other Muslim states to cope with the problems of poverty and under-development. Third, Pakistan and the oil-rich Arab states realized that they could cultivate mutually rewarding economic relations. Pakistan lacked sufficient foreign exchange for undertaking economic development but it had a vast reservoir of skilled and unskilled manpower and a relatively big service sector. The Gulf states had enormous wealth and foreign exchange but suffered from a shortage of trained manpower. Moreover, the Gulf was a food-deficient region whereas Pakistan being an agricultural country had potential for food production that could be supplied to the Gulf states. This complementary nature of their economies made policy-makers conscious of the need for promoting cooperation in the economic field.

Fourth, the stepped-up economic cooperation was a part of their effort to promote South-to-South cooperation with the goal of addressing their so-cioeconomic problems. They recognized that they could benefit from each other's experience and use their resources for their mutual benefit, thereby reducing dependence on the West. Fifth, economic cooperation undertaken in the first half of the seventies produced satisfying results for Pakistan and the Gulf states and they felt that it facilitated the achievement of their national goals. This reinforced the already existing good-will amongst these states and made it possible to extend the scope of economic cooperation in later years.

Economic cooperation is taking place both at multilateral and bilateral level, although the latter mode is more common. Major examples of multilateral economic cooperation involving Pakistan are the OIC sponsored activities and the RCD. OIC-related activities include periodic meetings of finance ministers of the member states and efforts to promote cooperation in several fields, including trade, finance and technology. The Islamic Development Bank, set up in 1975 with initial subscribed capital of two billion dollars and a paid-up capital of over 800 million dollars, was a major step in this direction. The RCD was set up in 1964 by Pakistan, Iran and Turkey to promote a wide-ranging cooperation amongst themselves. This was replaced with a new organization – the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) – in 1985.

Pakistan established Joint Ministerial Commissions with a number of Muslim countries, including Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey and the UAE, which held their meetings periodically to review bilateral economic cooperation and suggested new ways and means to expand its scope or to make it more effective. These deliberations produced agreements for joint industrial ventures and for more cooperation in the fields of trade, industry, agriculture, transport, science and technology, education, culture and tourism.

There was little direct financial assistance for Pakistan from the Middle Eastern states prior to 1972. Since then Pakistan received soft credits, interest-free loans and financial grants from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Libya, the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar. In 1974–5, Pakistan received more financial assistance from the oil producing countries than what Pakistan's traditional aid donors (the US and other Western countries) offered. By 1976–7, Pakistan had become one of the 'prime recipients of aid' from the Middle

East.¹⁷ Iran made two loans amounting to 730 million dollars during 1972–6 and other major loans described as general purposes loans were given by the UAE (100 million dollars), Libya (80 million dollars), Qatar (10 million dollars), and the OPEC Special Fund (21.45 million dollars). Saudi Arabia topped the list of those offering project assistance by contributing 130 million dollars, followed by the UAE (92 million dollars), Iran (75 million dollars), Libya (53 million dollars) and Kuwait (45 million dollars). When an earthquake caused widespread devastation in the northern regions of Pakistan in December 1974, Muslim states contributed 42 million dollars to the relief fund: Libya (16 million dollars), Saudi Arabia (10 million dollars), the UAE (8 million dollars), Kuwait (5 million dollars), Qatar (1 million dollars), Iran and other Muslim states (2 million dollars).¹⁸

The oil-producing countries made investments in joint projects in Pakistan in the seventies. Iran invested in a number of joint industrial ventures, mainly in Baluchistan. Saudi Arabia made funds available for a number of industrial projects and a Pakistan-Saudi Arabia bank, Al-Jazeera, was established in Saudi Arabia. The UAE-Pakistan joint ventures included the expansion of a fertilizer plant in Multan, and the setting-up of an oil refinery in Multan. Kuwait offered funds for improvement of the Tarbela-Karachi transmission line; Libyan-aided projects included a holding company, an investment banking corporation, a shipping company and a publishing house.

Investment and assistance from these states declined as their resources dwindled in the eighties due to the downward trend in oil prices. The Iranian Revolution (1979) and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 also adversely affected their assistance to, and investments in Pakistan. Iran could no longer spare funds as it was faced with the dual challenge of domestic reconstruction and an armed conflict with Iraq. The neighbouring Arab countries, perturbed by the radical Islamic disposition of the new Iranian government, diverted their resources for strengthening their external and internal security arrangements and for helping Iraq vis-à-vis Iran.

Trade is an important aspect of economic interaction between Pakistan and the Muslim countries which expanded rapidly in the seventies. The loss of East Pakistan in 1971 meant the loss of a big market for Pakistani goods. Pakistan needed an alternative market for its products, which it found in the Middle East and the Gulf. The major export items include vegetables, fruits, wheat, rice, cotton and textile products, and cement. The smuggling of cattle for slaughtering, fish, cement and several food items to the Gulf states is also reported from time to time. If farming is modernized, and packing and transportation facilities are improved, Pakistan could supply more farm

products to these states. The same applies to beef and goat meat and poultry products whose demand cannot be locally met in the Gulf states. Pakistan's major import from these states is crude oil and its products.

The most important benefit of Pakistan's ties with the Middle East has been the absorption of Pakistani manpower in the oil rich Gulf states and Libya. Over a million skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers were absorbed as construction and related developmental work boomed in these states in the mid- and late seventies. Skilled masons, carpenters, plumbers, welders, electricians, auto drivers and technicians of various types were in great demand. Engineers, doctors, nurses and other hospital staff, teachers, and people with experience in accountancy, business management, banking and a host of other professions were also able to find jobs in the Middle East. Sudan, Nigeria and Uganda also hired Pakistani teachers, engineers and doctors. This reduced the pressure of the unemployed and underemployed on Pakistan's domestic political system and the transfer of funds by Pakistanis working abroad became a major source of foreign exchange earnings for Pakistan. In 1972-3, Pakistani workers based in the Middle East remitted 37.74 million dollars as compared with 101.26 million dollars sent home by Pakistani workers elsewhere. By 1982-3, remittances from the Middle East, amounting to 2408.44 million dollars far exceeded the amount sent home from elsewhere (478.08 million dollars) and constituted approximately 83 per cent of total remittances for that year. The remittances constituted 18 per cent merchandise export in 1972-3, but by 1982-3 these surpassed merchandise export earnings by about 10 per cent. 19 However, foreign remittances began to decline after 1982-3, as major construction work had been completed in the Gulf region and the decline in oil earnings forced these governments to scale down their future plans. Despite a steady decline over the years, workers' remittances still constituted an important source of foreign exchange earning for Pakistan which suffered from the perennial problem of foreign exchange shortage and an unfavourable balance of payments.

The induction of money earned in the Middle East into Pakistan had a profound impact on life-styles and consumption patterns of the concerned population and helped middle-level business. But, this also generated new social tensions as 'Gulf bonanza' overtook the society with consumerism and high-visibility spending. Those who could not benefit from this found themselves at a clear disadvantage from obtaining necessary goods and services, which caused frustration and alienation amongst them. The export of manpower also caused a shortage of skilled construction workers, plumbers, carpenters, electricians and unskilled labour. Similarly, trade with the Gulf states caused some inconvenience to domestic consumers. Many food

items of daily consumption were in short supply from time to time in the seventies and their prices shot up. However, these problems were eased when the government of Pakistan began to regulate their shipment abroad so as to adequately cope with their demand in the domestic market.

THE SECURITY DIMENSION

As a champion of unity and harmony amongst the Muslim states, Pakistan favoured the adoption of joint measures for dealing with their common defence and security problems. However, given the diversity in the Muslim world, such proposals were not seriously pursued. The major exception to this was the cooperation among Pakistan, Iran and Turkey under CENTO, and half-hearted efforts by the Arab states to coordinate their security policies vis-à-vis Israel. It was in the late sixties that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia agreed on cooperation in this area, and Pakistan sent a small number of military officers to Saudi Arabia to help development of the Saudi Army and Air Force. A similar arrangement with Jordan made it possible to place a number of Pakistani military advisers at the disposal of the Jordanian government. Pakistan also offered training facilities to these states in its military institutions. The Sultanate of Oman directly recruited Baluchis to its army. Its recruiting teams frequently visited the Makran area to get Baluch youths, a practice that lasted until the early eighties.²⁰

The seventies have witnessed a realization amongst the decision-makers of Pakistan and the Gulf states that their security is interdependent due mainly to geographic proximity, economic and political linkages, and shared perceptions of the growing security pressures on the region. The Gulf rulers' fears of internal and regional instability coincided with Pakistan's post-1971 security predicament. These vulnerabilities were accentuated after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan: Pakistan was perturbed by, *inter alia*, the spectre of a two-front war, and the Gulf states viewed this as a prelude to an active Soviet support to the pro-Soviet dissident groups in the region which would intensify pressures on their governments. Most Gulf states were also alarmed by the radical disposition of the Islamic revolutionary regime in Iran and especially its assertion that it would encourage similar revolutions in neighbouring Gulf states.

Fully conscious of the weaknesses of their security arrangements, the Gulf states looked towards an ever-willing Pakistan for help. The Pakistan military was known for discipline and professionalism, and it had sufficient experience of handling American weapons and equipment which the Gulf states were also using. Moreover, the shared religious background of

Pakistani military advisers made them more acceptable in the Gulf. A large number of Pakistanis were already working in civilian sectors, the induction of military advisers was not bound to evoke any negative reaction. Had the Gulf rulers inducted American military advisers, the Islamic Republic of Iran and a host of fundamentalist-Islamic groups in the region would have taken a strong exception and this would have also made Gulf rulers vulnerable to the charge of relying heavily on the US for their political survival.

Pakistan cultivated bilateral security ties with the Gulf states: first, it signed protocols of cooperation in the military field providing for training facilities to their personnel in Pakistan. Second, a large number of officers and men of the Pakistan military were assigned to the armed forces of most Gulf and some other Arab states. They currently include retired as well as serving personnel, mainly of the Army and the Air Force, who perform training, maintenance and technical jobs, although it may not always be possible to draw a clear line between these assignments and active military duty. Pakistani pilots have been serving with the air forces of a number of Arab states since the late sixties, more so since the early seventies. Third, Pakistan exports small arms and weapons manufactured by Pakistan Ordnance Factories to a number of Gulf states. Fourth, Pakistan obtained some weapons through Iran and Turkey in the early seventies. Libya, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia provided Pakistan with financial assistance for strengthening its defence arrangements.

The concept of joint defence arrangements amongst Muslim states or a greater coordination of their security policies enjoys widespread support in Pakistan. The civil and military elite often talks about it and the media publishes articles on this theme from time to time, urging the Muslim states to pool their resources together for dealing with security problems. General Mirza Aslam Beg, Chief of Army Staff, urged Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan (after a popularly supported government was established) to develop a 'strategic consensus' amongst themselves. This would, he maintained, promote security and stability as well as strengthen these states which were linked together with 'strong historical, cultural and ideological' ties.²¹ This might sound premature because of the divergence in the orientations of their elite and the constraints of power politics (domestic and international). However, Pakistan will continue to be an ardent supporter of such an idea and it will always be willing to cooperate with any Muslim state for that purpose. Pakistan also advocates cooperation amongst the Muslim states in defence production. The need for setting up joint defencerelated industrial ventures has figured prominently in Pakistan's high-level interaction with Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Libya. However, no concrete measures have so far been adopted to establish joint ventures in defence production.

THE PROBLEM OF BALANCE

The seventies were characterized by Pakistan's balanced approach towards the Middle East: cordial relations with the states of the region irrespective of their political disposition and intra-Arab rivalries. This was also the period when Pakistan was pursuing an independent and nonaligned foreign policy and the cleavages in the Middle East were relatively defused.

The balance in Pakistan's interaction with the Middle East came under strain in the eighties due mainly to Pakistan's tilt towards the US against the backdrop of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan's task was also made difficult by the polarization of radical-Islamic, antimonarchy and anti-US post-Revolution Iran and the conservative, monarchical and pro-US Gulf states. This polarization accentuated as the latter endeavoured to contain the ideological spillover of the Iranian Revolution in the region.

These developments adversely affected efforts to promote peace and harmony amongst the Muslim states and compromised the role of the OIC as an effective forum for addressing the problems of member states. Pakistan also found it difficult to maintain a balance in its relations with the conservative, monarchical and pro-US Gulf states and the radical Muslim states, i.e., Algeria, Iran, Libya, and Syria. If anything, it became identified with the former, especially Saudi Arabia, and its relations with the latter declined.

Pakistan's clear tilt towards the pro-West and monarchical Gulf regimes, especially Saudi Arabia, could be explained with reference to the financial support it received from these states, the conservative Islamic disposition of General Zia-ul-Haq's government in Pakistan (1977–88), and the strong personal reverence the general felt for the House of Saud. Syria and Libya were viewed by the Zia regime as having a soft corner for the Bhutto family. As a result, enthusiasm and cordiality that marked Pakistan's relations with these states in the early seventies was replaced with business-like functional interaction in the early and mid-eighties. Pakistan's ties with the United States against the backdrop of the Afghanistan crisis also contributed to this trend.

The PPP government (December 1988-August 1990) endeavoured to restore balance in Pakistan's interaction with the Middle Eastern states by

improving its relations with Libya, Syria, Algeria, and the PLO, without downgrading the already existing multi-faceted interaction with the conservative and monarchical Gulf states.

There was a shift back to the conservative Arab kingdoms after the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto's government in early August 1990. In addition to condemning Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait, which no Pakistani government would have condoned, Pakistan contributed 5000 troops to the US dominated multi-nation force based in Saudi Arabia to counter the Iraqi threat. Pakistan's official circles claimed that its troops would not engage in military action outside the territory of Saudi Arabia and, that, in case of a war, they would protect the holy cities of Makkah and Madina, as non-Muslim/Western troops could not be assigned this duty.²² Pakistan consulted with Iran, Turkey, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and Jordan on these developments. It assured the Gulf states of its support to their independence and territorial integrity, and made an unsuccessful attempt to persuade Jordan to support the American and Arab policy on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.²³

This was the first instance of Pakistan's direct involvement in an intra-Arab dispute; previously, Pakistan avoided taking sides openly. For example, in the mid-seventies, while supporting the right of self-determination for the people of Western Sahara, Pakistan did not take sides when Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco diverged on ways and means to determine the territory's political future. Similarly, Pakistan maintained neutrality on the Iran-Iraq war (1980–8). When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Pakistan's first criticism of Iraq's action was carefully worded. However, on being approached by Saudi Arabia and prompted by the United States, Pakistan agreed to contribute troops which embroiled Pakistan in an intra-Arab conflict.

5 The United States

Pakistan's relations with the United States occupy an important place in Pakistan's foreign policy. The two states have generally maintained a favourable disposition towards each other but their interaction has not always progressed smoothly. It is a complex relationship because despite a convergence of interests and goals, as was the case in the fifties and the eighties, they diverge on several policy issues which produces ups and downs in their relations.

The major problem in their relations stems from the difference in their positions and roles in the international system. Being a superpower, the Unites States pursues global interests and its foreign policy behaviour is shaped essentially by its competition with the Soviet Union. Pakistan's security interests are regional and it views India as its major adversary. Whereas the United States is obsessed with the Soviet Union's influence, Pakistan wants to offset India's substantial advantage in military power. Thus, Pakistan's major interests have been to secure economic assistance, political support and weapons. For the United States, Pakistan's importance depends on the extent to which it is relevant to advancing its global strategy.

As United States policy towards Pakistan is an appendage to its global policy, any change in its global policy has ramifications for its Pakistan policy. The United States entered into military alliances with Pakistan in the fifties as a part of its strategy to contain the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Its economic and military assistance aimed at strengthening Pakistan's internal stability and external security so that it could resist a communist 'onslaught'.

Pakistan's relevance to US policy began to erode in the sixties due to a number of developments in the international system which included the advent of reconnaissance satellites and ICBMs that reduced the importance of American bases in Pakistan and elsewhere, the Sino-Soviet split, and the Sino-Indian border conflict, 1962. The United States began to manifest some fascination for nonalignment and decided to strengthen India's security to counterbalance China. This was bound to evoke the displeasure of, and protest from, Pakistan which felt the US was pursuing policies which adversely effected an ally, i.e. Pakistan.

Pakistan's strategic significance for United States global policy was once again enhanced by the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. United States policies to counterbalance Soviet adventure in Afghanistan

could not be effectively implemented without Pakistan's collaboration. Pakistan was thus courted and given the glorified title of 'Frontline state' as the United States decided to turn Pakistan into a bulkwark against Soviet 'expansionism'.

Pakistan's geographic proximity to the Gulf region and its historical, cultural, economic and, above all, security ties with Gulf states evoke much interest amongst US policy-makers who have an abiding interest in the stability of the region – a goal shared by Pakistan for its own considerations. The major US interests in the Gulf region include an uninterrupted flow of oil to the West and Japan, trade and investments, the recycling of Petrodollar, and the sustenance of the pro-West regimes. Pakistan's policies towards the Gulf region are viewed as helpful to US goals. Its Makran coast and especially the port of Gawadir have strategic importance and their control by an adversary can adversely affect America's interests in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean region.

US policy towards Pakistan is thus shaped primarily by considerations around Pakistan rather than within it, although Pakistani policy-makers tend to over-emphasize the importance of Pakistan to justify their alignment with the United States. Pakistan attracts 'peripheral and derivative' US interest, and American policy towards Pakistan is formulated 'essentially to protect and serve US objectives in adjacent regions to the east and west'.²

The divergence in their perspectives and considerations has given a cause of complaint to both sides. Pakistan has often complained about Washington's non-responsiveness to its preferences and security concerns. The main complaint pertains to US reluctance to extend full support to Pakistan in its disputes with India. The United States complains that Pakistan is not willing to subscribe fully to its global interests and it is wary of Pakistan's efforts to involve it in local or regional disputes which may not have direct relevance to its global interests.

Other issues which figure prominently in their interaction include non-proliferation and narcotics trafficking. They are engaged in a constant dialogue on the former, although they are at odds on the ways and means to achieve it. As the latter poses a serious threat to their social structures, they are cooperating to contain its production and trafficking. Another dimension of interaction pertains to US economic and technological assistance which has contributed to Pakistan's efforts to address poverty and underdevelopment. American arms transfers to Pakistan, whether as grant, on credit, or against cash payment, have been a notable aspect of their relationship, although their priorities do not always converge.

As a host of factors and divergent considerations shape their foreign policy perspectives, they have cultivated a multi-layered pattern of interaction involving both positive and negative exchanges, with positive exchanges being more conspicuous. The relationship varies from issue to issue and it fluctuates over time. However, the two countries generally play down their differences and cooperate with each other even when they do not fully share each other's goals.

POST-1971 PAKISTAN

There was a marked improvement in Pakistan's relations with the United States during 1972–5 against the backdrop of the controversial US 'tilt' towards Pakistan in the course of the Bangladesh crisis, 1971, and Pakistan's role in the promotion of Sino-US rapprochment. In fact, the normalization of relations between the United States and China in 1971–2 removed an irritant in Pakistan-United States relations. In the sixties, the United States was critical of Pakistan's efforts to augment its ties with China. However, with the visit of Dr Henry Kissinger and Nixon to China in July 1971 and February 1972 respectively, the close Sino-Pakistan ties turned out to be an asset for Pakistan. The two countries were obliged to Pakistan for facilitating their détente.

The United States favoured an early normalization of relations between Pakistan and India and urged continuation of the ceasefire and withdrawal of 'all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the Ceasefire Line in Jammu and Kashmir.' It also welcomed the signing of the Simla Agreement (1972), and the resumption of the repatriation of POWs and civilian internees (1973). Similarly, it hailed the agreement among Pakistan, India and Bangladesh (1974) for an amicable settlement of the war trials controversy, and the restoration of diplomatic and other ties between Pakistan and India.

The United States share of total foreign economic assistance to Pakistan was 68.4 per cent during 1951–60, which dropped to 50.6 per cent in the sixties. This steady decline continued in the seventies: 14.9 per cent during 1971–7.4 Despite the decline in the United States share, it was useful for Pakistan's economic development. Traditionally, the bulk of the assistance comprised food aid under the PL-480 programme, commodity assistance, and project assistance mainly for agriculture, health, population, education and infrastructure. In the early seventies, it provided loans and grants for overcoming economic dislocation caused by the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war and adopted a sympathetic attitude towards Pakistan's request to the international agencies for economic assistance and debt rescheduling. The United States also provided humanitarian assistance for flood-stricken areas in

1973,⁵ and contributed funds and goods for relief work when an earthquake caused devastation in the northern areas in December 1974.

Bhutto was assured of United States support for the 'sovereignty and unity' of post-1971 Pakistan by Nixon and the Secretary of State, William Rogers, when he met them in Washington on 18 December 1971.6 Similar views were expressed time and again by American leaders. Nixon described Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity as having a 'critical importance' for peace in South Asia,⁷ and that it was 'the cornerstone of American foreign policy.'8 This support was reaffirmed by President Ford as the 'enduring principle' of United States foreign policy.9 The Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, who visited Pakistan in 1971, 1973, 1974 and 1976, reiterated the US President's commitment when he described Pakistan's territorial integrity as his government's 'principal interest'.10 However, the United States did not make any specific security guarantee to back-up its commitment to Pakistan, and kept on molifying India by declaring that it acknowledged its stature as a pre-eminent regional power.

Pakistan reactivated its interest in CENTO as a counterweight to the Indo-Soviet Treaty (1971), and participated in CENTO military exercises – Midlink - in 1974. Bhutto offered to pull out of this treaty if India renounced its 1971 treaty with the Soviet Union. 11 Pakistan believed that an active interaction with CENTO members would strengthen Pakistan's defence and, above all, facilitate the lifting of the US arms embargo on South Asia. Bhutto was also willing to strengthen the existing defence arrangements with the United States with the objective of 'replacing American equipment destroyed during the war with India'. 12 However, the United States was neither in favour of entering into any new security arrangement with Pakistan nor did it want to remove ambiguities in the existing security pacts between the two countries. The lack of American enthusiasm was quite understandable. They did not want to alienate India altogether. Besides, Iran was viewed as a better candidate for closer collaboration in the defence and security field, which could, in turn, cultivate security ties with Pakistan.

ARMS EMBARGO

Traditionally, American arms sales constituted a core part of Pak-US security relations which were discontinued when the United States imposed an arms embargo on South Asia in 1971.¹³ Though the US decision applied equally to Pakistan and India the latter was not adversely affected as it obtained most of its weapons from non-American sources, and the Soviet

Union continued to supply weapons to India during the course of the 1971 war. Pakistan, which was obtaining a substantial part of its weaponry from the United States, found itself in an extremely difficult situation by the imposition of the embargo.

The Bhutto government lobbied hard for the lifting of the embargo so that equipment lost in the 1971 war could be replaced. It also wanted to obtain new weapons in order to show to the military that the government was deeply interested in their modernization. The government of Pakistan argued that the embargo was discriminatory and that, as a partner in regional security arrangements (i.e. CENTO, the 1959 Agreement of Cooperation), Pakistan was entitled to obtain weapons from the United States. It was not until March 1973 that the United States eased the embargo by resuming the sale of non-lethal military equipment and spare parts of previously supplied equipment. This was a return to the 1966–7 arms sales policy which enabled Pakistan to receive 300 Armoured Personnel Carriers and arms worth \$1.1 billion contracted before the imposition of the embargo.

Pakistan viewed this as a step in the right direction but it favoured a total removal of the embargo so that it could obtain new weapons and military hardware. This issue was taken up during Bhutto's visit to the United States in September 1973. He made a strong plea for the removal of the embargo by underlining the urgent need to modernize the defence apparatus in the face of security threats, Pakistan's role as an American ally, and the bilateral security arrangements between the two countries. Though the United States reaffirmed its commitment to Pakistan's independence and promised to continue providing grants and loans for economic development, it gave no signs of lifting the arms embargo.

It was not until 1975 that the United States decided to review its arms supply policy. Several factors contributed to that: first, the detonation of a nuclear device by India in 1974 introduced a new element in South Asia's strategic context. Pakistan, being perturbed by this development, raised the issue at various international forums, demanded guarantees for the non-nuclear weapon countries, and put forward a proposal for the designation of South Asia as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. India's nuclear explosion was discussed with the United States and the joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of Kissinger's visit to Pakistan in October–November 1974 described this as having 'adverse implications' for the region. ¹⁶ Pakistan urged the United States to review the arms embargo policy in the context of this development in South Asia.

Second, the assumption of power by Sardar Daoud after the overthrown of King Zahir Shah in Afghanistan, and the revival of irredentist claims on

Pakistani territory by the new Afghan government intensified security pressures on Pakistan. As tension mounted between the two countries in 1974-5, Pakistan urged the United States to provide concrete support.

Third, the insurgency in parts of Baluchistan which erupted in 1973, produced a long drawn-out confrontation between the Baluch tribes and the Pakistan Army. What perturbed Pakistan most was the Afghan support to some of the insurgent groups and its efforts to raise the Baluchistan issue at international level. The Pakistani leadership viewed Afghan policy towards the Baluchistan insurgency as an effort to destabilize Pakistan, which, in the opinion of a section of Pakistani decision-makers, enjoyed tacit Soviet support.

Fourth, the Shah of Iran, who was working towards making Iran a regional military power, was perturbed by the trouble in Baluchistan and strongly believed that the Afghan government was supporting Baluch insurgents at the behest of the Soviet Union. This worried him because he thought that the destabilization of Pakistan would adversely affect Iran's security. Therefore, he not only extended support to Pakistan to put down the insurgency in Baluchistan but also pleaded strongly with the United States to supply weapons to Pakistan.

Fifth, Pakistan's expanding ties with the Gulf states, especially in the security field, evoked active American interest. It was felt in the United States that a strong Pakistan with its ties with the Gulf states could be instrumental to advancing American interests in the Gulf region.

Sixth, the United States realized that its embargo did not stop the induction of weapons into South Asia. Pakistan and India were buying weapons from non-American sources, especially from European arms suppliers. Furthermore, Pakistan obtained weapons from China, and India continued to get a large supply of weapons from the Soviets. Thus, the continuation of the American arms embargo hardly made any sense.

Seventh, notwithstanding India's nuclear explosion, the normalization process in South Asia had made sufficient progress: the Pakistani POWs issue was amicably settled, Pakistan had recognized Bangladesh, and various steps were being taken to improve bilateral relations between Pakistan and India. The United States therefore realized that, given other security-related interests and developments in and around South Asia, a revision of the arms embargo policy was desirable.

When Bhutto undertook his second visit to the United States in the first week of February 1975, the US Administration was engaged in a detailed review of its arms embargo on South Asia. In addition to discussing the important regional and international political developments, and US economic assistance, especially food aid, to Pakistan, Bhutto repeated his plea

for the withdrawal of the arms embargo so that Pakistan could obtain 'defensive weapons for legitimate defence purposes.' The joint communiqué reiterated United States support for the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan, and Bhutto returned to Pakistan rather optimistic about the withdrawal of the embargo.

Bhutto's optimism was not misplaced, because 17 days after the conclusion of his visit the United States announced the lifting of the embargo on arms sales to India and Pakistan. However, the US government made it clear that it would not make any equipment available on credit or as a military assistance grant. The requests for arms would be considered against cash payment on a case-by-case basis. It would also take into account a number of other factors including the impact of arms transfers on the process of normalization of relations between Pakistan and India, the relevance of the request for arms to legitimate defence needs, and the level of armaments in the region.¹⁹

Pakistan welcomed the lifting of the embargo and described this as a rectification of an anomaly whereby an ally (i.e. Pakistan) could not purchase arms from the United States. India, which always opposed the procurement of weapons by Pakistan from external sources, was perturbed by the prospect of Pakistan getting new military equipment from the United States, and its government expressed 'strong disappointment and regret' over the lifting of the embargo.²⁰ This would, India maintained, lead to an arms race between the two countries and adversely affect the process of normalization initiated under the Simla Agreement.²¹ The United States rejected India's criticism,²² and Pakistan described India's opposition as unjustified.²³

The United States' demand for cash payment for all defence purchases was a serious constraint on Pakistan's ability to obtain new equipment. Therefore, Pakistan received quite a limited quantity of weapons during 1975–7. Moreover, after experiencing two embargos in 1965 and 1971, Pakistan had diversified its sources of arms procurement, and did not want to revert to the policy of heavy reliance on the United States for arms procurement pursued in the fifties. The United States was also not willing to sell any major weapon system or aircraft after the two countries developed sharp differences on Pakistan's nuclear programme in 1977.

THE NUCLEAR ISSUE

Pakistan's nuclear programme generated sharp differences between Pakistan and the United States. This episode began after Pakistan signed an

agreement with France in March 1976 for the procurement of a plutonium separation reprocessing plant. This deal was made possible when Pakistan accepted all the safeguards required by France, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) approved of the proposed sale. However, the United States interpreted this as an effort on the part of Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapon capability, and thus a potential threat to its nonproliferation policy.

Refusing to accept Pakistan's repeated assurances that its nuclear programme was designed to meet its energy needs, the United States attempted to dissuade Pakistan from obtaining the reprocessing plant by persuasion. When this did not work, the United States applied strong diplomatic pressures on Pakistan. Henry Kissinger, who visited Pakistan in August 1976, described the nuclear safeguards agreed to between Pakistan and France as inadequate, and warned Bhutto that the United States might be constrained to resort to punitive action against Pakistan if the nuclear deal with France was not cancelled. Subsequently, the Department of State officials, including the US ambassador to Pakistan made it abundantly clear to Pakistan's Foreign Office that they were totally opposed to the Franco-Pakistan deal, and that if Pakistan insisted on pursuing the deal, it could disrupt the gamut of their bilateral relations. In order to make their demand palatable, the United States offered to sell 110 A-7 aircraft to Pakistan. It also applied pressure on France to cancel the deal with Pakistan.

Pakistan viewed United States policy towards its nuclear programme as selective and discriminatory which caused strong resentment in Pakistan's official and unofficial circles. It was described as a denial of the right of a Third World state to acquire nuclear technology. Bhutto turned increasingly critical of the United States, especially after the right-wing opposition launched street agitation to dislodge him from power in the early summer of 1977. He publicly denounced the United States pressure on Pakistan's nuclear programme and charged that the United States was in league with his domestic political adversaries for the overthrow of his government as a retaliation to his 'defiant' policies.²⁶ These charges, repeated quite often by Bhutto before and after his overthrow, accentuated differences between Pakistan and the United States.

There is hardly any concrete evidence available to establish American involvement in the anti-Bhutto agitation and his ultimate overthrow by the military in July 1977. But some circumstantial evidence suggested that by the summer of 1977, the United States was no longer 'interested' in Bhutto. Two developments were quite significant: first, after April 1977, the United States stopped new economic assistance to underline its displeasure over Pakistan's efforts to acquire a nuclear reprocessing plant.²⁷ Second, in early June, the United States withdrew the offer of 110 A-7 aircraft.²⁸ Earlier, it

withheld the export of a large quantity of tear-gas to Pakistan.²⁹ These developments showed that the United States was not averse to any change of government in Pakistan – an indication fully understood by the opposition groups. The withdrawal of the A-7 aircraft offer discredited Bhutto in military circles. This was to be the first major aircraft procurement from the United States since the sixties. The cancellation of this deal and Bhutto's extremely strained relations with the United States, coupled with his serious domestic problems, brought Pakistan's military leadership to the conclusion that Bhutto could no longer be instrumental in the process of military modernization.

The disagreement between Pakistan and the United States on the nuclear question was not resolved after the overthrow of Bhutto and the establishment of military rule in Pakistan, Jimmy Carter (US President 1977–81) who assigned a high priority to the cause of nonproliferation, vigorously worked for the annulment of the Franco-Pakistan nuclear deal, and communicated to Pakistan that his administration was willing to put its relations with Pakistan at stake to secure Pakistan's compliance with the US legislation forbidding plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment by the states receiving American economic assistance.³⁰ He also rebuked Pakistan by excluding it from his travel itinerary when he visited Iran, India and a few other countries in the region in December 1977 and January 1978. United States efforts to stall Pakistan's attempts to procure a reprocessing plant succeeded when, in August 1978, France accepted American suggestion to cancel the deal. Two months later, the United States agreed to resume economic assistance to Pakistan for new development projects, and in November 1978, offered to sell military aircraft.³¹ In January 1979, it expressed its willingness to sell new military equipment to Pakistan 'within the parameters of [American] global and regional arms sales policies'.³²

A crisis erupted in Pakistan-United States relations in April 1979, when, on receiving intelligence reports that Pakistan was building a clandestine facility for enriching uranium through the use of the gas centrifuge method,³³ the United States invoked the Symmington-Glenn amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act to cut off all economic assistance and military sales to Pakistan. Military training grants were also stopped and a number of Pakistani military officers under training in the United States were asked to return to Pakistan without having completed their training programmes. However, food shipments to Pakistan under PL-480 were not discontinued.³⁴ Rejecting the charges of secretly acquiring nuclear weapon capability, Pakistan described America's punitive action as 'an act of discrimination provoked by Zionist circles' determined to prevent nuclear research in Muslim states.³⁵ The high level talks, held between the two countries in

May and October 1979 for the resolution of this problem, could not stem the steady deterioration of their relations.

The lowest point in their relations was reached on 21 November 1979, when a mob, mainly comprising students, ransacked and burnt down the US embassy at Islamabad, following rumours that the United States and Israel were involved in the siege of the Grand Mosque in Makka (Kaaba) by a fundamentalist Islamic group. Two American marines, two Pakistani employees of the embassy, and two demonstrators were killed and over 50 people were injured in the incident. Anti-American demonstrations were also staged in front of the American Centres in Rawalpindi, Lahore and Karachi. The government of Pakistan regretted the incident and, subsequently, paid 13 652 000 dollars to the United States as compensation for the burning down of the embassy.

IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS

Relations between Pakistan and the United States, which reached their lowest ebb after the Islamabad embassy incident, showed signs of improvement in January 1980, and the United States expressed its willingness to restore economic assistance and military sales to Pakistan. This dramatic shift was caused by the US decision to review its policy in response to Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan on 27 December 1979.

The United States responded to the Soviet move in Afghanistan by adopting several measures which included, *inter alia*, punitive political and diplomatic measures including a boycott of the Moscow Olympics and the suspension of proceedings for the ratification of the SALT II Treaty; the shoring up of its military capability in the region; and a decision to sustain resistance to the Soviet troops in Afghanistan.³⁸ In January 1980, Carter declared in his address to the joint session of Congress that 'an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.' A rapid Deployment Force, under active consideration for some time, was established to protect American interests in the Middle East and the Gulf region – an area from Egypt to Pakistan. On 1 January 1983, it was redesignated as the US Central Command (CENTCOM), with its head-quarters at Tampa, Florida.

Pakistan, which shared a long border with Afghanistan, was a logical choice for cooption by the United States. It offered to strengthen Pakistan's

defence arrangements, and sought the latter's cooperation for access to the Afghan resistance groups. In an interview with a Pakistani weekly, the US ambassador, Ronald Spiers, succinctly described American attitude towards Pakistan:

Our major interest and pre-occupation is to prevent an extension of Soviet power. . . . The Soviet move in Afghanistan has changed the strategic environment in this part of the world. Pakistan is now a frontline state under direct threat from the Soviet Union.⁴⁰

The United States invoked the hitherto dormant 1959 Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation⁴¹ to reaffirm its commitment to Pakistan's security *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union, and, as a gesture of solidarity, Carter had a telephonic conversation with Zia-ul-Haq on security issues.⁴² The first dialogue on the security issues was resumed in January 1980, when Agha Shahi, who was in New York in connection with the UN General Assembly debate on Afghanistan, visited Washington and met with the Secretary of State, Cyrus R. Vance, and other senior officials of the State Department.

Pakistan was inclined from the beginning to join hands with the United States to counteract the Soviets in Afghanistan, but it wanted categorical American guarantees for its security and a commitment to sufficient economic and military assistance before embarking on such a course of action. It was not therefore surprising that the first US aid offer of \$400 million – equally divided between economic aid and military sales – spread over two years was considered inadequate by Pakistan. Zia-ul-Haq described this as 'peanuts' and said that Pakistan could not buy its security with this amount. Alater, Zia's foreign policy adviser, Agha Shahi, declared that unless the offer was substantially increased it would 'detract from, rather than enhance our security'.

Two American delegations visited Pakistan in February 1980 to allay Pakistan's doubts about the American security commitment and to assess Pakistan's military needs. The first high-powered delegation was led by President Carter's adviser on national security, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and included, among others, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher. They had a detailed dialogue with Zia-ul-Haq and his foreign policy adviser, Agha Shahi. The two sides reaffirmed their identity of views on the Afghanistan situation and declared that the Soviet intervention posed a 'serious threat to the peace and security of Pakistan, the region, and the world.' However, there was no agreement on the quantum of aid and the nature of American guarantees to Pakistan. The crux of the problem was that Pakistan wanted to replace the 1959 Agreement with a formal security

treaty comprehensive enough to ward off all security threats, but Brzezinski was not prepared to promise anything beyond a public affirmation of the 1959 Agreement.

The second delegation comprised the US military experts who came to Pakistan to assess its military requirements. There was a wide discrepancy between what Pakistan described as its minimum needs and what the United States was inclined to offer. Pakistan's demand list was described by the American officials as a 'wishful shopping list' which included radar, aircraft, anti-tank missiles, armed helicopters, tanks, APCs, light field artillery and self-propelled guns. This involved an expenditure of approximately \$11 billion.⁴⁶

The major obstacle to evolving a consensus on the security issues was Pakistan's distrust of the Carter Administration. Given Pakistan's row with the Carter Administration on the nuclear issue, the former entertained doubts about the latter's verbal commitments. The Pakistani policy-makers were of the opinion that the commitment made in the 1959 Agreement was very vague and that it was not legally binding on the United States. Pakistan's earlier attempts to invoke this agreement during the Indo-Pakistan wars were thwarted by the United States. The constraints which the United States' desire to maintain goodwill with India imposed on the invocation of this executive arrangement was also not overlooked by Pakistan, especially because of the Carter Administration's renewed emphasis on India's regional role. Additionally, a section of the academia/regional experts/leaders of public opinion in the United States either opposed the revival of the security relationship or advised caution. Some elements in the US Administration also entertained reservations on close cooperation with Pakistan as they had not fully recovered from the trauma of the Islamabad embassy incident, not to speak of their doubts about Pakistan's nuclear programme.

The Pakistani policy-makers were of the view that these political uncertainties and deficiencies would render the 1959 Agreement inoperative at a time of crisis. They demanded iron-clad American commitment to Pakistan's security in the shape of a formal treaty approved by the US Senate.⁴⁷ Similarly, Pakistan wanted a substantial increase in the economic assistance proposed by the Carter Administration. The United States made a gesture by facilitating the rescheduling of Pakistan's debts in the summer of 1980, but the impasse on economic assistance and security relations persisted.

The meeting between Zia-ul-Haq and Carter in Washington in October 1980 enabled them to review their bilateral relations. These talks were described as 'very purposeful' by Zia-ul-Haq, and Carter reaffirmed the importance of Pakistan's independence, freedom and security for the United

States.⁴⁸ But, when it came to addressing the main issue of their bilateral relations – economic aid and security guarantees – they were unable to compose their differences. In the meantime, Pakistan turned towards the Muslim states and China for support in the context of the Afghanistan crisis. Their willingness to stand by Pakistan reinforced its policy of holding back on the revival of economic and security ties with the United States until satisfactory terms were agreed upon.

No new initiative was undertaken until after Ronald Reagan assumed the US Presidency in January 1981. Given Reagan's ideological orientations, he was more determined than his predecessor to project American power in the international system, pursue a strident approach towards Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, and strengthen ties with traditional allies as well as others sharing his perspective.

American policy-makers began to talk about developing a strategic consensus to counter Soviet influence among states of the region stretching from Pakistan to the east to Egypt to the west, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Pakistan's security was described as a matter of vital concern to the United States⁴⁹ and the Reagan Administration decided to make a substantial offer of economic and military assistance to Pakistan. Two rounds of Pakistan-United States talks in April (Agha Shahi's visit to the US) and June (James Buckley, US Under Secretary of State's trip to Pakistan) produced an agreement on the parameters of US assistance to Pakistan which included, inter alia, a commitment on the part of the United States to extend economic assistance and military sales credits amounting to approximately \$3 billion. The United States not only agreed to sell F-16 aircraft to Pakistan on cash terms but also allowed Pakistan to obtain urgently needed military equipment immediately against cash payment. It was also agreed that Pakistan would neither seek Congressional affirmation of the 1959 Agreement nor enter into a new security treaty with the United States. Pakistan would not offer any military bases to the United States nor would it accept any obligation that negated its membership of the NAM and the OIC.50

Explaining the purpose of US assistance to Pakistan, James Buckley said that it was designed to enable Pakistan to sustain its economic growth and military modernization because 'a secure, stable and independent Pakistan' was essential to the stability of the region. Pakistan needed support to continue resisting 'the bullying posture' of Moscow.⁵¹

Details of the economic assistance and military sales package were finalized during July-September. A Pakistani delegation headed by the Secretary General, Ministry of Defence, Major General (Retd) M. Rahim Khan, visited the United States in July 1981 to discuss Pakistan's require-

ments for weapons and military hardware, their cost estimates, and delivery time.⁵² These and other issues in the proposed aid programme were taken up when Agha Shahi paid a visit to Washington in August. A USAID delegation and Jeane Kirkpatrick, the US ambassador to the UN, came to Pakistan in August–September to follow-up the dialogue on the proposed aid relationship. These diplomatic exchanges were wrapped up by James Buckley's visit to Pakistan in mid-September. Soon after his return to Washington, the details of the first six-year economic assistance and military sales package were announced.

The next couple of months were spent on completing legal and constitutional formalities in the United States for making economic assistance and military equipment available to Pakistan. It involved seeking Congressional approval for the arrangement, and especially the lifting of the embargo imposed on Pakistan in April 1979. Despite some opposition to the revival of security ties with Pakistan in the two houses of Congress, the US Administration succeeded in December 1981 in obtaining Congressional clearance for assistance to Pakistan.⁵³

THE FIRST ASSISTANCE PACKAGE

The six-year assistance package (1981–7) which amounted to \$3250 million (\$3.2 billion) was equally divided between economic assistance and military sales. The 1625 million dollars (\$1.6 billion) economic assistance component focused on programmes in the field of agriculture (\$528.7 million), energy (\$423 million), health care (\$129.8 million), additional development programmes in Baluchistan and NWFP (\$94 million), and other assistance including private sector mobilization, rural roads, support and project design, and import of edible oil under PL-480 (\$449.5 million). Approximately 55 per cent of economic assistance was provided as grants while the rest was in the form of loans, repayable in 30 years after a grace period of ten years, at three per cent rate of interest (two per cent during the grace period). 55

The military assistance component of \$1625 million (\$1.6 billion) consisted wholly of Foreign Military Sales Credits, repayable in nine years after a grace period of three years as a 10–14 per cent rate of interest. ⁵⁶ Pakistan used these credits to acquire new weapons, military equipment and communications gear for enhancing the mobility, efficiency and strike-capability of the three services.

The core part of the military sales was the American decision to sell 40 high performance F-16 aircraft to Pakistan at a cost of approximately \$1.1

billion. Pakistan paid for these aircraft in cash, partly from its own resources and partly from the funds provided by friendly Arab countries;⁵⁷ Saudi Arabia being the main source. Pakistan attached great importance to the sale of these aircraft, and this was viewed in Pakistan as a tangible sign of US commitment to its security.⁵⁸ Pakistan was also allowed to purchase some military equipment on cash payment in 1982.

An extensive programme of economic development was launched by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in collaboration with the government of Pakistan. In the agricultural sector, the focus was on increasing food production, provision of agricultural supplies and equipment, improvement of irrigation facilities, tree plantation and forestry, agricultural research, training, and education. The energy sector was provided with funds, technical know-how, training facilities and equipment for the development of indigenous sources of energy. Rural electrification was also supported by the assistance programme. The health care programme involved the provision of medical facilities, disease prevention, population control, research and training facilities. Attention was also given to improving means of transportation; strengthening of the balance of payments; human resource development, especially training to the private sector; and eradication of poppy growing by offering alternate sources of income to the farmers mainly in NWFP/tribal areas. Special programmes were also launched in NWFP for the development of infrastructure and related facilities, including road building, electrification, off-farm jobs, and improvement of the irrigation system.

Baluchistan attracted much attention due to its vast coastline, proximity to the Gulf, and an area for potential Soviet penetration or southward advance. The United States joined the World Bank, EEC, Great Britain, and Kuwait for facilitating Pakistan's efforts to undertake development work in this province. Four new airports (Pasni, Ormara, Jewani, Khuzdar) were established, and the runway and other facilities at Quetta, Panjgur and Gawadar were upgraded to receive bigger aircraft. Attention was given to improving or building water resources, the irrigation system, roads and other infrastructural facilities in the province in general and the Makran Division in particular. A high priority was given to improving the road-link between Karachi and various parts of Makran.

In 1987, USAID introduced the Makran Division Training Programme whereby Baluch youths with an educational background of Intermediate (A-level) were selected for a two-part training course. The first part included a six-month English language course. The second part involved their training in various skills, i.e. health services, air-conditioning and refrigeration, electronics, road construction and maintenance, farm mech-

anics, irrigation and water management, petroleum and coal technology, marketing, accounting, and small business management, etc. They were supposed to return to Baluchistan after completion of their training.⁵⁹

USAID offered training facilities and 'study' trips to middle level management in the government and the private sector. Over 2500 Pakistanis benefited from this programme during 1982–7, who were given grants of varying duration, ranging from a few weeks non-degree programme to Master's or Doctoral studies. This programme was extended to the period of the 2nd US assistance package, 1987–93. For a large number of bureaucrats (Grades 17–19), who also availed themselves of this programme, this was their first extended exposure to the United States, which helped to cultivate the middle-order bureaucrats, some of whom would in due course rise to top positions in the administration.

Diplomatic interaction increased between the two countries on political, economic and security matters. George Shultz, Seccretary of State, visited Pakistan in July 1983, and the Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger, undertook two trips in September 1983 and 1986. Vice President, George Bush's visit in March 1984 was no less significant. From Pakistan's side. Foreign Minister, Yaqub Khan, was the most frequent visitor to the United States. He undertook 13 trips during 1984–7.61 Zia-ul-Haq visited the United States in December 198262 when the two presidents expressed their confidence that friendship between the two countries would be stronger in the future. Zia highlighted Pakistan's role as a 'friend' of the United States and a 'defender' of its interests in the region; Reagan praised Pakistan's 'courageous' stand in the face of Soviet pressure and declared that it stood in 'the front rank of the nations shouldering a great responsibility for all mankind'.63 These overtures helped to deflect the criticism of some Congressional leaders and others on Pakistan's nuclear programme and the Zia regime's record on human rights. Zia's assertion that Pakistan would not produce nuclear weapons was accepted by the United States at face value but it did not settle the controversy over it. The narcotics issue - poppygrowing in the tribal areas of Pakistan and drug-trafficking from there to the United States - was also discussed by the officials. They established a Joint Commission for the promotion of cooperation in economic, commercial (including trade), scientific, technological, and educational fields. The Commission was to hold its meetings periodically in each country alternatively for the purpose of reviewing their relations and suggesting ways and means to improve them.64

In the defence and security domain, the United States transferred weapons and extended training facilities to Pakistan. The two countries shared strategic information on Afghanistan and established a consultative group comprising their senior officials which met once or twice a year for reviewing their security relations. A number of senior US military officers visited Pakistan during the period of the first Pakistan-US military sales package.⁶⁵ Pakistan's senior commanders, including the Chiefs of Staff, visited the United States.

There were other signs that the United States and Pakistan were cultivating strong ties in the security field. Since 1985, Pakistan began to extend limited transit-stopover facilities to American P-3 Orion reconnaissance aircraft. In March 1986, the US aircraft carrier *Enterprise* made its first ever port-call to Karachi. The visit of another US carrier in November 1986 had to be cancelled due to the outbreak of ethnic violence (unrelated to the visit) in Karachi. Other port calls by American aircraft carriers included *Kittyhawk* in April 1987 and *Constellation* in March 1989. Zia-ul-Haq made the unusual gesture of visiting *Kittyhawk* during its port-call.

The enthusiasm demonstrated by Pakistan since 1985 for the expansion of security ties with the United States aimed at creating a favourable political climate in the United States for obtaining assistance beyond 1987. The preliminary work on the aid package for the post-1987 period was initiated in 1985, and Pakistan thought that an expansion of cooperation in the security field would strengthen its case. Moreover, Pakistan's desire to obtain an airborne early warning system to strengthen its air defence in the wake of Afghan air raids also led Pakistan to adopt a more pro-US disposition.

The United States recognized the need of supplying Pakistan with such a system⁶⁸ and the two governments explored different options – E-3A aircraft known as AWACS or the E-2C Hawkeye? Should these be sold or given on lease? Should the American pilots and technicians operate the AWACS aircraft? Pakistan indicated its preference for the AWACS aircraft,⁶⁹ but the proposal faced tough opposition from the leaders of public opinion in the United States, not to speak of its criticism by India and the Soviet Union. In Pakistan, the idea of the AWACS aircraft being flown by American pilots evoked strong opposition. Unable to come to an agreement on the type of airborne early warning system, the two sides de-activated the dialogue. Instead, Pakistan was provided with radar and communication gear.

The enhanced American role in Pakistan's economic development, supply of weapons and military equipment, and regular consultation on political and security affairs increased American influence in Pakistan. American intelligence networks operated with reasonable freedom from Islamabad, focusing mainly, though not necessarily exclusively, on Afghanistan. The US Administration developed strong connections with

Pakistan's military circles as the whole arrangement of economic assistance and military sales was negotiated with, and then implemented by, the military regime.

THE SECOND ASSISTANCE PACKAGE

The discussions for the extension of economic assistance and military sales beyond 1987 passed through three overlapping phases. In the first phase, Pakistan and the United States deliberated separately on the nature of the assistance and military sales package. The former decided on its priorities and requirements, and the latter looked into what it could offer to Pakistan. The second phase involved a high-level dialogue on the details of the assistance package between the top civil and military officials of the two countries in 1985–6. The third phase included the passage of the aid package through the US Congress and further deliberations between Pakistan and the United States in 1987.

Pakistan started off with an ambitious proposal for a new six-year economic assistance and military sales package worth \$6.5 billion on a concessional rate of interest. A series of meetings between senior officials of the two governments⁷⁰ produced an agreement on the quantum of assistance which was announced during the Islamabad visit of US Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, William Schneider Jr, in March 1986. The United States committed its support to Pakistan's economic development and especially its efforts to 'improve domestic resource mobilization, stimulate private sector investment and increase overall efficiency of the Pakistani economy.' and declared that it would 'continue to play an important role in Pakistan's defence modernization effort. '71 While accepting the new assistance offer, Pakistan maintained that, like the first assistance package, the new assistance programme did not constitute a constraint on its commitments as a member of the NAM and the OIC, and that its position remained unchanged on major international issues. Pakistan also reiterated its commitment to peaceful uses of nuclear technology and declared that it would continue to take effective steps to curb narcotic production and trafficking.⁷²

A major dialogue on the assistance relationship took place when Pakistan's Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo undertook his first visit to the United States on 15–22 July 1986. His trip aimed at facilitating the new assistance package by establishing a direct rapport with top US policymakers as well as by projecting the political change that had taken place in Pakistan – the withdrawal of martial law and the installation of a govern-

ment elected through partyless elections. This became imperative in view of the return of Benazir Bhutto to Pakistan in April 1986 and her insistence on the restoration of a fully participatory system. The visit demonstrated that the United States viewed the assumption of power by Junejo as an improvement over the previous political order in Pakistan. Reagan reiterated American commitment to Pakistan's independence, security and territorial integrity, and the two leaders expressed agreement on Afghanistan, especially on the need for a political settlement, and the security situation in the region.⁷³ Junejo had two important security-related meetings which underscored Pakistan's relevance to the US strategic perspective on the region: a luncheon meeting at the Pentagon with Weinberger and the topmost defence and security officials; a meeting in Orlando, Florida, with the C-in-C, CENTCOM, General Crist. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed during this visit for the transfer of strategic and advance technology to Pakistan. Junejo reaffirmed Pakistan's commitment to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and outlined the measures the government of Pakistan was adopting for poppy eradication.

Despite Junejo's assurances on the nuclear issue and Pakistan's greater identification with American interests during 1985–7, the assistance package got a rough going in the Congressional committee hearings. Pakistan was subjected to criticism in connection with its domestic political situation, the nuclear programme, the narcotics issue, and US relations with India. The Reagan Administration made a spirited defence of its assistance package by emphasizing Pakistan's relevance to America's security interests in the region, and it argued that the aid relationship dissuaded Pakistan from going nuclear. Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan's six trips to the United States in 1986–7, and several high-level reciprocal visits⁷⁴ underlined the importance the two governments attached to each other.

However, several US Congressional leaders entertained strong doubts about the peaceful nature of Pakistan's nuclear programme. Two incidents strengthened this suspicion. First, an Indian journalist reported in March 1987 that a leading Pakistani nuclear scientist, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, hinted to him in an interview in January about Pakistan having produced a bomb. 5 Second, in July 1987, a Pakistani-born Canadian, Arshad Pervaiz, was arrested in the United States on charges of attempting to 'illegally' export a special metal to a private concern in Pakistan which, the American officials suspected, could be used in nuclear research. Though the government of Pakistan denied any connection with the metal deal, and the Pakistani scientist accused the Indian journalist of distorting and misreporting the interview, the pro-India and other lobbyists opposed to American aid to Pakistan played up these incidents to derail the assistance package.

Their efforts were crowned with partial success when, in the last week of July 1987, a US House of Representative Committee recommended the suspension of new aid to Pakistan for 105 days starting from 1 October. Pakistan was asked to give categorical assurance that it would neither enrich uranium beyond the level above that required for peaceful purposes nor engage in any illegal procurement of nuclear-related material. On 1 October, aid to Pakistan was actually suspended because, after the expiry of 30 September of the waiver which exempted Pakistan from the application of the Symmington-Glenn amendment, the US Congress did not renew it, mainly due to procedural wranglings.

Pakistan's response to the aid suspension showed a divergence in the reaction of official and unofficial circles. The leaders of public opinion, scholars, and political analysts were critical of the US Congress' inaction and a number of them argued for a thorough reappraisal of Pakistan's foreign policy. However, the government of Pakistan avoided any public controversy with the United States over the suspension. The Foreign Minister expressed his concern to the US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Michael Armacost, who visited Islamabad in early August, but his public statement did not go beyond the diplomatic expression of 'dismay and anguish'. Prime Minister Junejo dealt with the issue in a different way by expressing his confidence in the ability of the people to face any hardship that could arise due to the aid suspension.

Pakistan's low-key response to the suspension of aid was shaped by a realization on the part of policy-makers that economic assistance and military sales were crucial to the sustenance of the existing socioeconomic order in the country. Therefore, the major focus of Pakistan's diplomacy was on overcoming Congressional opposition. The Pakistani policy-makers also recognized that the problems of the assistance package were the product of political wrangling between the White House and Capitol Hill, and that they should not add to the problems of the White House by issuing strident statements. When Junejo and Reagan met in New York in September 1987, where they attended the UN General Assembly session, the latter assured the former of his government's determination to make assistance available to Pakistan. However, he cautioned Junejo on serious American concerns about Pakistan's nuclear programme.

It was in December 1987 that the Reagan Administration managed to obtain Congressional approval for the new economic assistance and military sales package, with a two-and-a-half year waiver of the application of the Symmington-Glenn amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, for Pakistan.⁸² It had proposed a 6-year waiver but the House of Representative Foreign Affairs' Sub-committee on South Asian and Pacific Affairs recom-

mended its reduction to two years. After prolonged consultations between Congressional leaders and the Department of State, the two-and-a-half year period was mutually agreed.

On 15 January 1988, President Reagan certified that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons which made the waiver operative and fulfilled the last condition for the resumption of the new economic assistance and military sales package.⁸³ The White House statement argued that the discontinuation of the assistance relationship would have been 'counterproductive for the strategic interests of the United States, destabilizing for South Asia, and [it was] unlikely to achieve the nonproliferation objectives.'⁸⁴ The statement further said that the US Administration had communicated to Pakistan its 'continuing concern' over the nuclear programme and that it would 'continue pressing Pakistan away from a nuclear weapons option.' Pakistan, the statement added, had agreed to 'ensure an end to procurement activities [for the nuclear-related material] in the United States.'⁸⁵

The Unites States offered a six-year (1987–93) package of economic assistance and military sales worth \$4.02 billion at concessional rates of interest. Out of this, \$2.28 billion were allocated for economic assistance. Over three-quarters of this allocation was in the form of grants and the rest carried a 2–3 per cent rate of interest, repayable in 30 years after a grace period of 10 years. The credit for the purchase of military equipment amounted to \$1.74 billion, repayable in 7 years after a grace period of 5 years at 5 per cent rate of interest.⁸⁶

The United States offered less than what Pakistan had originally asked for (i.e. \$6.5 billion), but it was more than what was provided to Pakistan under the first assistance package. Whereas the previous package was equally divided between economic assistance and military sales, the new package deal allocated 56.71 per cent of its funds for economic assistance, with a higher proportion of grants. The acceptance of the concessional rate of interest was indicative of a change of policy on the part of Pakistan. In 1981, Pakistan rejected the offer of a concessional rate of interest for military sales credits fearing that it might compromise the nonaligned character of its foreign policy.⁸⁷ Such a caution was not considered advisable for the second assistance package.

Economic assistance under the new package extended the programmes initiated under the first assistance programme in agriculture, energy, health care, population, training and education, private sector mobilization, and infrastructural facilities. It also continued to extend the balance of payment help, assistance to Afghan refugees, and support to the programmes for discouragement to poppy production. The military credits were meant for

upgrading security arrangements by making new equipment available in artillery, armour, anti-armour, air and naval defence and communications. Attention was also given to training, maintenance and support activities for the three services. The pattern of regular mutual consultations on political and security affairs between Pakistan and the United States, initiated during 1981–7, was carried over to the period of the second assistance package. Senior officials and military commanders/military delegations, Congressional/parliamentary and other delegations visited each other for mutual consultations and monitored the implementation of the assistance package.

Pakistan and the United States continued to pursue a shared strategy of extending political and material support (including the supply of weapons) to a number of Afghan resistance groups. They also maintained a close rapport in connection with the Geneva-based parleys on Afghanistan. A number of important consultation visits took place before the beginning of the final round of the Geneva parleys: Michael Armacost (January and February 1988), Richard Armitage and two Senators (January 1988) to Pakistani; and Zain Noorani (February 1988) to the United States. Zia-ul-Haq who wanted to delay the signing of the peace accords on Afghanistan till an IUAM (a seven-party resistance alliance) dominated government was installed in Kabul, changed his mind due to, *inter alia*, the persuasion of the United States.⁸⁸

Pakistan's fears that the United States might abandon it after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, were allayed by the United States time and again. The US Defence Secretary, Frank Carlucci, who visited Pakistan in April 1988 (a few days before the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan were signed), assured Islamabad of his government's continuing support to Pakistan.⁸⁹ A similar undertaking of support 'beyond Afghanistan' was given when Pakistan's Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan, visited the United States in July 1988.⁹⁰

POLITICAL CHANGE IN PAKISTAN AND THE UNITED STATES

The United States reiterated its support to Pakistan's security after the death of Zia-ul-Haq in an aircrash in August 1988.⁹¹ A US Senate resolution paid tribute to him as 'true friend of the United States' and reaffirmed its 'longstanding bipartisan commitment to the security and independence of Pakistan'.⁹²

The United States manifested much interest in the commitment made by the Pakistani leadership that succeeded Zia-ul-Haq (President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and General Mirza Aslam Beg) for holding free and fair elections. Its official and unofficial circles made it known that they would welcome the restoration of the participatory political process in Pakistan. Soon after the general elections in Pakistan in November 1988, Richard Armitage (US Assistant Secretary of Defence), Richard Murphy (US Assistant Secretary of State), and other senior officials rushed to Islamabad to make a first hand review of the political situation and to lend support to Pakistan's Establishment in their efforts to instal an elected government. In addition to meeting with senior Pakistani civil and military officials, they also met with Benazir Bhutto, whose Pakistan People's Party (PPP) had won the largest number of seats in the National Assembly, and she was at that time campaigning for her appointment as Prime Minister.

The transfer of power to Benazir Bhutto on 2 December was welcomed by the United States, and this change was cited by the Reagan Administration as an additional argument for making the case for assistance to Pakistan in Congressional hearings in 1989: that the United States could not turn its back on the 'exciting new democratic government of Pakistan after having supported its military predecessor.'94

Benazir Bhutto responded positively to these gestures by vowing to further expand relations with the United States and pledged to continue with the on-going Afghanistan policy. She needed American support for a number of reasons. First, as a leader of a fragile coalition, she was too weak to deviate from the pro-US policy of the predecessor regime. Second, it helped to moderate the opposition of pro-US circles in Pakistan (especially in the establishment) to her government. Third, the demands of military modernization made it imperative to maintain cordial ties with the United States. Such a modernization was viewed by Benazir Bhutto's government as essential to keeping Pakistan's praetorian military satisfied. Fourth, the pressing economic demands against a backdrop of escalating ethnic conflict made her government, and for that matter any Pakistani government, dependent on American economic assistance. Fifth, the unresolved Afghanistan crisis and the shared perceptions of the Pakistan military and the United States on this issue restricted her room for manoeuvre. The top brass of the Pakistan military did not favour any major shift in the Afghanistan policy. 95 and she was obliged to accept this as a part of the arrangement with them that led to her ascent to power.

Pakistan and the United States continued to coordinate their policies on Afghanistan and other matters of mutual interest. In March 1989, the American naval fleet ship *Constellation* made a call on the Karachi port. A month later, the Paris based Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium⁹⁶ pledged aid

worth \$3095 million – \$85 million more than what Pakistan had asked for. It showed an almost 22 per cent increase over the last year's pledge, and members of the Consortium welcomed the restoration of democracy in Pakistan.

A major review of their bilateral relations was undertaken during Benazir Bhutto's visit to Washington in June 1989. President George Bush assured Benazir Bhutto of the 'continued commitment to assist in Pakistan's security and its economic and cultural development', and she described the talks as 'very useful, productive, and helpful – supportive'. The two leaders reached a broad agreement on Pakistan's security, US economic assistance to Pakistan, and the need for taking more steps for controlling drug trafficking. On Afghanistan, they agreed on the need for a political settlement incorporating the replacement of Najibullah's government with a broad-based government acceptable to various resistance groups and other Afghan exiles.

Benazir Bhutto endeavoured to dispel doubts about Pakistan's nuclear programme by declaring, in her address to the joint session of the US Congress, that Pakistan neither had an atomic bomb nor intended to produce one. She also offered to open Pakistan's nuclear installations for international inspection provided other countries in the region agreed to do so. 100 Later, the United States agreed to sell 60 more F-16 aircraft for \$1.5 billion outside the military sales arrangements under the 2nd assistance package. 101 In June 1990, the United States consented to the production of spare parts for F-16 aircraft in Pakistan.

The US State Department described the sale of F-16 aircraft as a step aimed at enabling Pakistan to maintain 'a credible deterrent' in a threatening regional security environment, and that it would strengthen the democratic process in Pakistan by showing to the people in Pakistan that their civilian leadership could effectively fulfil its security obligations. It was also argued that 'a Pakistan with a credible conventional deterrent will be less motivated to pursue a nuclear weapon capability'. Rejecting India's objections to the sale, the Department of State maintained that this would neither change the regional military balance (already in favour of India) nor destabilize the region. A 'more confident Pakistan with a reasonable defensive capability' would be 'better able to negotiate the kind of fair and lasting agreements with India which [would] reduce the chances of war between them', it was claimed. Pakistan adopted an equally supportive disposition towards the United States. In December 1989, it voted in the UN General Assembly in support of the US intervention in Panama.

Pakistan and the United States coordinated their policies for the resolution of the post-Soviet withdrawal problems in Afghanistan. Their major focus was on establishing a broad-based government comprising the major resistance groups as a viable alternative to the Soviet-backed Kabul regime that could work towards restoring normalcy in Afghanistan as well as maintaining a favourable disposition towards their interests. The initial US enthusiasm for the IUAM-AIG (Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen and the Afghan Interim Government) faded as the latter could not muster a broad based Afghan support and were unable to establish an effective control of parts of Afghanistan territory. The American search for alternatives beyond the IAUM-AIG reflected in their suggestions for an interim government that incorporated major shades of Afghan resistance and the Afghan exiles, the dropping of the demand for the replacement of President Najibullah prior to any settlement, and the repeated affirmation of its willingness to enter into an arrangement with the Soviet Union for a simultaneous stoppage of military supplies to their respective clients in the civil strife in Afghanistan. Pakistan expressed willingness to go along with these suggestions, although the Pakistan military continued to lean towards the **IUAM-AIG.**

A broad review of the Afghanistan problem and other aspects of their bilateral relations was undertaken when the US Under Secretary of State, Robert Kimmitt, visited Pakistan in January 1990, and Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Yaqub Khan, travelled to Washington in April, and to New York in September–October for the UN General Assembly session. They also discussed the tension that developed between Pakistan and India as a consequence of the mutual recriminations over the outbreak of a violent mass movement in Indian-administered Kashmir. The United States, which deplored India's use of force against the civil population in Kashmir, advised both Pakistan and India to settle their differences on this problem through dialogue. It also joined the Soviet Union to counsel them to deescalate tension. 103

The dismissal of Benazir Bhutto's government in August 1990 by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who enjoyed the support of the military, was described as Pakistan's internal matter by the US ambassador to Pakistan who was communicated about the President's decision prior to its formal announcement.¹⁰⁴ The spokesperson of the US State Department stated that the United States supported the democratic process in Pakistan and hoped that the elections would be held as announced. It was also stated that the United States would be 'concerned' if the democratic process was interrupted.¹⁰⁵

This change did not adversely affect Pakistan-US relations mainly because the constitution was invoked for dismissing Benazir Bhutto. This was accompanied by the fixing of a date for new elections which was honoured, although the institution of judicial proceedings and a massive propaganda campaign against the ousted Prime Minister and senior PPP (Pakistan People's Party) leaders skewed the electoral process in favour of their adversaries. No change in Pakistan's policy towards the United States and especially Pakistan's decision to make its troops available to Saudi Arabia in the background of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (August 1990) ensured American acquiescence to the change.

However, the nuclear issue continued to haunt their bilateral relations. US law required annual certification by the US President that Pakistan did not possess an atomic weapon, for the release of economic aid and military sales. This certification was issued without any problem until 1987, when for the first time the release of new aid was delayed for want of such a certificate. Aid was also suspended for a few weeks in 1988 and 1989 when the US President delayed the issuance of such a certificate, ostensibly to pressure Pakistan into placing all its nuclear facilities under full scope international safeguards. A similar situation developed when, after the expiry of the 1989 certification on 30 September 1990, the US President held back new certification thereby suspending new aid to Pakistan from 1 October. US sources claimed that Pakistan made clandestine efforts in 1990 to purchase high temperature furnaces from the United States (like the purchase of special metal in 1987) which were said to be capable of producing metals suitable for a nuclear weapon programme. These sources also alleged that Pakistan was engaged in modifying some F-16 aircraft so that these could carry nuclear weapons. 106

The roots of the latest American apprehension on the subject of Pakistan's nuclear programme went back to November 1988, when President Reagan detailed his government's concern in a letter to President Ishaq Khan. The issue was taken up with Benazir Bhutto during her premiership (December 1988– August 1990) and she categorically declared that Pakistan's nuclear programme was peaceful. However, this assurance did not satisfy the American administration and they raised this issue in almost every high-level contact between the two governments during 1989–91. What perturbed them most was their 'information' that the nuclear programme was under the control of the Pakistan military, which did not divulge its details to the civilian government. By the time aid was suspended (October 1990), the US was convinced that Pakistan's nuclear programme had reached the stage where it could produce nuclear weapons.

An attempt to resolve the difference on the nuclear issue was made in June 1991, when a high-level Pakistani delegation led by Wasim Saiiad, Chairman of the Senate, visited the United States. Though the two sides agreed to strengthen their 'friendship and cooperation', they could not

reconcile their divergent perspectives on Pakistan's nuclear programme. US officials told the visiting Pakistani delegation that the assistance programme, especially the supply of military equipment, could be restored only if Pakistan agreed to roll back its nuclear programme.

US ability to pressure Pakistan on this issue is going to increase in the future. The Afghanistan crisis has lost its erstwhile relevance to the American strategic perspective, leading to the downgrading of Pakistan's strategic importance. The end of the superpower confrontation and the success of the US-led coalition in the war with Iraq (1991) has given a new sense of power to the US. This has further strengthened American ties with the Gulf kingdoms, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Moreover, the US does not want to assign any autonomous role to the Pakistan military in its sponsored Gulf security arrangements, at least for the time being, thereby making it possible for the US to adopt a tougher policy towards Pakistan.

6 The Soviet Union

Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union have been marked by indifference, distrust, and mutual recriminations on one account or another, although there were brief periods when these could be described as correct and cordial. Many people in Pakistan believe that a strain in its relations with the Soviet Union cannot be avoided for a host of reasons. For some, the non-compatibility of Islam with Marxism-Leninism makes it difficult for the two states to develop lasting friendship. This line of thinking was subscribed to more often by the ruling elite in the early years of independence, and cited as one of the reasons to justify Liaquat Ali Khan's decision not to avail himself of the invitation to visit Moscow. Subsequently, this argument was pushed into the background but an untested fear that friendship with Moscow would compromise Pakistan's Islamic character was entertained by right wing/religious groups. A variant of this argument views Soviet opposition to Pakistan as a consequence of their perception that Pakistan's Islamic disposition and Islamic resurgent movements could cause an ideological spillover into Soviet Central Asia which had a large Muslim population. Another explanation describes the Soviet Union as an expansionist power which has a 'grand design' to establish its hegemony in the world, and that, as Pakistan stands in the way of southward expansion, it views Pakistan as an obstacle to the realization of its foreign policy goals.²

Others do not play up the 'grand design' theory, but hold the Soviet Union responsible for the problems in Pak-Soviet relations.³ Still others attribute the difficulties in Pak-Soviet relations to Pakistan's pro-West disposition, and especially its participation in security arrangements with the West (the alliance system of the fifties and security ties in the context of the Afghanistan crisis).⁴ There are those who take a balanced view of arguing that both Pakistan and the Soviet Union have to share the blame. They also argue that, given Pakistan's resource constraints and the geostrategic environment, it cannot afford to permanently antagonize the Soviet Union. Pakistan should improve its relations with the Soviet Union and support its initiatives for defusing tension in the international system.⁵

FOUNDATIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP AND THE CHANGING PATTERNS

Three major factors influenced the development of Pak-Soviet relations.

These included the biases of policy-makers in the two countries in the initial stages of their contact, a lack of appreciation of each other's security concerns, and the accumulative impact of negative bilateral interaction in the context of the Pakistan-India disputes and superpower rivalry. Their interplay created psychological and political barriers which the leaders of the two countries could not really overcome, although they often talked about the need to improve their relations.

Soviet leaders were indifferent towards the establishment of Pakistan partly due to their preoccupation with Europe and partly because the centrality of Islam to the movement for the creation of Pakistan did not coincide with their highly doctrinaire world view; no message of felicitation was sent by the Soviets on the establishment of the state. They thought that the partition of the sub-continent was the result of the British policy of divide and rule, and that the two successor states of Pakistan and India would continue to follow British policies.

Pakistani leaders did not show much interest in cultivating the Soviets in the early years of independence. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, who recorded two special broadcasts for the people of the United States to introduce Pakistan to them, did not make such a gesture towards the Soviet Union. The top Pakistani leadership had no contact with the Soviet Union in the pre-independence period and could not come out of the British mould of keeping a distance from the Soviets. The fact that Britain represented Pakistani interests in the Soviet Union until they exchanged ambassadors could not be helpful to promoting any rapport.

The Pakistani leadership was extremely pro-West due to their ideological disposition, educational and cultural exposure to the West (i.e. Britain), and their personal contacts with the British. They felt that the West was a natural ally and that, being more advanced than the Soviet Union in science and technology, it had more to offer to Pakistan.

Therefore, it was not surprising that Pak-Soviet relations developed rather slowly. Though they exchanged notes for the establishment of diplomatic relations on 1 May 1948, the Pakistani and Soviet ambassadors took up their assignments in December 1949 and March 1950 respectively. Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, was invited to Moscow in June 1949 (after the United States had extended a visit invitation to Nehru). The invitation was accepted but Liaquat Ali Khan did not undertake the trip. He went to the United States, a development that reflected the biases of the Pakistani leaders. Prime Minister Khan's speeches and statements during his visit to the United States in May 1950, emphasizing the shared values between Pakistan and the United States and paying a glowing tribute to the people of that country, reinforced Soviet distrust of

Pakistan. Later, the unearthing of the 'Rawalpindi conspiracy' (March 1951), involving some senior military officers and civilians with pro-Moscow leanings, for the overthrow of the Pakistan government, further alienated the rulers of Pakistan from the Soviet Union. This set in motion an anti-Soviet and anti-communist campaign in Pakistan which appeared to enjoy official blessing.

Divergent security perceptions were also obstacles to development of their relations. Pakistan's dispute with India over Kashmir and problems arising out of the partition process, coupled with the historical legacy of distrust and confrontation between Muslims and Hindus, shaped Pakistan's threat perception. The search for security *vis-à-vis* India emerged as the dominant influence on Pakistan's foreign and security policies. Pakistan's alignment with the West, especially the United States which was looking for allies in the region for its own reasons, found Pakistan to be a willing partner, and the two developed a security partnership for different reasons: Pakistan, for enhancing security against India, and the United States, for creating a security-network to contain the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union's world view was shaped by its post-1945 Cold War with the United States and its sensitivity to Western presence in the bordering states. Its European borders were secured by establishing allied Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. When Pakistan joined Iran and Turkey to be integrated into the US-sponsored regional security arrangements, the Soviets felt that their southern flank was exposed and that Pakistan had become directly involved in anti-Soviet activities initiated by the United States. The Soviet perspective was so much conditioned by the Cold War people that its leaders were unable or unwilling to give any consideration to Pakistan's security predicament. Similarly, Pakistani leaders were so trapped in the Pakistan-India confrontation that they did not worry much about the implications of their alignment with the distant United States for their relations with the neighbouring Soviet Union.

Soviet criticism of Pakistan began in 1950, alleging that the United States was seeking military bases in that country. Its policy towards the Kashmir problem was also influenced by the Cold War. As early as February 1948, the Soviet delegate to the UN Security Council, though maintaining a neutral position on the Kashmir issue, made clear gestures towards India. What worried the Soviets was that the United States and Britain might exploit the dispute to their advantage and that the former might turn Kashmir into a military base. That was why they criticized the despatch of UN missions to Kashmir, and suggested in 1951–2 that the UN should not be involved in any plebiscite in Kashmir. It argued that the people of Kashmir could decide their future through an elected constituent assem-

bly.¹² This proposal was put forward at a time when some Kashmiri leaders and Indians were already advocating this as a substitute to holding a UN-supervised plebiscite in Kashmir, as originally agreed to. But, it was not until 1955 that the Soviet Union declared Kashmir to be an integral part of India.

The negative interaction that developed between Pakistan and the Soviet Union in the wake of their divergent security perspectives strengthened their mutual prejudices but they did not completely write each other off. Pakistan wanted to improve its relations, or at least minimize Soviet hostility. Similarly, the Soviets kept the option of improvement of their relations with Pakistan open because of the latter's strategic location – proximity to Soviet Central Asia, its close links with the Gulf region and other Muslim states, and the US-China factor. Therefore, whenever the two states got an opportunity to improve their relations, they endeavoured to make use of it. The Soviets have on occasions adopted a balanced position on Pakistan-India disputes, but whenever they found themselves in a situation when they had to choose between Pakistan and India, their multifaceted ties with India carried more weight.

Opportunity knocked for the improvement of their bilateral relations in the early sixties when Pakistan and the Soviet Union softened their attitude towards each other, for their own considerations. Pakistan was alienated from its alliance with the United States, mainly due to the May 1960 U-2 incident and the threat of Soviet retaliation which made Pakistan conscious of the possible cost of alignment, and the Western arms aid to India after the Sino-Indian conflict, 1962. Pakistan's policy makers decided to maximize their options by improving ties with the socialist countries. This trend was reinforced by the refusal of Western partners in the alliance system to extend any material support to Pakistan in its war with India in 1965. The Soviets read these signals shrewdly because they always wanted to somehow loosen Pakistan's links with the West. Furthermore, the Sino-Indian conflict demonstrated two things to the Soviets: India could not easily be built up as a counterweight to China, and India's acceptance of Western military aid in 1962-3 raised doubts about its nonalignment. The Soviet Union therefore adopted a balanced approach towards Pakistan and India by modifying, rather than abandoning, its position on Pakistan's alliances with the West and the Kashmir dispute.¹³ It adopted a nonpartisan position on the Rann of Kutch dispute, played a mediatory role in the wake of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, and suggested to India in 1968 that it should settle its dispute with Pakistan on the Farakha barrage on the lines of the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. Pakistan reciprocated by adopting a more independent foreign policy without formally abandoning its participation in defence

pacts. However, in April 1968, Pakistan decided not to extend the lease of the US communication base at Badaber, near Peshawar, after the expiry of the existing lease in 1969.

The high level contact between the two states increased. Ayub Khan visited the Soviet Union in April 1965, January 1966 (the Soviet-sponsored peace talks between Pakistan and India at Tashkent), and October 1967 the first Pakistani head of state/government to travel to the Soviet Union. Another Pakistani President, Yahya Khan, visited Moscow in June 1970. The first Soviet head of government ever to undertake a trip to Pakistan was Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin who visited Islamabad in April 1968 and May 1969. Two Pakistani military delegations headed by Air Marshal Nur Khan (C-in-C of the Air Force) and General Yahya Khan (C-in-C of the Army) visited Moscow in June 1966 and July 1968 respectively. These exchanges led to a Soviet decision to supply weapons and military hardware in a limited quantity during 1968–70.14 A soviet military delegation, headed by Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Grechkov, visited Pakistan in March 1969. Marshal Grechkov argued during the visit for not letting the military balance in South Asia change to Pakistan's disadvantage. 15 However, the Soviet leadership assured India of its continued support and declared that they 'would do nothing to undermine its very cordial relations with India.'16

New strains began to show as Pakistan and the Soviet Union diverged on Brezhnov's proposal for Asian Security (1969), and Pakistan's military action in East Pakistan (1971). Soviet President Podgorny's strongly-worded letter to Yahya Khan, condemning Pakistan's action in East Pakistan and Yahya Khan's equally terse reply signalled a downward slide in their relations. This trend accelerated after the Sino-US rapprochment (July 1971), facilitated by Pakistan which perturbed the Soviet Union and India who viewed this as a 'dramatic shift in Asian power balance' to their disadvantage.¹⁷ The Soviet Union and India solidified their political and security links by signing the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971 so as to counter what they perceived to be an incipient US-China-Pakistan axis. The Friendship Treaty encouraged India to adopt a more strident position on the Bangladesh crisis, although the Soviets avoided a public endorsement of India's position, and urged Pakistan for a political settlement. When the war broke out between Pakistan and India on this issue, the Soviet Union extended strong diplomatic and military support to India. 18 While putting all their weight on India's side the Soviets still wanted to retain some goodwill with Pakistan. Therefore, they did not favour India overrunning major parts of West Pakistan (the present Pakistan) and they joined with the United States to bring about a ceasefire. 19 The Soviets felt that any further change in South Asia's state system in the immediate aftermath of the establishment of Bangladesh would be destabilizing. However, Soviet support to India on the Bangladesh issue evoked widespread resentment in Pakistan and bilateral relations plunged to their lowest point.

A GRADUAL IMPROVEMENT

Both long and short term considerations made it imperative for Pakistan not to let the antagonism of 1971 permanently impair Pak-Soviet relations. From the long term perspective, Pakistan recognized that it could not pursue independent foreign policy and broad-based interaction in the international system without maintaining working relations with a superpower like the Soviet Union. Besides the economic gains which flowed from improved interaction with the Soviet Union, it was expected to restore some balance in Soviet policy towards Pakistan and India, as was the case in the midsixties. Many thought that this would also dissuade the Soviets from adopting a 1971-like hostile posture towards Pakistan if it were again plunged into a new domestic strife or another war broke out with India. The short term considerations focused on seeking Soviet indulgence for the resolution of problems that resulted from the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war.

The Soviet Union also did not want to permanently alienate Pakistan because of the latter's continued relevance to its strategy in the region. The Soviet leaders wanted to wean Pakistan away from the United States and China as well as seek its cooperation for the implementation of their proposal for Asian Collective Security. The Soviet perception that a prolonged stalemate in South Asia would make Pakistan more dependent on the United States and China led the Soviet leaders to encourage India to engage in dialogue with Pakistan.

However, the Soviets were not willing to accept Pakistan's criticism of their policies towards the Bangladesh crisis, and they held the United States and China responsible for Pakistan's dismemberment. The Soviet Union recognized Bangladesh on 24 January 1972 – the first major power to do so,²⁰ and it welcomed the Simla Agreement (July 1972) as a positive development for the restoration of peace and normalcy in South Asia.

Bhutto established a direct rapport with the Soviet Union on 31 December 1971 – 11 days after assuming power – when he had a brief meeting with the Soviet ambassador, A. A. Rodionov, at Lahore Airport. It was in March 1972, that Bhutto paid a visit to the Soviet Union, enabling the two sides to review their relations for the first time since the 1971 episode. Coming shortly after Sheikh Mujibur Rehman's visit to Moscow, Bhutto's trip was dominated by the previous year's developments in South Asia. The

Soviet leadership defended its 1971 policies and Kosygin said bluntly in public: 'If history were to be repeated, we would take again the same stand because we are convinced that it is a correct one.'21 Asking Pakistan to work towards peace and reconciliation in South Asia, he held out an offer of friendly relations, including economic and technological cooperation. Bhutto, who explained his government's policies to the Soviet leaders and sought their cooperation in economic and political fields, was partially successful: the Soviets agreed to revive economic cooperation but they did not support Pakistan on the withdrawal of troops and the return of POWs.

The Pak-Soviet joint communiqué which said very little on Indo-Pakistan problems except noting Bhutto's desire for establishing peaceful conditions in South Asia, underlined their desire for developing 'good neighbourly' and 'mutually advantageous cooperation'. 'Respect for territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other' were emphasized as the cardinal feature of their relationship. They agreed to maintain regular contact on matters of mutual interest and the Soviets agreed to revive cooperation in geological prospecting, power generation and construction of a steel mill.²²

Pakistan and the Soviet Union expressed broad agreement on a number of international issues, including the establishment of 'just and lasting peace' in the Middle East on the basis of the UN Security Council resolution November 1967; the need for withdrawal of foreign troops from Indo-China, and the right of the people of this region to decide their political future; 'general and complete' disarmament, including nuclear disarmament; ban and destruction of all chemical weapons; elimination of colonialism and apartheid; and the need for a strict adherence to the UN Charter in the conduct of inter-state relations.²³

The Soviet Union agreed in March 1973 to relieve Pakistan of repayment of Soviet loans utilized in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) before 1971, and other debts were partly rescheduled. The Soviets also supplied humanitarian assistance to the flood-affected areas of the Punjab and Sind in 1973. Agreements were signed for the supply of equipment and material for the installation of a thermal power generator at Gudu, tractors and agricultural machinery, including their repair facilities, and bilateral trade. Soviet experts visited Pakistan in connection with the Soviet offer of setting-up a steel mill; two major agreements were signed and, in December 1973, work on the steel mill was initiated. An accord for cultural and scientific exchanges was signed in February 1973, followed by several arrangements/agreements in 1973—4 for cooperation in educational and cultural fields, broadcasting and telecasting, participation in film festivals, and exchange of delegations in these fields.

A minor irritant appeared when several Soviet fishing trawlers engaged in fishing near Pakistan's territorial waters on the Makran coast during October 1972–March 1973. The Pakistani fishermen felt that the Soviets, with their modern fishing equipment, would adversely affect their fish catch. Many thought that these trawlers might also be engaged in intelligence gathering. Pakistan took up the matter with the Soviet Union, and in March 1973, it extended its Exclusive Fishery Zone (EFZ) up to 50 nautical miles from the coastline, modifying the February 1966 decision to fix the limits of territorial waters and the EFZ at 12 nautical miles. The Soviet trawlers quietly left the area.²⁵

ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND AFTER

Pakistan declined to endorse the Soviet proposal for an Asian Collective Security system when it was raised during Bhutto's visit to Moscow in March 1972.26 This proposal was first made by the Soviet Union in June 1969. The 1968 British decision to withdraw gradually from the Indian Ocean, and Soviet confrontation with China led the Soviets to work towards expanding their influence in the region by promoting political, economic and strategic cooperation in Asia. Such an arrangement, they thought, would exclude their adversaries, i.e. the United States and China, and link the major Asian states in a pro-Soviet cooperative framework. They were also encouraged by the fact that their relations were equally good with Pakistan and India. In May 1968, Kosygin suggested economic cooperation, especially trade arrangements, amongst Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and the Soviet Union. He offered generous Soviet economic aid and military assistance to Pakistan for joining such an arrangement.²⁷ This was followed by Leonid Brezhnev's statement in June 1969, stressing the need of establishing an Asian Collective Security system by developing a consensus on the regional security environment. The Soviets expected to play a coordinating, if not commanding, role in bringing about and then sustaining such an arrangement. They hoped that this would establish Soviet credentials as an Asian power and insulate the participant countries from Chinese and American influences.

Pakistan maintained in 1969 that, in view of its several on-going disputes with India, the proposal for economic cooperation and trade was premature. It turned down the Asian Collective Security, as it appeared to be directed at China. This issue was raised during Yahya Khan's visit to Moscow in 1970. He reiterated Pakistan's objections on Soviet proposals and expressed his unwillingness to make Pakistan a party to any anti-China alliance.

The Soviet leadership revived the proposal in 1972–3 as a measure for consolidation of peace in Asia.²⁸ Citing the efforts to set up an all-European security system, Soviet President Podgorny said in Kabul in May 1973 that the proposed Asian Collective Security would provide for 'the renunciation of the use of force in the relations between states, respect of sovereignty, inviolability of the frontiers, non-interference into each other's internal affairs, an extensive development of mutually beneficial economic and other cooperation on an equal footing.'²⁹

Bhutto was confronted with the Asian Collective Security proposal during his visit to Moscow in March 1972 as a guarantee of peace and its international borders, and as an alternative to Pakistan's revived interest in CENTO. Bhutto reiterated Pakistan's earlier negative response and argued that until the major territorial and other disputes were settled, such an arrangement was impractical. He maintained that Pakistan had to take into account the views of other states like Japan, India, China and Afghanistan on this proposal.³⁰ Bhutto was more categorical in his opposition to Asian Collective Security in 1975. He argued that a conference of Asian states on the lines of the European conference at Helsinki (1975) was premature for two major reasons. First, the existence of several territorial disputes and other problems amongst the states of Asia made it difficult to replicate the European experience. Second, as China perceived the Collective Security System as being hostile to its interests, no purpose would be served by setting this up while China stayed out.31 The Soviets were naturally unhappy over Pakistan's response but they did not press the issue.

Bhutto's October 1974 visit to Moscow was undertaken in a much more relaxed political context than was the case during his earlier visit. Pakistan had recognized Bangladesh, the POW question was amicably settled, and other steps for the normalization of relations between India, Bangladesh and Pakistan were under way – something the Soviets had been urging since 1972. Bhutto's socioeconomic reforms and nonalignment in foreign policy was appreciated by the Soviet leaders who welcomed Bhutto with a lot of courtesy and cordiality.

The joint communiqué reiterated the commitment of the two countries to develop mutually beneficial trade and economic relations, promote scientific and cultural cooperation, and cultivate political relations on the basis of 'peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems'. Expressing satisfaction on 'the progressive normalisation of the situation' in South Asia, they hoped that Pakistan, India and Bangladesh would continue to take steps towards the consolidation of peace and security, and that all outstanding problems between Pakistan and India would be settled in accordance with the Simla Agreement. They also expressed the hope that

Pakistan and Afghanistan would settle their 'differences' through peaceful means.³²

A number of international issues drew their attention. These included the Cyprus issue, the problems in Indo-China, the Middle East dispute (including the rights of the Palestinians), and colonialism and apartheid in Africa. They called upon the international community to find just and lasting solutions to these problems. Reiterating their support to the UN as 'an important instrument of strengthening peace and international security,' they emphasized the need of taking steps for 'general and complete' disarmament.³³

The next 3-4 years following Bhutto's visit witnessed a relatively active and smooth interaction between the two states. They avoided propaganda against each other and the Soviet Union did not extend material support to the insurgent Baluch tribes who were engaged in a confrontation with Pakistan's federal government. Similarly, the Soviet Union did not fully endorse the revived irredentist Afghan claims on Pakistani territory. To Daoud's dismay, they advised Afghanistan and Pakistan to settle their differences through negotiations and peaceful means.

Economic, commercial and cultural relations showed an upward trend, and a wide range of Soviet publications, including political magazines, were available in Pakistan. The diplomatic contact was strengthened and the two sides often highlighted their expanding ties. The Soviet ambassador to Pakistan, Azimov, went to the extent of suggesting that Bhutto's Moscow visit had opened a 'new chapter' in the development of relations between the two countries.³⁴ Important Soviet visits to Pakistan included those of the special envoy, A. Zorin (August 1975), Deputy Foreign Minister, Nikolai Firyubin (March 1976), and an eight member parliamentary delegation (March 1976).

The imposition of martial law in Pakistan in July 1977 did not upset their cordial relations. Zia-ul-Haq's government continued to follow the policy of friendship with the Soviet Union. However, a number of developments triggered by the pro-Moscow coup in Kabul in April 1978 built strains in Pak-Soviet relations. The new Kabul government led by Noor Mohammad Taraki strengthened its ties with Moscow, revived its traditional dispute with Pakistan on the Durand Line, and announced support for the right of self-determination for the Pakhtuns and Baluchs living in Pakistan. These developments perturbed Pakistan, which began to cultivate the non-Marxist, especially Islamic, adversaries of the Kabul regime.

The Soviet Union was unhappy over Pakistan's incipient connections with the Kabul regime's adversaries and it made a low key endorsement of Afghanistan's charge that Pakistan was interfering in its internal affairs.

The major thrust of Soviet criticism was at the United States, China, and Saudi Arabia who were said to be helping the opponents of the Taraki regime. However, as resistance intensified in Afghanistan, the Soviets began to name Pakistan as the trouble-shooter, and by March—April 1979, the Soviet media openly attacked Pakistan for 'aiding and abetting' insurgency in Afghanistan. Soviet charges against Pakistan included the provision of sanctuary and equipment to the resistance groups, the imparting of training to them in Pakistan by American and Chinese experts, and the infiltration into Afghanistan of Pakistan's security personnel in plain clothes.³⁵

Pakistan, which denied the Soviet and Afghan charges was upset by the drift in its relations with the Soviet Union. Its leaders had not expected that the Soviets would come out so openly in support of the Afghan government. An attempt to salvage the relationship was made when, in June 1979, Pakistan's Interior Minister, Mahmaud Haroon, visited Moscow. The Soviet leaders demanded an end to Pakistan's interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs, and told the visiting Pakistan Minister that they could not stay indifferent to the attempts to 'dislodge' a friendly and allied government in a neighbouring country.

THE AFGHANISTAN CRISIS AND PAK-SOVIET RELATIONS

The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in the last week of December 1979 and the subsequent involvement of Soviet troop in the civil strife in that country had far-reaching consequences for Pak-Soviet relations. The divergence in Pakistan and Soviet perspectives on, and strategies towards, the Afghanistan situation proved highly contentious and it intensified the strains that had surfaced in their relations during 1978–9.

The Soviet Union argued that its troops entered Afghanistan on the request of the Kabul government and that these troops would neither stay permanently in Afghanistan nor were these intended to pose any threat to Pakistan. The assurance of no invasion of Pakistan was repeated by the Soviet leadership on a couple of occasions. Agha Shahi reported in August 1981 that the Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev and other top Soviet leaders assured him that there was 'no threat' to Pakistan from the Soviet Union. This assurance was repeated by the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan, Vitaly Smirnov, in February 1984, who said that the Soviet Union would not 'advance' in the direction of Pakistan. In return for these assurances the Soviets wanted Pakistan not to join other states, especially the United States, in opposition to their intervention in Afghanistan. It also sought

Pakistan's assurance that it would not in any way support Afghan resistance.

Pakistan was not impressed by the Soviet explanations and assurances. It interpreted the Soviet action as a clear violation of an established code of international conduct, a virtual invasion of a nonaligned, Islamic neighbouring state. Pakistan felt that this development threatened its independence and security because the buffer between Pakistan and the Soviet Union was removed altogether. Given the traditional distrust and periodic tension in their relations, Pakistan was bound to be perturbed by the idea of having to put up with the presence of Soviet troops on or near its borders. The spill-over of the civil strife in Afghanistan into Pakistan, mainly in the shape of an influx of Afghan refugees and some resistance activity, threatened the socioeconomic order of the affected Pakistani areas and multiplied internal security problems.

Pakistan demanded an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan so that Afghanistan's independent and nonaligned status was restored and the Afghans who sought shelter in Pakistan returned to their homes in safety and honour. However, recognizing its limits to cope with the ramifications of the Afghanistan crisis, Pakistan mobilized international support for its Afghanistan policy by emphasizing the injurious implications of the Soviet action for the international system. It joined hands with others who shared its perspective to build pressure on the Soviet Union at various international forums, especially the UN, NAM, and OIC. Pakistan extended humanitarian assistance to over three million Afghan refugees lodged in Pakistan, and a low-key support was given to Afghan resistance groups. It also adopted measures to strengthen its defence and security with American and Chinese cooperation. The United States revived its security links with Pakistan, supplied modern weapons and equipment for the three services of the military, and gave categorical security guarantees vis-à-vis the Soviet threat so that Pakistan did not sucumb to Soviet pressures. These measures were accompanied by a search for a negotiated settlement of the Afghanistan problem.

The Soviet Union adopted several strategies to dissuade Pakistan from opposing its intervention in Afghanistan. It applied diplomatic pressure by accusing Pakistan of providing a sanctuary to Afghan resistance, and that it was a conduit for arms supply to them. Pakistan was thus, the Soviets maintained, waging 'an undeclared war' against them.³⁸ Warning Pakistan of the risks inherent in its opposition to the Soviet role in Afghanistan, the Soviet media often projected Pakistan as being an instrument of the United States and China who were using it to pursue their goals. The visit of the US

National Security Adviser, Zbignew Brzezinski, to Pakistan in February 1980 drew sharp Soviet criticism. It was described as an attempt on the part of the United States to use Pakistan as a 'staging ground' for aggression in the region and that Pakistan was not giving any thought to the consequences of allowing its territory to be used against Afghanistan.³⁹ The resolution passed by the special meeting of the foreign ministers of the Muslim countries, held at Islamabad in the last week of January 1980, condemning Soviet action and demanding the withdrawal of its troops, also received negative treatment in the Soviet media.⁴⁰

Soviet criticism of Pakistan increased after Pakistan accepted the US offer of economic assistance and military sales in 1981. The Zia regime was accused of exploiting American obsession with the Soviet Union to obtain economic assistance and weapons. The Soviet media also highlighted domestic opposition to Zia-ul-Haq and that he was using an Islamic mask as well as American support to sustain his unpopular rule. I Zia-ul-Haq's visit to the United States in December 1982 evoked sharp comments from the Soviet Union. In fact, every major civil and military exchange visit between Pakistan and the United States got a negative press in the Soviet Union.

The Soviets charged Pakistan with providing military bases to the United States which the latter was using to pursue its strategic goals in the region,⁴³ a charge vehemently denied by Pakistan. They argued that Pakistan had become 'a major bridge-head for aggression against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan'.⁴⁴ Pakistan's efforts to obtain AWACS aircraft from the United States were criticized by the Soviet Union in strong terms and dubbed an 'unfriendly step' and a 'provocation' which it could not ignore.⁴⁵

Another Soviet strategy was to echo the Indian criticism of the US-Pakistan security relationship, and they often argued that Pakistan could use the newly acquired weapons against India. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko said in 1981 that the US aid to Pakistan threatened 'the balance of forces in Southern Asia' and that Pakistan was serving as a 'bridge-head against the Soviet Union and the countries of South and Southwest Asia'. Such statements touched the right chord in New Delhi which was traditionally averse to Pakistan's efforts to acquire weapons and military equipment from external sources. As the Indian leaders viewed American arms supply to Pakistan as a greater threat to their interests than Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, they maintained a sympathetic disposition towards the Soviet Union's Afghanistan policy. They often joined the Soviet Union to criticize Pakistan and often attempted to deflect criticism of Soviet intervention in various international forums. This evoked in Pakistan the spectre of a joint Soviet-Indian punitive action, a two-front scenario, which pushed

Pakistan more towards the United States and China. Pakistan was also perturbed by the Karmal government's periodic reiteration of its irredentist claims on Pakistani territory and its policy of disputing the legality of the Durand Line.⁴⁷ In 1988, the Soviets played up India's criticism of Pakistan's military training facilities and arms sales to Sri Lanka.⁴⁸

Still another Soviet pressure tactic was to subject Pakistan's nuclear programme to sharp criticism. In 1982-3, the Soviet government expressed 'concern' over Pakistan's efforts to manufacture nuclear weapons and blamed the West for condoning Pakistan's bomb-making activities.⁴⁹ This issue was raised by the Soviets in the main committee of the UN General Assembly in October 1984, and the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Mikhail Kapitsa, brought this up in an interview in October 1985.50 The Soviets took up this issue directly with Pakistan in June 1986, and warned that Pakistan should not attempt to 'manufacture' a bomb.⁵¹ The Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, Gennadi Gerasimov, said in September 1988 that the Soviet Union 'could not remain passive' if Pakistan manufactured nuclear weapons.⁵² These statements coincided with India's case against Pakistan's nuclear programme. These were also meant for the consumption of American groups actively engaged in the campaign against American assistance to Pakistan. Ironically, while criticizing Pakistan's alleged nuclear ambition, the Soviets offered to supply nuclear technology, including nuclear power reactors, to Pakistan, provided Pakistan improved its relations with them.⁵³

They also resorted to limited punitive measures against Pakistan by deploying Afghan troops and aircraft for ground attacks and air raids on Pakistan's border areas, especially the refugee concentrations. At times Soviet pilots were used in such operations, who flew the aircraft with Afghan markings. These raids, which often caused heavy losses of life and property on the Pakistani side, were meant to destabilize the bordering areas by causing panic amongst the refugees and local population as well as warn Pakistan that these could escalate into a wider conflict.

The initial Soviet criticism of Pakistan was accompanied with an offer of a negotiated settlement of the post-intervention issues and problems. However, the Soviets insisted on direct negotiations between Pakistan and the Karmal government installed by them in Kabul. They made it clear that such a dialogue would not address itself to the withdrawal issue as it was an exclusively bilateral matter between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. This was not acceptable to Pakistan and it insisted in early 1980 on non-recognition of the Karmal regime and the withdrawal of Soviet troops as a pre-condition for any dialogue.

Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Riaz Piracha's visit to Moscow, and Presidential Adviser on Foreign Affairs (later Foreign Minister) Agha Shahi's

meeting with his Soviet counterpart, Gromyko, at the UN headquarters, New York (both in September 1980) were the first face-to-face contacts between senior policy-makers of the two countries. This was rather late as the lines were clearly drawn between them. Nevertheless, the contacts were useful. Gromyko suggested direct talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan and outlined his government's grievances against Pakistan. Agha Shahi, explaining Pakistan's position on these issues, argued that Pakistan was not pursuing such a policy at the behest of others, but in pursuance of its own interests.⁵⁴

The Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Nikolai Firyubin, held wideranging talks with the Pakistan leaders in August 1981. The two sides treated each other with courtesy and expressed sentiments of goodwill in their public statements. Firyubin talked about the prospects of improvement of their relations, and Agha Shahi, reciprocating his sentiments with positive remarks, politely raised Pakistan's concerns caused by the induction of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.⁵⁵ Without composing their differences on Afghanistan, they agreed that 'the process of talks and mutual consultations' should continue in the future.⁵⁶

These contacts were revived during the UN General Assembly session, which produced a temporary thaw in Pak-Soviet relations. The Soviet ambassador to Pakistan, Smirnov, in an article published in Pakistan, underlined Soviet interest in the 'negotiated settlement of [the problems] between Pakistan and its neighbours without outside interference'. On the future of Pak-Soviet ties, he wrote: 'The ideals of peace and international cooperation . . . will eventually triumph and the obstacles hindering the development of broad good neighbourly relations between the USSR and Pakistan and between Pakistan and its neighbours will be removed.'57 It was, therefore, not surprising that Afghanistan and the Soviet Union agreed to the UN sponsored parleys on Afghanistan. A few days before the opening of the first round of Geneva-based parleys on Afghanistan in June 1982, the foreign ministers of Pakistan and the Soviet Union had a cordial meeting in New York where they were attending the UN General Assembly's special session on disarmament. This was followed by Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Niaz A. Naik's visit to Moscow in September, who reported that the talks were held in a 'positive and friendly spirit' and that Pakistan had 'reasons to be satisfied' with these talks. 58 Yaqub Khan later stated that the Soviet attitude towards Pakistan had softened.⁵⁹

It was during this period that the Soviet Union offered a security pact to Pakistan – a kind of friendship and cooperation treaty – under which it undertook to guarantee Pakistan's security, provided Pakistan delinked itself from the US policy in the region and withdrew support to Afghan

resistance. Later, the Afghan government hinted at recognizing the Durand Line as the international border in exchange for political accommodation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Soviets also indicated in early 1983 that they would not be averse to replacing Babrak Karmal as part of an overall settlement. However, Pakistan shied away from an early settlement in deference to the wishes of the United States, Saudi Arabia, the insurgent groups based in Pakistan and their Pakistani allies.⁶⁰

There was a toughening of the Soviet attitude towards Pakistan after the second session of the second round of the Geneva parleys in June 1983. The frequency and sharpness of Soviet criticism of Pakistan increased and they threatened Pakistan more often with dire consequences of its continued 'interference' in Afghanistan at the 'behest' of others. Air raids and ground attacks on Pakistani border areas by Afghan aircraft and troops were stepped up. The changed Soviet attitude was also reflected in statements by the Soviet ambassador, Vitaly Smirnov, which combined the traditional Soviet policy of stick and carrot: hard-hitting criticism and offers of improved economic cooperation and peaceful relations. Accusing Pakistan of encouraging, training and arming the Afghan resistance groups, he said that if such activities did not stop, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan would be constrained into thinking about ways and means to put an end to such activities.⁶¹

Pakistan repeatedly denied these charges, arguing that Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan was the root cause of the problem. It maintained that the Afghan resistance groups were engaged in their struggle all by themselves; no military training camps for these groups existed in Pakistan; they were not getting arms through Pakistan; and Pakistan was not pursuing its Afghan policy at the instance of any foreign power. Occasionally, the government of Pakistan invited the Soviet ambassador in Islamabad to visit the border areas to identify military training camps for Afghan guerrillas. The Soviets turned down the invitation.

Pakistan restricted cultural interaction with the Soviet Union. The import of a large number of Soviet publications, including *International Affairs* and *New Times*, was restricted. The Soviet embassy at Islamabad and its Consulate General in Karachi were asked to reduce their staff (August 1980), and the publication of their magazine *Tulu* was suspended. A number of Soviet technicians working in Pakistan were asked to leave. The only exception was the Soviet staff with the steel mill. The Soviet offers of training/higher education were not availed of, except those relating to steel and allied technologies. As some youths with pro-Soviet leanings, mainly from NWFP and Baluchistan, quietly left for Moscow via Kabul, ostensibly for higher education, the government of Pakistan ordered that all those who

studied in the Soviet Union without prior government approval would not be hired for government and semi-government jobs.

Though routine contact between Pakistan and the Soviet Union was maintained, ⁶³ no meaningful dialogue took place on the contentious issue. Zia-ul-Haq received a cold-shoulder treatment in Moscow in February 1984, where he attended the funeral of Yuri Andropov. His successor, Konstantin Chernenko or any other senior party member did not receive Zia-ul-Haq. The Soviet Union also declined a visit of Pakistan's Foreign Secretary in July 1984. When Zia-ul-Haq visited Moscow again in March 1985 to participate in the funeral of Chernenko, his successor, Mikhail Gorbachev, confronted him with the charge of active support to Afghan resistance. He warned the Pakistani president that this could adversely affect Pak-Soviet relations in other areas, including the economic field. ⁶⁴ This was the first time that the Soviets threatened to resort to economic pressures.

Two incidents in 1984–5 further irritated the Soviet Union. First, a bomb explosion partly damaged Aeroflot offices in Karachi in August 1984. No resistance group claimed responsibility. Second, in April 1985, a number of Soviet and Afghan personnel, held in detention by a resistance group in Matani, near Peshawar, were killed in an explosion. Despite Pakistan's denials of any connections with the incident, the Soviet Union reacted angrily and charged the regular Pakistani troops of involvement in the Matani incident.⁶⁵ In an interview with a Pakistani journalist, Mushahid Hussain, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Mikhail Kapitsa, said in October 1985: 'Your country is at war with the Soviet Union. Sometime back 12 Soviet soldiers were killed on Pakistan territory. There is an undeclared war launched from your territory against Afghanistan.'⁶⁶

THE GORBACHEV INITIATIVE

A positive shift in the Soviet Union's policy towards Pakistan shaped up in 1985 as part of Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to restructure Soviet politico-economic order and foreign policy. In February 1986, he hinted about his desire to pull out of Afghanistan in the near future, followed by his Vladivostok speech in July 1986, wherein he talked of improving relations with the states in the Asian and Pacific region and by building consensus amongst them on security issues. A number of steps were taken in a bid to defuse the Afghanistan crisis, including the withdrawal of six Soviet regiments from Afghanistan and the replacement of Karmal with Najibullah.

The Soviet Union reverted to its pre-1983 policy towards Pakistan – harsh criticism coupled with offers of friendship. However, there was one major difference from the earlier policy: Gorbachev made his moves in such rapid succession that the policy-makers in Islamabad found it difficult to match these with equally positive gestures.

The dialogue between Pakistan and the Soviet Union was revived. Special Soviet envoy, Anatoly Valkov, visited Islamabad in September 1986 to brief Pakistan on Gorbachev's initiative and to discuss the bilateral issues. The goodwill generated by this visit was soon neutralized when Soviet Assistant Military (Navy) Attaché, Colonel F. I. Gorenkov, was shot dead in Islamabad by a person described as mentally deranged by Pakistan's official sources. The Soviet Union made a blistering criticism of Pakistan over the incident and described this as a premeditated killing at the instance of those opposed to a political settlement in Afghanistan or an improvement of relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union.⁶⁷

However, the Islamabad incident was not allowed to spoil the long-term reconciliation efforts. Yaqub Khan and Eduard Shevardnadze met in New York, and the latter indicated in his address to the UN General Assembly that his government would endeavour to settle the Afghan problem by taking into account the 'legitimate interests' of the Afghan people, its friends and the neighbouring states.⁶⁸ The desire for reconciliation dominated Gorbachev's visit to India in November 1986, who avoided criticizing Pakistan while touring India.⁶⁹ These developments facilitated Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Abdul Sattar's visit to Moscow in December - the first since the cancellation of an earlier visit in July 1984 - and the talks focused on the modalities of Soviet withdrawal and other related issues. The tone of Soviet ambassador to Pakistan, Abdul Rehman Vazirov, mellowed. He said that the Soviet Union wanted friendly relations with India and Pakistan and that if Pakistan adopted an 'independent' foreign policy, the Soviet Union 'would certainly come forward'.70 However, he made it clear that his country would not 'abandon' Afghanistan. 71 Yaqub Khan expressed satisfaction over the Soviet gestures and said that Pakistan would pursue these 'with sincerity and a sense of purpose'.72

The diplomatic interaction maintained its momentum in 1987, involving several visits, positive statements and gestures. Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, Anatoly Kovalyev, opened his visit to Pakistan in January 1987 with an optimistic note that Pak-Soviet ties would strengthen and that he intended to hold 'intensive, meaningful, constructive and useful dialogue' in Pakistan.⁷³ He held consultations with Yaqub Khan and the top foreign office bureaucrats, and called on Zia-ul-Haq with a message from Gorbachev.

Yaqub Khan undertook two trips to Moscow in February (a two-day visit in the first week, and a stopover in the last week on the way to Geneva for talks on Afghanistan) for talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops and other bilateral issues. Pakistan urged the Soviets for a shorter withdrawal timeframe. determined exclusively by logistic requirements.74 Tass reported that the two foreign ministers were moving closer to an agreement on this issue.⁷⁵ In April, Zia-ul-Haq and Junejo visited the Soviet embassy separately to offer condolences to the ambassador on the death of his father. There were other signs of a thaw as well. When two Soviet MI-24 helicopters straved into Pakistan and were forced to land in the Chitral area in October, their six-man crew, headed by KGB Major Yevgeni Nicolai, was quickly handed over to the Soviet embassy. A 37-member Soviet tourist group visited Pakistan, and two Pakistani delegations (a women's delegation to participate in an international conference, and a businessmen's delegation) visited Moscow. Two of Pakistan's political leaders, Maulana Kausar Niazi and Syed Fakhr Imam, who visited the Soviet Union on an official invitation reported on their return the Soviet keenness to defuse the situation and to settle the Afghanistan problem.

The flurry of diplomatic activity sharply reduced their difference on the withdrawal timeframe, and by the end of 1987, the Soviet Union made up its mind to disengage from Afghanistan without unnecessary delay. But, they still diverged on a number of issues which haunted the prospects of improvement of their relations. The major among these were Pakistan's continued support to Afghan insurgency and the use of Pakistani territory by these groups, Pakistan's efforts to obtain AWACS from the United States, the shooting down of an Afghan An-26 transport aircraft by Pakistani jets in March 1987, the continued Afghan air raids and ground attacks on Pakistani territory, and bomb blasts in Pakistan's major urban centres which were blamed on Afghan agents.

It was in this background that the Soviet Union announced its decision on 8 February 1988 to begin the troop pull-out from Afghanistan from 15 May 1988, provided Pakistan and Afghanistan signed a peace agreement by 15 March. Within two days of this dramatic announcement, the Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister visited Islamabad for talks on the above proposal. A new round of the Geneva-based talks on Afghanistan produced an agreement in April 1988 for Soviet withdrawal in 9 months: 15 May 1988 – 15 February 1989.

Zain Noorani and Yaqub Khan, who visited Moscow in May and August 1988 respectively, assured the Soviet authorities that Pakistan wanted to implement the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan in their true spirit. They also urged the need for improving Pak-Soviet relations. The Soviets wel-

comed Pakistan's assurance but they conditioned the improvement of their relations with proper implementation of the Accords. However, their inability to reconcile their perspectives on the post-withdrawal Afghanistan kept them wary of each other and they pursued conflicting goals: Pakistan continued to support the insurgency in Afghanistan and worked towards the replacement of the Najibullah regime with a broad-based government comprising the resistance groups of its choice; the Soviet Union insisted on retaining Najibullah or a PDPA-dominated government in Kabul.

The Soviet Union was strongly irritated by the stepped-up resistance activity during the course of its troop withdrawal and threatened to take 'resolute retaliatory steps' if Pakistan did not change its policy. ⁷⁶ Its retaliation was swift and hard: Afghan aircraft carried out air raids on Pakistani border areas in August, September and November; ⁷⁷ the deployment of SS-1 Scud missiles, MiG-27 and Tupolev 'Backfire' bombers in Afghanistan, and the supply of weapons and military equipment to that country; the use of aircraft based inside the Soviet Union for attacks on insurgent positions in Afghanistan; ⁷⁸ and the firing of Scud missiles on Pakistani territory. The Soviets took a strong exception to the speculative report regarding possible Soviet and Afghanistan involvement in the crash of Zia-ul-Haq's aircraft. ⁷⁹

Soon after coming to power, Benazir Bhutto made a gesture towards the Soviet Union by sending relief goods for earthquake victims in Armenia in December 1988. This was followed by two important Soviet visits which activated the dialogue between the two countries. First Deputy Foreign Minister, Yuli Vorontsov, visited Islamabad in the first week of January 1989, to discuss the post-withdrawal arrangements in Afghanistan in the light of Gorbachev's offer in the UN General Assembly for an immediate ceasefire in Afghanistan, the establishment of a broad-based government in Kabul that included Najibullah, and the convening of an international conference on Afghanistan for ensuring its independent and nonaligned status.80 He also met with the chairman of the seven-party resistance alliance, Prof. Sibghatullah Mujaddeedi, in Peshawar. The other Soviet to visit Pakistan was Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in February - ten days before completion of the Soviet withdrawal. He sought Pakistan's cooperation for defusing tension in Afghanistan and emphasized the need for an 'end to the interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs.'81 Rejecting the 'military path', the two foreign ministers agreed on the need for a political settlement in Afghanistan and the establishment of a broad-based government by the people of Afghanistan themselves. They visualized the Afghanistan of the future as 'a sovereign, independent and nonaligned' state 'maintaining good relations with its neighbours'. They also reiterated their commitment to 'faithfully observe the provisions of the Geneva Accords.'82 These polite assertions glossed over the fact that they diverged on the means to achieve these goals, and especially on the composition of a broad-based government.

Pakistan's military circles were convinced that the Kabul government would collapse soon after Soviet withdrawal and therefore promoted the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen (IUAM) - an alliance of seven Islamoriented resistance groups - as an alternative to the Kabul government, and helped them to set up the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) with its headquarters in Peshawar. They also supported the AIG bid to capture Jalalabad in March-April 1989. To the surprise of most Pakistani and Western experts, the Kabul regime put up a spirited defence, and the poorly organized resistance groups, not trained for a conventional war, were beaten back. In September 1989, the AIG-IUAM guerrillas made an unsuccessful bid to capture the town of Khost, near the Pakistani border. Military operations elsewhere could not produce the major breakthrough the AIG needed to establish itself as a viable alternative to the Najibullah government. A group of pro-AIG officers in the Afghan Army, led by Lt.-Gen. Shahnawaz Tanai, made an unsuccessful attempt in March 1990 to overthrow Najibullah. Tanai fled to Pakistan.

The Soviets were very critical of the Pakistani connection with these developments. They subjected Pakistan to the harshest criticism in years in connection with the Jalalabad operation. Yuli Vorontsov (Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister) charged that Pakistani troops had directly participated in the operation which, in his opinion, amounted to Pakistani aggression.⁸³

While supporting the AIG, Pakistan did not give us the diplomatic option: a regular dialogue was maintained with the Soviet Union. Pakistan facilitated talks between the Soviet Union and Afghan resistance groups for the release of Soviet POWs. The preliminary sessions, held in November and December 1988, were followed by more meetings in January, June, July and November 1989, and April 1990, resulting in the release of some Soviet prisoners.

Two major developments augmented the prospects of settlement of the Afghanistan problem and improvement of Pak-Soviet relations. First, the failure of the AIG to dislodge President Najibullah from power and establish itself effectively on Afghanistan soil, led Pakistan to look for alternatives. Second, the highest level dialogue between the two superpowers in 1989–90 reduced the gap in their perspectives on Afghanistan. The Soviets hinted at softening their position on American demands for a simultaneous stoppage of military supplies to their clients, the Kabul regime and the

resistance groups respectively. The United States indicated that it would not insist on Najibullah's removal as a pre-condition for a political settlement.⁸⁴ Pakistan confirmed in August 1990 that the United States and the Soviet Union had come to a 'broad agreement in principle on Afghanistan' for holding elections for the future government, but they diverged on the powers Najibullah would exercise during the election period.⁸⁵

The Soviets indicated to Pakistan that they would like to settle the Afghanistan issue at the earliest opportunity. A Soviet delegation, led by Ambassador Nikalai Kozyrev, which visited Pakistan in August 1991, expressed their desire to explore the prospects of settlement on the basis of the five-point proposal offered by UN Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, in May. In the meantime Pakistan sought the support of Iran and Saudi Arabia for seeking an early settlement of the problem. Two tripartite conferences were held in July (Islamabad) and August 1991 (Tehran) which included Pakistan, Iran and the representatives of the majority of the leading resistance groups based in those countries. They agreed to pursue settlement jointly on the basis of the UN Secretary General's proposal, meet with him to seek clarifications on his proposal, and establish contacts with the Soviet Union.

The prospects of settlement on Afghanistan looked bright in September 1991. Pakistan's foreign office was of the view that the developments in the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the unsuccessful coup against Gorbachev were conducive to settling this problem. More so, Iran and Saudi Arabia, which diverged in their approaches to the Afghanistan problem in the past, were now prepared to lend full support to Pakistan's efforts to seek a political settlement. If these efforts succeed, the major obstacle to the improvement of Pak-Soviet relations is removed.

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Pakistan and the Soviet Union did not allow their political differences to completely undermine their economic relations. They maintained some economic interaction even when their political ties were quite strained, as was the case in 1971 and 1983–6. However, the absence of the requisite political push was the major constraint on the expansion of their economic relations, which could best be described as limited but useful.

The origin of Pak-Soviet economic relations can be traced back to the early years of independence when they started trade. A Soviet trade delega-

tion visited Pakistan in 1949 and the first barter trade agreement was signed in 1952. But, these relations could not grow in any significant way as Pakistan joined the US-sponsored alliance system and the Soviets came out openly in favour of India on Pakistan's disputes with that country. It was only in the sixties that some noteworthy developments took place in the economic field against a backdrop of the reorientation of their bilateral political relations. The Soviet Union offered four credits amounting to US \$176 million during 1961-6 to Pakistan for the exploration of oil and gas and the purchase of Soviet agricultural machinery. Bilateral trade also showed some improvement. These trends received a set-back as Pakistan and the Soviet Union diverged on the East Pakistan crisis, and the latter extended uninhibited support to India after the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan war, November-December 1971. An effort to give a boost to these relations was made in the post-1971 period, and their economic relations improved significantly during these years as they worked towards composing their political differences.

The Soviet Union offers loans on soft terms. Normally, 2.5 per cent interest is charged and repayments are spread over 12 to 15 years. Repayments can be made in manufactured goods and raw materials. The Soviets show greater interest in public sector projects but the private sector is not ignored altogether. While cooperating with the private sector, they extend financial and technological assistance and do not become regular partners by holding shares. Their goods are generally cheaper than the products supplied by Western countries. The Soviets claim that their economic assistance helps Pakistan to 'solve the key economic and social problems . . . reconstruct its economy inherited from imperialism' and reduces its 'one-sided dependence on the world market'. 86 However, their resource constraint makes it difficult for them to compete with Pakistan's Western aid donors, both in terms of funds and the range of projects for economic and technological cooperation. They also appear to be behind in several technological and industrial areas which makes some of their cheaply priced products less attractive. Above all, the political differences between Pakistan and the Soviet Union, and the pro-West orientation of Pakistan's political and economic elite places the Soviet Union at a clear disadvantage.

The Soviet Union offered credit facilities, supplied machinery and equipment, transfered technology, and extended training facilities in several areas. Their assistance for exploration of oil, gas and minerals, which included geological surveys, drilling, technical advice, training facilities, and the supply of equipment, proved quite fruitful as oil and gas were discovered in reasonable quantity at a number of places. In 1983, negotiations between the two countries and the visit of Pakistan's Petroleum

Minister, Major General (Retd) Rao Farman Ali, to the Soviet Union produced an agreement for the supply of two rigs for the exploration of oil. The Soviets also showed interest in drilling new wells in the Dhadak oilfield.⁸⁷

Power generation is another area where the Soviet Union extended useful assistance to Pakistan. It helped to set up a 210 megawatt capacity power generating unit at Guddu which went into production in 1980. In December 1983, the Soviets agreed to cooperate in the construction of Multan Thermal Power Plant. They supplied three turbines of 210 megawatt capacity each against a credit made available by them.⁸⁸

The most significant Soviet contribution was the setting up of a steel mill near Karachi. The first offer of a steel mill was made in the mid-fifties which was repeated in the late sixties. It was in 1971 that an agreement was reached for the construction of a steel mill with the initial annual capacity of 1.1 million tons of steel and pig iron. The foundation stone was laid in December 1973, and it was inaugurated in August 1981. In addition to providing machinery, equipment, and technical know-how, the Soviets imparted training to Pakistani engineers and technicians in Pakistan and the Soviet Union. Later, they offered to extend its production capacity to 1.5 million tons and the expansion work was resumed in July 1988. In another gesture in January 1989, the Soviet Union agreed in principle to raise its production capacity to three million tons per year.⁸⁹

Another area which received Soviet attention was agriculture. It supplied tractors and several agricultural implements to Pakistan. The Soviet Union collaborated with a Pakistani private sector firm for the production of Belarus tractors in Pakistan. According to the Census of Agricultural Machinery, 18 950 Soviet Belarus tractors were being used in Pakistan in 1984, which was a little over 12 per cent of the tractors in use during that year. Other Soviet contributions included a 1000 kw medium wave broadcasting transmitter for Islamabad and a couple of other medium and short wave radio transmitters. They also agreed in 1989 to meet 70 per cent of the construction cost of the Merrani dam which would be constructed on the Dasht river in Makran, Baluchistan, in six years.

The agreements and protocols signed between Pakistan and the Soviet Union from time to time helped to boost their trade in the seventies, although it constituted a small fraction of their total foreign trade. Three types of arrangements exist for bilateral trade: cash payments, barter, and the supply of goods against repayments of Soviet credits. The major imports from the Soviet Union include machinery, equipment and spare parts for various Soviet-aided industrial projects, agricultural implements, earth moving and road building equipment, metals and metal products, chemical

and a small number of consumer goods. Pakistan's exports to the Soviet Union comprise mainly cotton, cotton yarn and textile products, leather and leather goods, and carpets.

Some efforts to improve economic relations were made after Gorbachev launched his initiative for settling the Afghanistan problem. Making a plea for improved trade relations, the Soviets argued that Pakistan could make use of the big Soviet market by supplying cotton and textiles, footwear, leather and leather products and several other items. 91 The Soviet government also attempted to win over Pakistan's private sector. A delegation of Pakistani businessmen, led by the President of the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI), visited the Soviet Union for ten days in July 1987 to explore the prospect of enhancing economic cooperation. The FPCCI and the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry signed an agreement for promoting cooperation between the two organizations and for strengthening economic links between the two countries. They expressed interest in setting up joint ventures in agricultural machinery and implements, heavy mechanical items, generators, power plants, and machinery for packaging industry. 92 Pakistan and the Soviet Union organized exhibitions of their products and machinery in Moscow and Karachi in 1987 respectively. The Soviet Minister for Foreign Trade, E. P. Bavrin, who visited Pakistan in December 1987, signed a protocol for expanding their trade by increasing the supply of consumer and other products. He held out an offer of further expansion of trade and economic ties, and invited Pakistan's private sector to undertake joint ventures in the Soviet Union.93

An interesting aspect of Pak-Soviet economic ties pertains to the smuggling of Soviet goods from Afghanistan to Pakistan, which increased after Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. A wide range of Soviet goods, such as air conditioners, fridges, TVs, were available in Pakistan at prices lower than those of Japanese and Western products. The government of Pakistan was perturbed where it found out that the foodstuff smuggled into Pakistan after the Chernobyl nuclear accident carried a moderate level of radioactivity. It advised people not to use these items and ordered their confiscation and destruction.⁹⁴ No independent confirmation of the said contamination of foodstuff was available.

It goes to the credit of Pakistan and the Soviet Union that they did not suspend their economic interaction after they developed sharp differences on Afghanistan. However, the slowing down of these relations in the eighties could not be denied. There was very little building-up on what they had achieved in the seventies – a situation better than a total disruption but far from satisfactory. The leaders to the two sides often acknowledged that

there was wide scope for the expansion of their economic and trade relations but they found it difficult to bypass political realities.

Another problem was the lack of sufficient follow-up measures which delayed the implementation of their decisions, sometimes indefinitely. For example, in December 1983, Pakistan's Finance Minister, Ghulam Ishaq Khan's visit to Moscow produced agreements for the supply of two deep drilling rigs and three turbines for the Multan Thermal Power Station (discussed earlier), construction of a prefabricated housing plant, and the upgrading of the training centre at the Steel Mill. The implementation of these decisions was rather slow which compromised the goodwill generated by these agreements. Pakistan and the Soviet Union decided in May 1988 to set up a Joint Ministerial Commission for the promotion of bilateral cooperation. This proposal was endorsed during Shevardnadze's visit to Pakistan in February 1989, but the decision was not implemented for a long time.

The mutuality of interest and cordiality that developed between Pakistan and the People's Republic of China in the sixties has become a permanent feature of their bilateral relations. They have demonstrated a remarkable understanding of, and a sympathetic attitude towards, each other's foreign policy goals, and have generally adopted a mutually supportive disposition towards the major regional and international issues. These trends have shown stability despite several changes of governments and key personnel in the two countries.

China and Pakistan have similar views on the liberation struggles in Asia and Africa, Palestinian rights, the political and economic problems of the Third World and especially the New International Economic Order. They adhere strictly to non-intereference in each other's internal affairs, mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

They share perceptions on the regional strategic environment and view each other as struggling to assert their national identity and sovereignty in the face of challenges posed by the states with 'hegemonic' pretentions – India for Pakistan, and the Soviet Union for China. The Chinese support is an asset for Pakistan in its confrontation with India and it facilitates Pakistan's efforts to maximize its options in the context of South Asian politics. China also gains from its ties with Pakistan. It has an on-going border dispute with India and, as India's regional ambition conflicts with China's foreign policy goals, a strong and stable Pakistan is viewed by China as a constraint on India's drive towards a regional role. A strong Pakistan can also withstand Soviet pressures – a consideration that acquired greater importance for the Chinese after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan has its own problems with the Soviet Union and therefore, it is happy to obtain China's support.

Pakistan's independent and nonaligned foreign policy initiated in the sixties, was supportive of China's foreign policy goals. It not only pleaded for the rehabilitation of China as a member of the international community but also made a practical contribution towards bringing an end to China's isolation. Pakistan served as a useful link between China and the rest of the world at a time when the United States was bent on isolating China. The political and economic relations that China cultivated with Pakistan helped to ease the rigours of isolation, and China cited its ties with Pakistan to

demonstrate its desire to develop mutually beneficial relations with non-Marxist states. Pakistan also helped China's interaction with a number of Muslim states, especially those which had no formal diplomatic relations with China. Above all, it facilitated a secret indirect dialogue between China and the United States, resulting in normalization of their relations in 1971–2. Pakistan was one of the sponsors of the resolution that seated China in the UN in 1971.

There are no contradictions in the strategic and political goals of Pakistan and China, and they have found out over the years that their relationship is mutually rewarding. That is why the improvement of China's relations with India is not likely to drastically alter the present pattern of Pakistan-China relations. Sino-Indian friendship has limits for two major reasons. First, the unresolved border dispute which they have currently pushed to the background, remains a potential threat to the normalization process, and either side can revive it when, and if, needed. Second, they perceive each other as rivals in the region, and China will find it difficult to put up with an all-powerful and domineering India. A similar logic applies to the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the retreat of Soviet-backed Vietnam troops from Cambodia. The basic divergence in the goals and aspirations of China and the Soviet Union is a constraint on their efforts to improve their relations. The increased bilateral interaction does not necessarily mean that they have developed a consensus on major strategic and political issues in the international system, especially those pertaining to the Third World. Therefore, China will continue to need a strong, stable and friendly Pakistan in the future. However, Pakistan and China may not always pursue identical strategies for the achievement of their shared goals.

China enjoys a lot of goodwill and support at popular level in Pakistan because of its consistent support. It is viewed as a reliable friend, and the major political parties are supportive of friendship with China. It will not be an exaggeration to write that there is a near unanimity in Pakistan for maintaining friendly relations with China.

It is not merely the content but also the style of diplomacy that has helped to build goodwill for China. Its diplomats and other officials are low-keyed and come across as modest and humble individuals. They do not manifest the sense of superiority and indifference often associated with diplomats of the United States and the Soviet Union respectively. The Chinese project themselves as representatives of a Third World state, maintain a low profile life-style, and give due respect to local cultural sensitivities.

THE SEARCH FOR A VIABLE RELATIONSHIP

Pakistan was the first Muslim country to extend recognition to the People's Republic of China on 4 January 1950, and the Chinese and Pakistani ambassadors took up their assignments in each other's capital in September and November 1951 respectively. Welcoming Pakistan's first ambassador, Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (Mao Zedong) expressed the hope that their friendship would be strengthened over time and that this would promote peace and security in Asia and the world.¹

However, as the Chinese and Pakistani governments were busy with their domestic problems, their relations developed slowly. They established trade relations and a number of items, including jute, cotton, rice, textile and leather goods, and coal were traded in a limited quantity. In 1953, the first trade protocol was signed to place the trade relationship on a firm basis. Pakistan maintained a sympathetic disposition towards China in the political field. As early as September 1950, Pakistan pleaded for seating the People's Republic of China in place of the 'Nationalist' Chinese (Taiwan) government in the United Nations. It adopted a neutral position when the induction of Chinese troops in Tibet (1950) came up before the UN. Similarly, Pakistan did not vote on the resolution branding China as an aggressor in Korea (1953), although it was inclined towards the American perspective on the Korean problem.

There was a shift in Pakistan's China policy – from sympathy to ambiguity – as it cultivated security ties with the West. On the one hand the Pakistani leaders explained to the Chinese leadership that Pakistan's participation in the defence pacts was not aimed at China. The meeting between Pakistan's Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali Bogra and Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai (Zhou Enlai) on the eve of the Bandung Conference, 1955, was instrumental in removing Chinese doubts about Pakistani's involvement in these pacts.² On the other hand, Pakistan adopted a pro-US position on the seating of China in the UN and, during 1953–60, voted for postponing consideration of this issue.

China showed an understanding of, and patience towards, Pakistan's participation in the defence pacts, and Chinese leaders avoided a blistering criticism of Pakistan that characterized the Soviet response. The reciprocal visits of Pakistan's Premier H. S. Suhrawardy (October 1956) and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (December 1956) kept their bilateral relations intact: trade, cultural and goodwill exchanges. However, Pakistan demonstrated a negative attitude towards China from time to time: criticism of China during Suhrawardy's visit to the United States in July 1957; Pakistan's vote

for a resolution criticizing China for violating human rights in Tibet, 1959; the 1959 offer of joint defence to India to counter the 'threat from the north.'

Pakistan-China relations took a turn for the better in the sixties, as the leaders of the two countries faced a new geostrategic environment. Pakistan's alienation from the US-sponsored pacts resulted in its decision to adopt an independent posture in the international system which underlined the need for improving relations with the hitherto ignored socialist countries, especially China. The Chinese leaders were looking for international support in the context of their border dispute with India. Pakistan, which had its own problems with India, figured as China's natural ally in the region.

Four major treaties and protocols signed in 1963 signalled the beginning of a new era in Pakistan-China relations. These included the trade agreement giving the 'most favoured nation treatment' to each other in trade, commerce and shipping (January); the border agreement (March); the air transport agreement (August); and the barter trade agreement (September). Since 1961, Pakistan revived its support to seating China in the UN, and it stood by China in its efforts to counter an American campaign for the isolation of China. Similarly, Pakistan refused to endorse the Soviet Asian Collective Security proposal (1969) because, *inter alia*, China was opposed to it. China gradually adopted a pro-Pakistan position on Pakistan's disputes with India. It supported Pakistan on the Kashmir issue and the Rann of Kutch dispute (April 1965). Similarly, China extended uninhibited support to Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan War, September 1965, and, subsequently, began to supply weapons.

Highest-level interaction also increased in the sixties which reinforced their ties. The Chinese visits included Zhou Enlai (February 1964, June 1966)³, President Liu Shao Chi and Foreign Minister Chen Yi (March 1966). From Pakistan's side Presidents Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan visited in March 1965 and November 1970 respectively. Pakistan's senior military commanders also visited China in 1968 (C-in-C of the Army, General Yahya Khan), 1969 (Chief of General Staff, Army, Lt.-Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan), and 1970 (C-in-C of the Air Force, Air Marshal A. Rahim Khan, and C-in-C of the Navy, Vice Admiral Muzaffar Hasan). The high powered Pakistani delegation which Bhutto led to China in November 1971 included representatives of the armed forces: Lt.-Gen. Gul Hasan Khan (Army), Rear Admiral Rashid (Navy), and Air Marshal A. Rahim Khan (Air Force).

China extended support to Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity in 1971 when it was faced with civil strife in East Pakistan (Bangla-

desh). Its diplomatic support to Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistan war, 1971, was expressed in no less equivocal terms which was duly appreciated in Pakistan

Thus, the initial slow growth of their relations and the wavering on the part of Pakistan was replaced with a rapid expansion of their ties in the sixties. This was often described as Pakistan's 'flirtation' with China and the United States was initially unhappy over these developments, but Pakistan and China found this relationship to be mutually rewarding, and therefore self-reinforcing. By the end of 1971, this relationship was firmly established and they maintained a close and regular rapport on matters of mutual interest in the diplomatic, security and economic fields without in any way interfering in each other's internal affairs. This relationship could be described as an outstanding example of a state-to-state relationship based on mutuality of interest resulting from their concordant perception of the geostrategic environment and a satisfying experience of friendly interaction.

SUPPORT TO PAKISTAN'S RECOVERY

A major goal of China's South Asian policy in 1972 was to help Pakistan overcome the trauma of dismemberment (December 1971) and regain its image in the international system. China felt obliged to support an ally when the latter was faced with a serious crisis of confidence. This was also meant to convey a message to other Third World states that China always stood by its allies. The outcome of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War had tilted the balance of power in South Asia decisively in favour of India, which suited neither Pakistan nor China. Pakistan being averse to India's dominant role, wanted to maintain its freedom of action in foreign policy by mobilizing international support. China, on its part, felt that a secure and stable Pakistan would withstand India's pressures and contribute effectively to promoting peace and stability in the region.

Zhou Enlai reaffirmed the continued Chinese support to Pakistan soon after Bhutto replaced General Yahya Khan as the President of Pakistan after the surrender of the Pakistan military in East Pakistan (Bangladesh). In his message to Bhutto, Zhou paid tribute to the 'heroic struggle' of the people of Pakistan 'against the Indian aggressors in defence of their state sovereignty and territorial integrity'. He expressed the hope that their friendly relations and mutual cooperation would 'develop and grow stronger daily'.

China extended diplomatic support to Pakistan for the solution of problems caused by the 1971 war, promised to stand by Pakistan in its efforts to

maintain its independence and territorial integrity, contributed towards Pakistan's economic development, and helped to strengthen defence by supplying weapons as well as by setting up defence-related industry. Overawed by China's consistent support, several unofficial circles argued for signing a security pact with China.⁵ A Pakistani political analyst argued several years later that China's support in the post-1971 period helped Pakistan to overcome its problems and prevented India from realizing its 'hegemonic' ambition in the region.⁶

A major review of their bilateral relations and ways and means to address the post-war political and security issues was carried out during Bhutto's visit to China on 31 January – 2 February 1972. Zhou Enlai and Bhutto spoke enthusiastically about the friendship between the two countries and they expressed their desire to work together for the achievement of their shared goals. Pakistan's three services chiefs (Lt.-Gen. Gul Hasan, Rear Admiral H. H. Ahmad, and Air Marshal A. Rahim) who accompanied Bhutto held negotiations with their Chinese counterparts, and the Naval Chief stayed behind for more consultations.

The joint communiqué reiterated China's 'firm' support to the government and people of Pakistan in 'their struggle to preserve their state sovereignty and territorial integrity against outside aggression and interference'. Condemning India's aggression against Pakistan, it endorsed Pakistan's standpoint on the withdrawal of troops, return of POWs, and other issues for the normalization of the situation in South Asia. They also expressed the hope that the non-Bengalis in Bangladesh would be provided with adequate personal security. The two leaders reaffirmed their faith in the Bandung principles for promoting peace in South Asia and elsewhere and they declared their support for the people of Indo-China in their 'just struggle for national liberation', the Palestinian and the Arab cause, and the struggles in Africa and Asia against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism. The Chinese government decided to write-off four loans amounting to 110 million dollars, and deferred for 20 years the repayment of the 1970 interest-free loan. It also agreed to make fresh loans available to Pakistan in the future.7

These positive views were reaffirmed by the two sides on numerous occasions. The visits of China's Vice Foreign Minister, Chiao Kuan-hua, Foreign Minister, Chi Peng-fei, and a military delegation led by China's Deputy Chief of Staff, Chang Tsai-chien, in August 1972, June 1973, and January 1974 respectively underlined the growing understanding between the two countries. General Tikka Khan, Chief of Army Staff, Mrs Nusrat Bhutto, and Aziz Ahmad, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Defence, paid visits to China in January, February and August 1973 respec-

tively and expressed their deep gratitude to the Chinese leaders for their support to Pakistan. It was not merely China which made repeated assertions about the importance it attached to its friendship with Pakistan; the Pakistani leadership reciprocated such sentiments in similar terms and declared that they felt proud of this relationship. Speaking at a dinner in honour of the visiting Chinese Vice Foreign Minister in August 1972, Bhutto asserted that Pakistan would stand by China as China supported Pakistan, and that Pakistan was not willing to cultivate ties with any state at the expense of its friendship with China.⁸

It was during Bhutto's 1972 visit to China that the Chinese government decided to hold back the recognition of Bangladesh⁹ as a gesture of support to Pakistan. When, in August 1972, Bangladesh applied for membership to the UN, Pakistan approached China to stall the move until the troops withdrew to their respective territories and all Pakistani prisoners of war were returned, as laid down in the UN Security Council resolution of 21 December 1971. China obliged Pakistan by exercising its first-ever veto on Bangladesh's application in the Security Council. This made it clear to India and Bangladesh that the latter could not enter this world body without arriving at a settlement with Pakistan on the two most contentious issues, i.e. the withdrawal of troops, and the unconditional repatriation of Pakistani POWs.¹⁰

When Bhutto undertook his second official visit to China in May 1974, two major problems between Pakistan and India (i.e. the troop withdrawal and the repatriation of Pakistani POWs) had been settled. China and Pakistan expressed satisfaction over the reduction of tension in South Asia, but they qualified their satisfaction with determination 'for continuing vigilance against [the] tendencies towards hegemonism and expansionism and assertion of claims to positions of dominance or spheres of influence,'11 a reference to their shared perception of Indian and Soviet policies. Highlighting Pakistan-China relations, Vice Prime Minister of China, Teng Hsiao-ping (Deng Xiaoping) said:

China and Pakistan are close neighbours, and there exists a profound traditional friendship between our two people. . . . The Chinese government and the people highly treasure, and will never forget, the support and help the government and people of Pakistan have given us in many respects over the years. Our Pakistani friends may rest assured that, come what may, the Chinese government and people will, as always, firmly support Pakistan in her struggle in defence of national independence, state sovereignty and territorial integrity and against hegemonism

and expansionism, and firmly support the people of Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self determination.¹²

A new security situation developed in South Asia when, on 18 May 1974, India exploded a nuclear device. Pakistan naturally felt threatened and sought international guarantees against India's newly-demonstrated nuclear capability. Its Foreign Secretary, Agha Shahi, visited China in the first week of June for consultations. The Chinese reaffirmed their traditional support for Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity and, subsequently, endorsed Pakistan's proposal for declaring South Asia a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ). Similar assurances and guarantees were repeated when China's Vice Prime Minister, Li Hsien-nien, visited Pakistan in April 1975. He declared that the Chinese people would always remain 'reliable friends' of the people of Pakistan and that the Chinese government would always stand by Pakistan in defence of its 'national independence and state sovereignty against foreign aggression, interference, and subversion'. 13

Bhutto's visit to Beijing in May 1976 further strengthened understanding between the two countries on matters of mutual interest. Bhutto described his visit as a 'new milestone' that would lead to 'an even more active phase' in their bilateral relations. The Chinese Premier, Hua Kuo-feng (Hua Guofeng) spoke in an equally affectionate tone to highlight their friend-ship. The joint communiqué expressed satisfaction at the outcome of the talks and endorsed the understanding reached between the two governments during Bhutto's previous visits. Additionally, they supported Nepal's proposal for making that country a Zone of Peace as well as the proposal for declaring the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. China reiterated its support for Pakistan's proposal for designating South Asia a NWFZ. Describing Taiwan as 'an inalienable part' of China, Pakistan reaffirmed its 'full support to the Chinese people in their struggle to liberate Taiwan'. 15

An agreement on scientific and technical cooperation and a protocol to the agreement on economic and technical cooperation were signed between the two governments. Two senior military commanders who accompanied Bhutto during this trip (General Mohammad Shariff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee; and Air Chief Marshal Zulfikar Ali Khan, Chief of Air Staff) held consultations with the Chinese defence officials on security affairs.¹⁶

Two top Chinese leaders died in 1976. On 8 January, Zhou Enlai died, and as he was known as one of the leading architects of Pakistan-China Friendship, the government of Pakistan observed a week-long mourning.

Bhutto described him as a 'true and sincere friend of Pakistan' and paid him a glowing tribute for his services to the cause of international peace.¹⁷ Pakistan's Parliament passed a condolence resolution on this occasion.

Similarly, the government of Pakistan observed a week-long mourning when Mao Zedong died on 9 September.¹⁸ Pakistan's Senate (upper house of the parliament) passed a condolence resolution on Mao's demise and both the President and Prime Minister sent condolence messages. President Fazal Elahi Chaudhry paid him a glowing tribute as 'one of the most outstanding leaders of all times' who had left 'an indelible mark on the pages of human history'. Bhutto recalled his 'love and affection' for the people of Pakistan and described his thoughts and vision as the guiding spirit for the people of China as well as for oppressed people elsewhere.¹⁹

There was no shift in Pakistan's relations with China after the overthrow of Bhutto and the assumption of power by General Zia-ul-Haq in Pakistan in July 1977, but a slowing-down of interaction was discernible. A Chinese trade delegation visited Pakistan in September, and Zia-ul-Haq inaugurated the Chinese embassy's new building in the same month. However, it was not until Zia-ul-Haq's first visit to China in December that the Chinese leadership had their first direct and face-to-face contact with him. The two sides reiterated their traditional cordiality towards each other and the Chinese repeated their support for Pakistan's efforts to safeguard its independence and territorial integrity and to oppose external interference and hegemonism. No joint communiqué was issued but the two sides expressed satisfaction over the visit.

The Chinese leadership began to open up towards the military rulers of Pakistan after the overthrow of Sardar Daoud in Afghanistan in April 1978. The initial Chinese indifference towards the new Afghan government of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) changed to apprehension as the PDPA, known for its pro-Soviet disposition, began to strengthen its ties with the Soviet Union, culminating with the signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation in December 1978. China was also concerned over Afghanistan's efforts to revive its irredentist claims on Pakistani territory.

The Chinese viewed these developments as the gradual absorption of Afghanistan into the Soviet security system and that the Afghan pressures on Pakistan were part of the Soviet strategy to expand its orbit of influence. This, once again, underlined the relevance of an independent and non-aligned Pakistan for China. Its Vice Prime Minister, Keng Piao, who led a 40-member delegation to Pakistan in June 1978 to participate in the inauguration of the Karakorum Highway, declared that a strong Pakistan was

conducive to maintaining peace and stability in the region.²⁰ Bilateral interaction was stepped up between Pakistan and China. The important exchanges included: Agha Shahi's visits to Beijing (September 1978 and May 1979), two Chinese Vice Prime Ministers, Wang Chen and Li Xiannian to Pakistan in November 1978 and January 1979 respectively, two Chinese military delegations led by the Air Force Commander, Zhang Tingfa, and the Deputy Chief of General Staff, Zhang Caiqian, in March and October 1979 respectively, and a Chinese Vice Minister in May 1979. A Pakistan Air Force delegation visited China in October 1979.

Chinese Prime Minister, Hua Guo-feng, made a cautiously worded appeal to Zia-ul-Haq for sparing Bhutto's life. Declaring that it was 'entirely Pakistan's internal affair', he argued that China being a good neighbour and friend would appeal for granting him clemency. Such an appeal was understandable as Bhutto had played an important role in improving ties between Pakistan and China. However China, which highlighted non-interference in internal affairs of other states as a cardinal feature of its foreign policy, could not jeopardize its permanent interests in Pakistan for the sake of an individual, no matter what were his contributions.

THE AFGHANISTAN CRISIS

China condemned the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan as a 'hegemonic action' that violated the sovereignty and independence of Afghanistan and posed 'a grave threat to peace and security in Asia and the whole world.' Rejecting the Soviet contention that its troops were invited by the Afghan government, China demanded an immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.²² A formal protest was lodged with the Soviet ambassador in Beijing with a demand that the Soviet Union should 'immediately stop their aggression and intervention' in Afghanistan, and that, as Afghanistan was China's neighbour, 'the Soviet armed invasion' of that country posed a threat to 'China's security'.²³

The Chinese were of the strong view that the induction of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, coupled with the Soviet-backed Vietnamese military intervention in Cambodia, aimed at controlling the Strait of Harmouz, the warm ports of the Indian Ocean, and the Strait of Malacca which would enable them to 'manipulate Western Europe and Japan, and isolate and weaken the United States'.²⁴ This was a clear step towards establishing Soviet domination over the whole world.²⁵ It was also described as one of the three obstacles to the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations, along with the

Soviet military concentration on China's northern borders, and the Moscow-supported Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia. Furthermore, the Chinese felt that the Soviet move threatened the security and internal stability of their long-term ally Pakistan.

Support to Pakistan's security was the major feature of China's Afghanistan policy because they wanted to honour their often repeated commitments. Furthermore, the goal of thwarting Soviet expansionism could not be achieved without harmonizing policies with Pakistan and seeking the cooperation of other states, especially the United States.²⁶

Pakistan and China coordinated their strategies to deal with the situation arising out of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. China's Foreign Minister, Huang Hua, who visited Islamabad in the third week of January 1980, expressed solidarity with Pakistan. Condemning Soviet action in Afghanistan in strong terms, he called upon the international community to extend 'adequate and effective' assistance to 'the Afghan people and their resistance movement and other patriotic forces' in Afghanistan. 'This kind of assistance', he maintained, 'should also be given to the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan and [the] countries faced with the threat of Soviet aggression'.²⁷

Zia-ul-Haq's visit to Beijing in May 1980 produced a unanimity of views on Afghanistan. China's Premier Hua Guo-feng described the Soviet action as 'a threat to the security of the South Asian countries' and a serious danger to 'the peace of Asia and the whole world'. Zia-ul-Haq spoke of the 'dangerous consequences' of the Soviet intervention which was 'an infringement of the liberty of a nonaligned Muslim state'. The two sides agreed to work together to seek a solution to the Afghanistan problem. A review of the developments in Afghanistan and other issues was undertaken when Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Agha Shahi, visited China in December 1980, shortly after Soviet President Brezhnev's visit to India. China's Foreign Minister, Huang Hua, endorsed Pakistan's policy on Afghanistan. He said, 'We appreciate [the] correct position of Pakistani government which insists that the Soviet Union [should] withdraw its troops and the Afghan people [must] be allowed to decide their own future free from outside interference.'30

China's Prime Minister, Zhao Ziyang (appointed in September 1980) undertook his first trip to Pakistan in May–June 1981 for consultation on regional security and political affairs. He reiterated China's four-point perspective on Afghanistan: Soviet intervention was a consequence of its hegemonic and expansionist designs, a firm support to Afghan resistance, a call to the international community to give maximum support to the Afghan people in their struggle against the Soviet troops, and assistance to neigh-

bouring countries, especially Pakistan, to enable them to combat the 'Soviet designs'.³¹ Pakistan and China expressed a unanimity of views of Afghanistan, Pakistan's security, and opposition to hegemonism and expansionism. Declaring Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan as a 'serious threat' to Pakistan, Zhao reiterated China's support to Pakistan in its 'just struggle to oppose foreign aggression and interference and safeguard the national independence and sovereignty of the country'.³²

The exchange visits of senior civilian and military officials also increased in the wake of their shared perceptions on Afghanistan. China supplied weapons and military equipment to Pakistan, extended humanitarian assistance to Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and bolstered Afghan resistance by diplomatic support and a limited weapon supply. It endorsed Pakistan's demand for a negotiated settlement of the Afghanistan problem. It welcomed the initiation of the Geneva-based indirect talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan under the auspices of the representative of the UN Secretary-General. Pakistan kept China posted on the course of these negotiations.

RECIPROCAL HIGH-LEVEL INTERACTION

By 1980–1, regular high-level reciprocal visits emerged as the main channel of interaction between the two countries. Every new Pakistani and Chinese leader assigned priority to establishing contact with each other. This underlined the importance they attached to each other and provided them with regular opportunities to monitor the regional and international situation and their bilateral relations. However, they did not always issue joint communiqués after the highest level visits. The banquet speeches and press conferences outlined their shared perceptions. Such visits often produced agreements for Chinese assistance to Pakistan in economic, technological and defence fields.

There were several important visits during 1982–3. Chinese Vice Premier, Ji Pengfi, led a goodwill mission to Pakistan in March 1982 which included, among others, Han Nienlung, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Zhang Zehan, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Army. Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Yaqub Ali Khan, who succeeded Agha Shahi in March 1982, undertook his first foreign trip in his new assignment to China in April and met with the top Chinese leaders – Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang, and Huang Hua – who assured him of the continued Chinese support. Zia-ul-Haq's visit to China in October 1982 underlined their identical perspectives on Afghanistan: China reaffirmed its often repeated position

and argued that a tough resistance to the Soviets in Afghanistan would force them to withdraw; Pakistan expressed its determination to continue to oppose Soviet intervention and support resistance, coupled with a search for a political settlement. China also reiterated its support to Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity. China and Pakistan decided to set up a joint committee to promote economic, trade, scientific and technological cooperation, and to make a yearly review of their bilateral relations. Chinese Foreign Minister, Wu Xueqian, visited Pakistan in July 1983, which produced yet another identity of views on matters of mutual interest.

Two visits in 1984 were significant: Chinese President Li Xiannian³³ in March and Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Yaqub Khan, in July. The Chinese President's visit was described by the Chinese as a big success because its four purposes were fully realized, i.e. promotion of understanding, learning from each other, deepening of friendship, and expansion of cooperation.³⁴ Identifying relaxation of tension and promotion of peace as the shared goals of Pakistan and China, the Chinese appreciated Pakistan's efforts to improve its relations with India and declared that they also wanted to develop friendly relations with India on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence. Regarding Afghanistan, they expressed their doubts that the Soviet would withdraw on their own and reaffirmed their support to the people of Afghanistan in their efforts to 'liberate their country from the aggressor'. 35 Yaqub Khan's visit was equally successful, as they agreed on the need for a comprehensive settlement of the Afghanistan crisis and supported the UN Secretary General's efforts to achieve this goal. China maintained that the Afghanistan settlement must ensure the unconditional and comprehensive withdrawal of Soviet troops, and the independence and sovereignty of Afghanistan must be fully respected and guaranteed. Pakistan endorsed Chinese demands for the withdrawal of Vietnam troops from Cambodia (Kampuchea) and supported the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea under the leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk for 'the realization of the right of the Kampuchean people to determine their own political and social system free of outside intervention and coercion'.³⁶

Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo's trip to China in November 1985 was his first official foreign visit, which he described as 'memorable and highly successful'.³⁷ He maintained that their bilateral relations were 'not only mutually beneficial but [these were] also a guarantee for peace and stability [in the region].'³⁸ The two sides reiterated their well known positions on Afghanistan, regional and international issues. Yaqub Khan's two visits to China in 1986 (September and December) were part of regular consultations between the two countries. The September visit produced an

agreement of cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the fields of industry, agriculture, medicine, and power generation, subject to the standard International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. This agreement need not be linked with the speculative reports in the Western and Indian press about China's alleged support to Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme; that China supplied Pakistan with the data on nuclear weapon design, and that Pakistan tested its nuclear device in China. Both Pakistan and China denied these reports.

The December visit took place against a backdrop of positive pronouncements by the Soviet Union for an early political settlement of the Afghanistan problem, and the withdrawal of six Soviet regiments. The two sides emphasized the need for a 'peaceful and just political solution' of the Afghanistan crisis, and, on Kampuchea, Pakistan endorsed the UN General Assembly's repeated demand for the withdrawal of Vietnam's troops. Underlining the need for developing good neighbourly relations on the basis of 'mutual respect and sovereign equality', Yaqub Khan said that the improvement of Pakistan-India relations would be beneficial to their people. Chinese Foreign Minister, Wu Zueqian, condemned the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan as it inflicted 'untold sufferings' on the people of that country, constituted a security threat to the neighbouring states, and undermined peace in the region. Regarding Pakistan, he reiterated China's 'resolute support' for its 'national independence, state sovereignty and territorial integrity'. He maintained that their friendly relations would 'grow in strength and develop further' as these were based on a 'solid foundation'.39

Chinese Prime Minister, Zhao Ziyang, visited Pakistan in June 1987. The talks produced yet another identity of views on major global and regional issues. Demanding the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and Kampuchea, the two prime ministers underlined the need promoting peaceful relations with their neighbours. They emphasized that any settlement of the Afghan problem must ensure the exit of all Soviet troops, return of Afghan refugees, and restoration of Afghanistan's independent, sovereign and nonaligned status. In his message on his departure from Pakistan, Zhao Ziyang expressed his strong belief that their friendly relations and cooperation would 'grow in strength and develop daily'. The follow-up visits of Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, Zhu Qichen, in September and November reinforced these cooperative trends.

The practice of regular high-level consultations was maintained in the subsequent years. Pakistan's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Defence, Zain Noorani, travelled to Beijing in February 1988 to exchange

views on the last session of the Geneva-based talks on Afghanistan which were due to open in March. The Chinese welcomed the signing of the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan in April as a 'positive development' and 'a major victory for the Afghan people'. ⁴³ Prime Minister Junejo, who visited China in May, briefed his Chinese counterpart, Li Peng, on the post-settlement problems in Afghanistan and succeeded in securing their support for Pakistan on these issues.

Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Dr Humayun Khan, and Foreign Minister, Yaqub Khan, travelled to Beijing in June 1988 for consultations on bilateral and regional affairs. The post-Geneva Accords situation in Afghanistan, especially the Soviet withdrawal and the continuing civil strife, came up for a detailed discussion. The Chinese were favourably disposed towards Pakistan's perspective on the implementation of the Geneva Accords. Yaqub Khan described his visit as 'most gratifying and purposeful' and declared that China's support to Pakistan and other smaller nations in 'safeguarding their sovereignty and territorial integrity' and its 'forthright support for just causes' helped 'stability and peace in our region'.44

Benazir Bhutto, who assumed Pakistan's premiership in December 1988, selected China for her first official foreign trip in February 1989, coinciding with the completion of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Declaring that friendship with China was a cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy, she described her visit as a 'sentimental homecoming' because she had earlier visited China along with her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in the seventies.⁴⁵ The two Prime Ministers reviewed the whole gamut of their bilateral relations as well as the regional and international situation. As always, they had similar views on these affairs, especially on Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations. Praising Pakistan's support to the people of Afghanistan, Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng hoped that the establishment of a broad-based government in Kabul would contribute to restoring Afghanistan's 'independent, peaceful, neutral and nonaligned status.'46 A number of agreements were signed on reciprocal encouragement and protection of investments, extension of trade protocol, concessionary loans to build coal-based power stations, and the supply of 75 Chinese-made F-7 aircraft.⁴⁷ In April 1989, Iqbal Akhund, a special envoy of Pakistan's Prime Minister, called on the Chinese authorities in Beijing with a letter from Benazir Bhutto regarding the situation in Afghanistan. China, once again, endorsed Pakistan's proposal for a broad-based government comprising the major political forces in Afghanistan. They hoped that such an arrangement would promote peace in Afghanistan, restore its neutrality and nonaligned status, and encourage the Afghan refugees to return to their homes.48

Pakistan did not join the West in condemning China on suppressing a student agitation in Beijing's Tiananmen square in June 1989. The Foreign Office spokesman declined to make any comment on these developments but expressed 'grief and sorrow' on the loss of human lives.⁴⁹ Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Dr Humayun Khan, undertook a routine visit to China, followed by the visit of a Senate delegation during the same month.

Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng's visit to Pakistan, in November 1989, provided the two governments with another opportunity to renew their commitments to the shared perspectives on Afghanistan and other regional and international issues. The Chinese repeated their support for Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity, and Pakistan paid tribute to China's long established and trusted friendship. Several agreements were signed for extending bilateral economic relations. The most significant development was China's decision to supply Pakistan with a 300+ megawatt nuclear power plant. This power plant is expected to be operational by 1996, and will be subject to standard IAEA safeguards.

The regular high level interaction was maintained through a number of civil and military exchange visits and mutual consultations.⁵⁰ Pakistan's President, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, undertook a visit to China in September 1990. The two sides expressed their well-known cordiality and unanimity of views on regional and international issues, and they signed three agreements pertaining to cultural exchanges, Chinese assistance for Afghan refugees, and the Saindak project in Baluchistan.

THE KASHMIR ISSUE

China's policy on the Kashmir issue has oscilated between neutrality and support to the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir. In the fifties, the heyday of Sino-Indian friendship, China avoided taking sides and called upon India and Pakistan to settle this problem through direct negotiations. Zhou Enlai maintained during his visit to Pakistan in December 1956 that, like other disputes among the Afro-Asian nations, the Kashmir dispute could also be settled amicably and that the 'colonists' who originally created this problem should be kept out of it. Similar views were expressed during his visit to Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in 1957, and he did not favour taking this issue to the UN.⁵¹ Later, Mao Zedong declared that China would maintain a neutral position on Kashmir.⁵² The Pakistan-China boundary agreement (March 1963) was signed as a provisional arrangement and article 6 provided that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute, it would be renegotiated/reconfirmed by China and the concerned sovereign au-

thority. A cautious sympathy for Pakistan on Kashmir manifested in the joint communique issued after the signing of this border agreement as the Chinese government lauded Pakistan's efforts for seeking an amicable settlement of the Kashmir dispute.⁵³ However, an overall position of neutrality on Kashmir was asserted by Zhao Enlai in an interview with the Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) later in the same month.⁵⁴

A clear tilt towards Pakistan's position on Kashmir began to shape up in China's policy as its relations with India got bogged down in the boundary dispute, and its relations with Pakistan improved in the wake of Pakistan's efforts to adopt an independent posture in world affairs. China expressed categorical support to the right of the people of Kashmir to determine their political future during Zhou Enlai's visit to Pakistan in February 1964.

In the seventies, China argued for a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir problem through the exercise of the right of self-determination by the people of Kashmir. The joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of Bhutto's visits to China in 1972, 1974, and 1976 contained specific references to the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir and described their efforts in this respect as a 'just struggle'. The top Chinese political and military leaders interacting with their Pakistani counterparts publicly endorsed Pakistan's position on Kashmir. At times, they called for the settlement of the Kashmir problem in the spirit of the Simla agreement and the resolutions of the UN,⁵⁵ an indirect method of suggesting a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute through the exercise of the right of self-determination.

A subtle shift in China's Kashmir policy took place in the eighties when Chinese leaders avoided pointed references to the right of self-determination, and emphasized more than ever the need of a negotiated settlement of this and other problems between Pakistan and India, although they did not waver in their support to Pakistan's security and territorial integrity.

The first public expression of the revised Chinese approach to the Kashmir problem was made by Deng Xiaoping in his interview in an Indian journal, *Vikrant*, in June 1980. He described Kashmir as a bilateral problem between Pakistan and India which the two countries should settle amicably. A similar approach was adopted by Premier Zhao Ziyang during his visit to Pakistan in May–June 1981. He did not make a public endorsement of the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir, and stressed more than his predecessors the need of reconciliation amongst the states of South Asia 'free from outside interference and through consultations on an equal footing'. The absence of a reference to the right of self-determination was understandable because, since the revival of diplomatic ties between India and China in 1976, China was working towards improving its

relations with India. China's Foreign Minister was to undertake a visit to India shortly after Zhao's trip to Pakistan. Therefore, it was not considered advisable to issue a statement on Kashmir that offended India.

As the process of normalization of relations between China and India gained some momentum, Chinese leaders avoided critical comments about the latter's policies towards other South Asian states, and they did not return to the idiom of the seventies on the Kashmir issue. They also urged the reduction of tension in South Asia and called upon the states of this region to improve their relations on the basis of sovereign equally, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, peaceful co-existence, amicable settlement of their disputes, and mutual benefits. They progressively adopted a non-partisan attitude towards inter-state disputes in South Asia.

Pakistan has shown an understanding of China's silence over the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir in view of the latter's efforts to develop a functional interaction with India. Pakistan views this as a tactical change rather than a withdrawal of support. On his return from China in November 1985, Junejo remarked that 'there should be no doubt about Chinese support to Pakistan' on the Kashmir issue.⁵⁸

Chinese policy on reduction of tension in South Asia coincides with Pakistan's policy of improvement of relations with India. The improved Sino-Indian relationship can reduce India's suspicion of the multi-faceted Sino-Pakistan relations, and minimize India's need to maintain a pro-Soviet slant on foreign policy.

THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

Pakistan-China security relations, dating back to 1965–6, include consultations on security affairs, China's arms supply to Pakistan, and its help to boost Pakistan's indigenous defence production. It was against a backdrop of Pakistan's weapon losses in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War and especially the US arms embargo that China offered to supply weapons and military equipment. The first consignment of weapons was delivered to Pakistan in early 1966, and on 23 March 1966 Chinese MiG-19 and T-59 tanks were included in the Pakistan Day parade, as Pakistan's first acknowledgement of receipt of Chinese weapons and equipment.

Consultations on security affairs shaped up into a regular feature of their bilateral relations in the seventies when senior military commanders and military delegations from the three Services, visited each other. Bhutto's entourage during his visits to China always included some senior military commanders, and in 1972 and 1976 some of the senior military officers accompanying Bhutto stayed on in China for extended consultations. The Chinese government accepted Pakistan's proposal in 1976 to include some of Pakistan's armament requirements in its long-term defence production programme so as to ensure a regular and reliable supply.⁵⁹

Interaction between the military establishments of the two countries increased after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Five military delegations were exchanged in 1980 (China four, Pakistan one) for mutual consultations as well as to underline their desire to pursue a shared strategy for regional security problems. Subsequently, such delegations were exchanged on an annual average of two to three, excluding the senior military officers who accompanied the head of state/government in his official visits. These trips generally lasted for 5-10 days, which included visits to military institutions, briefings on strategy, mutual consultations on the regional security environment, and a discussion on ways and means to strengthen Pakistan's defence. The visiting Chinese commanders always reaffirmed their support to Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity. In December 1985, two Chinese Navy ships made the first-ever port call at Karachi, Occasionally, the Chinese commanders were conferred awards by Pakistan for their contribution to promoting good relations between the armed forces of the two countries. For example, General Chi Haotian, Chief of General Staff, was decorated with 'Nishan-i-Imtiaz: Military' in March 1989.

Chinese arms supply against soft or interest-free loans or as an outright grant contributed to enhancing Pakistan's defence capability, and, until the initiation of the US assistance package in 1982, China was the single major source of arms procurement for Pakistan. Its supplies in the sixties included, *inter alia*, MiG-19 (F-6), and Ilyushin-28 bombers, T-59 tanks, Shanghai II mortar gunboats, equipment for three infantry divisions, and small arms and ammunition. They also provided funds and technical know-how for setting up an ordnance factory at Ghazipur, near Dhaka, which was commissioned in April 1970. Pakistan lost this facility when Bangladesh became an independent state in 1971.

China helped to re-equip the Pakistan military after its debacle in the 1971 war with India. Its major supplies in the seventies included a variety of equipment for the three Services, such as, T-50 tanks (259 during 1972–6, 50 per year under an arrangement agreed to in 1977), small arms and weapons, MiG 19/F-6, F-6bs, F-4/MiG-17, Tu-16 (H-6) aircraft, gunboats, submarines, and patrol boats. This pattern of arms transfers continued in the eighties and the early nineties Pakistan also received long-range and anti-armour guns, and communication equipment; F-6bs,

F-7 (MiG-21), and Q-5 Fantan (MiG-19) aircraft; CSA-1 SAM batteries; and various naval crafts, including Romeo submarines. In 1989, Pakistan and China initiated negotiations for the sale of a Chinese nuclear submarine to Pakistan.

The protocols and agreements signed between Pakistan and China in 1974 and 1976 served as the foundation of cooperation in defence production. China provided financial and technical assistance, including machinery and technicians for boosting indigenous production of weapons. A tank rebuild factory at Taxila was commissioned in November 1979. It can repair and overhaul tanks and manufacture some spare parts. A tank manufacturing factory, also situated at Taxila, was inaugurated in October 1988. In June 1990, an agreement was signed for the transfer of technology and for more cooperation in defence production, including the progressive production of T-59 and T-85/11 tanks as well as the manufacture of a new tank in Pakistan. China assisted the expansion and modernization of the ordnance complex at Wah. A new 12.7 mm anti-aircraft gun factory went into production in 1985. China also assisted Pakistan's guided missile programme. Another important defence-related Chinese-aided project is the F-6 rebuild and overhaul factory, part of the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex at Kamara. It was commissioned in November 1980. As Pakistan acquires superior Chinese aircraft, this facility will be upgraded and extended. Pakistan and China are also jointly developing a trainer aircraft, Karakoram-8, a slightly modified version of the L-8 jet trainer, and plans for co-production of some other aircraft in Pakistan are under active consideration. The Heavy Mechanical Complex and the Heavy Foundry and Forge, set up with Chinese cooperation, produce tools, machinery and other engineering equipment which are used by the military as well as the civilian sector.

ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL RELATIONS

Pakistan and China maintain multi-faceted economic relations involving China's economic assistance, cooperation for industrialization and related development activity, and trade. China extends financial assistance as grants, interest-free or low-interest loans, with a stipulation that the loans can be repaid in local goods. It often supplies its products and equipment at lower than the international market prices. Though China does not push any specific economic priorities with its economic assistance, it shows greater interest in labour-intensive projects as well as those yielding tangible bene-

fits for the people. However, there is a limit to which China can assist Pakistan because of its resource constraints and the lack of high technology superior to the one offered by the United States and the West. That is why, despite China's attractive terms, Pakistan continues to seek economic and technological assistance from the West.

China has been making loans and grants available to Pakistan for industrialization and other developmental activities as well as for the purchase of weapons since 1964. As a gesture of goodwill, the Chinese government decided in 1972 (Bhutto's visit to China) to write off four loans worth \$110 million which it had given in the sixties, and the repayment of the 1970 interest-free loan was deferred for 20 years. Several agreements for the provision of loans were signed in the mid-seventies. This pattern continued in the eighties when China extended more loans for setting up industry, power generation, and other developmental projects.

China provided machinery against credit facilities, the technical knowhow, and training facilities for setting-up the Heavy Mechanical Complex, and the Heavy Foundry and Forge at Taxila. Completed in 1971 and 1977 respectively, these units produce machinery for setting-up industry, tools and engineering equipment; some of these products are exported. Other major Chinese-aided projects include two textile mills in NWFP and Azad Kashmir; a fertilizer, a sheet glass, and a cement factory in NWFP; two sugar mills in Sind; and a couple of engineering and small-sized steel/pig iron factories. (Defence-related industry has been discussed in the earlier section.)

China's contribution to power generation and transmission is significant. It offered loans for constructing power transmission lines from Tarbella, and a thermal power unit at Gaddu (Gaddu-4). In 1987, China agreed to provide three power generation units — each of 210 megawatt — for the Jamshoro thermal power project (Jamshoro-2). Two years later, they decided to extend the scope of cooperation for the Jamshoro power project, and China agreed to provide a nuclear power plant to Pakistan.

A host of agreements and protocols were signed in the mid- and late eighties for the expansion of the existing cooperation and for initiating new projects. They resumed work on modernization and extension of the Heavy Mechanical Complex and the Heavy Foundry and Forge. China agreed to cooperate in setting up a heavy electrical complex at Haripur (NWFP) to produce transformers of eight different types and high voltage electrical equipment. An agreement was signed in 1987 for setting up a TV assembly-cum-manufacturing factory at Islamabad as a joint venture between a Pakistani firm and China's National Electronics Import and Export Corporation at a 60:40 ratio. In 1989, the two governments agreed on reciprocal en-

couragement and protection of investments in order to facilitate more joint ventures between Pakistani and Chinese firms.

China, which helped Pakistan's mining industry by undertaking soil survey for an iron ore project in Baluchistan in the seventies, agreed in October 1988 to provide technical and financial assistance for the Saindak mining project in Chaghai district. This project, when completed in 3–4 years, would produce copper and other precious minerals. In April 1989, they signed another agreement for joint exploitation and development of water and mineral resources in Baluchistan and NWFP.

Four agreements signed during Chinese Premier Li Peng's visit to Pakistan in November 1989 dealt with avoidance of double taxation, an interest-free loan of 50 million Yuan (\$13.5 million) for various projects, road making machinery for Baluchistan, some equipment for a medical college in Lahore, and humanitarian assistance for Afghan refugees. A Memorandum of Understanding signed in December provided for procurement, joint research and development, co-production and transfer of technical know-how for a period of ten years in the fields of defence, science, technology and industry.

Pakistan and China developed trade relations in the fifties but it was not until January 1963 that they signed an agreement to give the 'most favoured nation treatment' to each other in trade, commerce and shipping. A barter trade agreement was signed in the following year. In 1969, with the opening of the traditional 'silk route' between Gilgit and Xinjiang, a border trade agreement was signed. These agreements, renewed annually, coupled with other follow-up agreements and protocols, served as the framework of their trade interaction.

Major Pakistani imports from China include coal, iron and steel products, capital goods, industrial raw material, a large number of consumer goods, especially paper, office stationery, and other small scale or cottage industry goods, tea and silk. The major exports include raw cotton, textiles, cotton yarn, leather, fertilizer, carpets and rugs, woollen goods, and a large number of consumer goods. China obtained several sea vessels constructed by the Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works.

Border trade is an important feature of their economic relationship. As the Karakoram Highway was inaugurated in 1978 and transportation facilities improved, the border trade increased rapidly. Pakistani and Chinese caravans visit each other and exchange goods (barter) for use in Pakistan's northern areas and China's Xinjiang province; some of these goods trickle down to the major urban centres. The most common Pakistani exports through the border trade include textiles, dried fruits, medical herbs, light industrial goods, colour television, passenger bus bodies/frames, handicrafts,

and a host of consumer goods. Pakistan's major imports through this channel include printed cloth, woollen blankets, silk, electrical equipment, road-making machinery, agricultural implements, and articles of day-to-day use. In July 1987, a modern trade centre was constructed in Gilgit at a cost of Rs1.8 million to accommodate the border trade activity under one roof.

An important feature of the Pakistan-China trade relationship is that the balance of trade has been in China's favour since the early seventies. The only exception was 1980–1 when China made a huge purchase of cotton, as its own cotton crop suffered from under-protection. By 1987–8 the imbalance became quite sharp, which perturbed Pakistan's policy-makers who took up the issue with China to seek remedial measures.

Cultural relations, and scientific and technical cooperation between Pakistan and China expanded as they signed agreements and protocols in these fields. They agreed to exchange scientific and technological information and to assist each other in the fields of hydroelectricity, solar energy, drilling and petroleum industry, health, small-scale industry, agriculture and rural technologies, and construction industry; mutual cooperation in education, banking, electronics and medicines. In December 1987, the National Bank of Pakistan and the Bank of China signed an agreement for sharing training, management and development experience for five years. The former agreed to conduct special training programmes for Chinese bankers and accommodate some Chinese in its regular training programmes.⁶⁰ Pakistan and China waived the visa requirement for the holders of diplomatic and official passports.⁶¹

Cultural and other exchanges are regularly undertaken. These include the exchange of folk art, literature, and feature films; and the reciprocal visits of cultural and performing art groups, educationists, scholars, scientists and engineers, members of parliament, youths, women, and Chinese Muslims. They participate in each other's major sports and cultural events, and exchange coaches for the promotion of sports. China provided major funding for establishing the sports and cultural complex at Islamabad under an agreement signed in 1974.

An outstanding feat of engineering was the construction of the Karakoram Highway by Chinese and Pakistani engineers. The highway, over 800 km long, which passes through the most rugged mountainous terrain along the traditional silk route, is an all-weather road capable of carrying passenger and cargo traffic. It links China's Xinjiang province with Pakistan's northern areas which are already linked by road with the rest of Pakistan, thereby providing a road link from China to the Middle East and the Arabian Sea. Though designed to improve communication and trade, its strategic importance cannot be ignored. It can be used for troop movement

and, with some upgradation, it can take heavy armour and large size container trucks.

The antecedents of the Karakoram Highway could be traced back to 1959 when Pakistan Army engineers resumed work on the Indus Valley Road, which connected Pakistan's major cities with Gilgit. Pakistan decided to upgrade and extend this road to the Pakistan-China border after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war. The Chinese consented to build a similar road on their side up to the Khunjerab pass, linking Chinese towns like Tash-Kurgan, Kashgar and Urumchi with Pakistan.⁶² China also offered assistance in the form of road construction machinery and equipment for building bridges under the agreements signed in 1966 and 1967. This road link was inaugurated in February 1971. Two years later, China and Pakistan decided to turn this road into a highway of international standard. The Chinese offered machinery, equipment and construction material, and their labour worked along with Pakistani labour on this project.⁶³ The total workforce numbered 24 500, including the Chinese.⁶⁴

The Karakoram Highway was inaugurated in 1978, but work on the improvement of road communication in the northern areas did not stop after the completion of this project. Attention was given by Pakistan with Chinese cooperation to the Karakoram Highway's upkeep, construction of some other roads linking different places with one another, and with the Karakoram Highway.

In September 1985, Pakistan and China began to use the Karakoram Highway for surface postal mail. The mail exchanged at the Khunjerab pass, the Pakistan-China border at an altitude of about 1600 feet, is meant not only for the adjoining regions of the two countries (Gilgit, Baltistan, and parts of NWFP, and Xinjiang) but Pakistan also receives transit mail for Turkey and Saudi Arabia.⁶⁵ The Khunjerab pass was opened to third country travellers in May 1986,⁶⁶ which made it possible for them to travel between these two countries by road (Pakistanis and Chinese had this permission since 1982), although the climatic conditions are not so hospitable for tourism in this region.

A new dimension has been added to Pakistan-China relations with the softening of the Chinese government's attitude towards religious and cultural identities which made it possible for the Chinese Muslims to enjoy more freedom. 67 Chinese Muslims, mainly from Xinjiang, use the Karakoram Highway for their journey to Saudi Arabia for the annual haj pilgrimage. They are offered free travel and accommodation facilities during their transit through Pakistan. They are allowed to bring some goods to Pakistan for sale to cover part of their travel cost. Most of their goods are purchased by the Utility Stores Corporation, a semi-government body, but one can see

some Chinese Muslims selling pure silk, cotton and synthetic fibre cloth, dresses, handicrafts, and gift items in the vicinity of their camps in Gilgit and Islamabad.

With reports of religious and political rumblings among the Chinese Muslims in 1990, interaction between the northern areas of Pakistan and Xinjiang has acquired greater importance. This can, if carefully cultivated, provide the Islamic revivalists in Pakistan, Afghanistan and elsewhere with access to the increasingly assertive Chinese Muslims. But, given the cordiality and trust between China and Pakistan, the latter would discourage such activity. Moreover, the difficult mountainous terrain and long distances would also be an obstacle to such interaction.

Notes

CHAPTER 1: THE GEOSTRATEGIC ENVIRONS AND FOREIGN POLICY

- Hedley Bull, 'The Third World and International Society', The Yearbook of World Affairs, 1979 (London: The London Institute of World Affairs, 1979), pp. 15–31 (see p. 15).
- 2. See, for example, W. R. Thompson, 'The Regional Subsystem', *International Studies Quarterly* (17, 1, March 1973), pp. 89–117.
- 3. M. Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationship (New York: The Free Press, 1972); Robert A. Mortimer, The Third World Coalition in International Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984); Helge Hveem, 'Small Countries under Great Pressure: The Politics of National Vulnerability during International Restructuring', Cooperation and Conflict (XXII, 4, 1987), pp. 193–208; and David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967).
- Carsten Holbread, Middle Powers in International Politics (London: Macmillan, 1984); Stephen P. Cohen, 'Toward a Great State in Asia', in Onkar Marwah and J. D. Pollack (eds), Military Power and Policy in Asian States: China, India, Japan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 9-41.
- See, R. Keohane and J. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977); S. P. Huntington, 'Transnational Organizations in World Politics', World Politics (24, 3, 1973), pp. 333–368; J. Herz, 'The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation State', in James Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 76–89.
- For a review of major approaches and perspectives on foreign policy, see, Michael Clarke and Brian White (eds), *Understanding Foreign Policy* (Aldershot, Hants: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 1989).
- 7. Mohammad Ayoob, 'The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains?' *International Studies Quarterly* (33, 1, March 1989), pp. 67–79.
- 8. Caroline Thomas, In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations (Boulder: Rienner, 1987), p. 5.
- 9. Mustafa Chaudhary, 'Dynamics of Super Power-Small Power Relationship', in Syed Farooq Hasnat and Anton Pelinka (eds), *Security for the Weak Nations: A Multiple Perspective* (Lahore: Izharsons, 1986), pp. 31–9 (see p. 38).
- Hedley Bull, 'The Revolt Against the West', in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 217–28; see also, Peter Lyon, 'The Emergence of the Third World', in ibid., pp. 229–37.
- 11. Yezid Sayigh, Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries, Adelphi Paper No. 251 (London: IISS, 1990), p. 52.

- 12. Sri Lanka was the chairman of NAM when this application was made and it actively supported Pakistan's case.
- 13. The African countries whose heads of state/government visited Pakistan included Algeria, Djibouti, Guinea, Kenya, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Zambia, Zimbabwe. The visits in connection with the 2nd Islamic conference, held at Lahore in 1974, are not included. See also chapter on Pakistan's relations with the Muslim world for more visits from Africa.
- 14. Pakistan extended humanitarian assistance from time to time. Some such instances were: a gift of 5000 tons of rice to Niger (1975), and 500 tons of rice to Seychelles on the eve of its independence (1976); a grant of Rs 1 million to Mozambique to enable it to overcome the negative consequences of application of sanctions against Rhodesia (1976); \$44 000 for African refugees (1981); rice, wheat flour and other food aid worth 4 million dollars for the famine stricken people (1985); food, clothing and medicine for refugees (1986); relief goods for Uganda (1986); interest-free loan of Rs 50 million to Uganda (1987); another interest-free loan worth 2.45 million dollars to Guinea Bissau (1989).
- 15. Pakistan is also critical of superpower efforts to deploy offensive weapons in outer space.
- See the address of Pakistan's Foreign Minister to the UN Conference on Disarmament. Muslim, 1 August 1986; the statement of Pakistan's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs to the UN Conference on Disarmament and Development: Dawn, 27 August 1987.

CHAPTER 2: PAKISTAN AND INDIA

- See, for example, S. M. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1974); Sharif-al Mujahid, 'India-Pakistan Relations, in Latif Ahmad Sherwani, et. al., Foreign Policy of Pakistan (Karachi: Allies Book Corporation), pp. 31–48.
- 2. Such a point of view is often projected by North Indian political analysts.
- 3. Siser Gupta, *Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations* (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1966), pp. 440.
- 4. Stephen P. Cohen, 'The Strategic Imagery of Elites, in James M. Roherty (ed.), *Defence Policy Formation: Towards Comparative Analysis* (Durham, N.C: Caroline Academic Press, 1980), pp. 153-73.
- 5. Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistan Conflicts since 1947 (Boulder: Westview, 1988), pp. 11-14.
- 6. S. D. Muni, 'India and Regionalism in South Asia: A Political Perspective', in Bimal Prasad (ed.), *India's Foreign Policy: Studies in Continuity and Change* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979), pp. 115–16.
- 7. Douglas C. Makeig, 'War, No-war and the Indo-Pakistan Negotiating Process', *Pacific Affairs* (60, 2, Summer 1987), pp. 271-294.
- 8. Cited from Surjit Mansingh, *India's Search for Power: Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy 1966–82* (New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1984), p. 240.
- 9. Pakistan Times, 3 February 1972.
- 10. For the text of the Sino-US joint communiqué, see ibid., 28 February 1972.
- 11. Ibid., 17 February 1972.

- 12. Sun, 20 February 1972.
- For a comparison of the Simla Agreement with the Tashkant Declaration, see Z. A. Bhutto, 'The Simla Accord', *Pakistan Horizon* (XXV, 3, 1972), pp. 3-16; Mehrunnisa Ali, 'The Simla Accord and Tashkant Declaration', *ibid.*, pp. 53-74.
- 14. Shri Ram Sharma, *Indian Foreign Policy: Annual Survey 1972* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1972), pp. 154–5.
- 15. Lok Sabha Debates, fifth series (XVII, 1, 31 July 1972), col. 246.
- 16. Mansingh, India's Search for Power, p. 229.
- 17. National Assembly of Pakistan Debates (2, 5, 14 July 1972), p. 712.
- See the joint statement issued by the Chiefs of Army Staff of Pakistan and India on 20 December 1972. For the text: *Pakistan Horizon* (XXVI, 1, 1973), p. 109.
- 19. Pakistan Times, 21 September 1972.
- 20. Ibid., 11 October 1972.
- 21. Foreign Affairs Record (XVIII, 7, July 1972), p. 195.
- 22. Pakistan Times, 3 August 1972.
- 23. Ibid., 11, 12 and 13 August 1972.
- See the statement of Aziz Ahmad, Secretary General, Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the delienation of the Line of Control in Kashmir: *Dawn*, 12 December 1972.
- 25. Lok Sabha Debates, fifth series (XI, 5, 17 March 1972), Col. 61.
- Ibid., (XIV, 35, 2 May 1972), Col. 360. See also, Pakistan Horizon (XXV, 4, 1972), p. 85
- 27. Two categories of detainees were also released: the civilians who were interned for being on a visit to the other side when war broke out were exchanged in September 1972. Those detained prior to the outbreak of war were released in 1974.
- 28. News briefing by India's Foreign Secretary: *Pakistan Times*, 29 December 1971.
- 29. Pakistan Times, 30 December 1971.
- 30. Bangladesh also established courts for the trials of civilians living in Bangladesh on charges of collaboration with the Pakistani military, in 1971. Many people, including the last Bengali Governor of East Pakistan, Dr A. M. Malik, were sentenced to imprisonment, ranging from a few years to life.
- Compiled from newspaper reports. The Indian authorities claimed that two of them died due to the injuries sustained by them in a clash between two groups of POWs. Pakistan disputed this explanation.
- 32. The statement of the official spokesman of the government of Pakistan: Dawn, 22 April 1973.
- 33. India accused Pakistan's military and civilian officials of committing brutalities against the people of Bangladesh, and claimed that the Pakistanis 'systematically liquidated professionals and intellectuals'. It also defended the right of Bangladesh to put such officials on trial. See the letter of India's Permanent Representative to the UN Secretary General: Foreign Affairs Record (XVIII, 1, January 1972), pp. 7–9; see also the statement of the Indian delegate to the meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission: ibid., (XVIII, 4, April 1972), pp. 109–10.
- 34. Dawn, 26 March 1972; Pakistan Times, 26 March 1973; see the letter of

- Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the UN Security Council: Dawn 9 April 1972.
- 35. Pakistan Times, 15 September 1972.
- 36. Asian Recorder, 4–10 June 1973, pp. 11420–21.
- For the text of the Pakistani response to the Indo-Bangladesh Declaration, see: Pakistan Times, 21 April 1973; Pakistan Horizon (XXVI, 2, 1973), pp. 114-15.
- Aziz Ahmad, Pakistan's Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, and P. N. Haksar, Indian Prime Minister's Special Emissary, led their delegations.
- 39. Asian Recorder, 7–13 May 1974, p. 11986. This amount included administration expenses as well as pay and allowances of the POWs. The pay and allowances ranged from Rs14 to Rs139 per month. Pakistan Times, 9 December 1972; see also ibid., 5 August 1972.
- 40. See the section on the recognition of Bangladesh.
- 41. The criterion for the repatriation of Biharis was stated in the Tripartite Agreement, 1974.
- Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 January 1989, p. 28; see also the statement of Pakistan's Finance Minister: Dawn Overseas Weekly, 14–20 July 1988.
- 43. India was the first country to extend recognition to Bangladesh on 6 December 1971, 10 days before the Pakistani troops surrendered there. Pakistan broke off its diplomatic relations with India.
- Diplomatic relations were restored with these states in March 1972 and later in the same year.
- 45. For the text of Pakistan's statement on withdrawal from the Commonwealth: *Dawn*, 31 January 1972.
- 46. In October 1972, Bangladesh was given the status of permanent observer in the United Nations.
- 47. Commenting on Bangladesh's application for membership of the United Nations, Bhutto said,

They claim that they have 78 or 81 countries by now who have recognized them and as a result of this they can walk into the United Nations without Pakistan's recognition, without Pakistan's consent, and so they do not have to enter into negotiations with us on this or other matters. . . . I can tell you emphatically that if Dhaka tries to enter the United Nations, the doors of the United Nations will be closed to it. . . . If Mr Mujibur Rehman the Bangla Bandhu, holds a veto in his hand . . . there is a veto in our hands also and so let us both drop the veto and meet without pre-conditions to resolve our problems on the basis of equity, on the basis of the United Nations resolutions of December 7, 1971, and December 21, 1971. (Pakistan Times, 12 August 1972).

- 48. The resolution on Bangladesh's admission was sponsored by Australia, Barbados, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, El-Salvador, Hungary, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Poland, Senegal, and Yugoslovia.
- 49. The resolution on the POWs was sponsored by Algeria, Argentina, Guinea, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, the Sudan and Turkey.

- 50. Pakistan Horizon (XXVI, 3, 1973), p. 77.
- 51. For the text of the resolution, see, *National Assembly of Pakistan Debates* (3, 38, 9 July 1973), pp. 2715-16.
- 52. Asian Recorder, 7-13 May 1974, pp. 11986-87.
- 53. The statement of the government of Pakistan: Pakistan Times, 2 June 1974.
- 54. Ibid., 11 July 1974.
- 55. For Pakistan's reasons for reviving the dialogue, see Bhutto's statement, *Pakistan Times*, 5 August 1974.
- 56. For the text of the joint communiqué: Dawn, 15 September 1974.
- 57. The commodities were: cotton, engineering goods, jute manufacture, iron ore, railway equipment, rice and tea.
- 58. For the text of the trade protocol: *Pakistan Horizon* (XXVII, 4, 1974), p. 193; *Dawn*, 1 December 1974.
- 59. In the first twelve months after the signing of the protocol (November 1974–October 1975), India imported 200 000 bales of cotton from Pakistan, but the latter did not import anything from India. See the statement of Pakistan's Parliamentary Secretary in the National Assembly. Nawa-i-Waqt, 28 November 1975.
- 60. India imposed a ban on the overflight of Pakistani aircraft in February 1971, when two Indians hijacked an Indian Airlines aircraft to Lahore and then burnt it after releasing the passengers. An inquiry conducted subsequently by Pakistan revealed that the hijackers belonged to an Indian intelligence agency and that the episode was carried out with India's official blessings. After denying overflight rights to Pakistan, India decided not to use Pakistani airspace.
- 61. See Agha Shahi, *Pakistan's Security and Foreign Policy* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988), p. 11.
- 62. For a detailed study of India's policy on the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, see Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 'India and Afghanistan', Regional Studies (Islamabad) (V, 4, autumn 1987), pp. 7–22.
- 63. For the text of the joint communiqué, see *Pakistan Horizon* (XXXIV, 3, 1981), pp. 194–5.
- 64. Asian Recorder, 19-25 February 1980, pp. 15324-25.
- 65. Bimal Prasad, 'India and the Afghan Crisis', in K. P. Misra (ed.), *Afghanistan in Crisis* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1981), p. 80.
- 66. The statement of India's Minister of State for Defence, Shivraj Patil: Asian Recorder, 15-21 January 1982, pp. 16409.
- The statement of India's Foreign Minister, Narasimha Rao: Muslim, 3 December 1983.
- 68. Ibid., 25 January 1984; see also India News (London), 16 July 1981.
- 69. See Zia-ul-Haq's press conference: Muslim, 3 September 1981.
- 70. See the statement of India's Foreign Minister: *Asian Recorder*, 12–18 August 1980, pp. 15596.
- 71. For the text of the statement: Muslim, 16 September 1981.
- 72. Ibid.
- 73. Zubeida Mustafa, 'Pakistan's Foreign Policy A Quarterly Survey', *Pakistan Horizon* (XXXIV, 4, 1981), pp. 3–13; see also the statement of India's Foreign Minister: *Muslim*, 26 November 1981.
- 74. Muslim, 26 November 1981.

- 75. Jyotirmay Banerjee, 'Hot and Cold Diplomacy in Indo-Pakistani Relations', *Asian Survey* (XXIII, 3, March 1983), pp. 280–301 (see p. 289).
- Muslim, 31 January 1982; Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 February 1982, pp. 10–11.
- 77. Shahi, Pakistan's Security, pp. 186-9.
- 78. Dawn, 8 July 1985.
- 79. Hindu International Edition, 10 December 1988.
- 80. *Indian Express*, 27 and 31 August 1983; *Muslim*, 27 September 1983 (Indira Gandhi's letter to Zia-ul-Haq and the latter's reply).
- 81. Jang, 28 August 1983.
- 82. Pakistan lodged a protest against the 'highly offensive and objectionable' remarks made by members of Indian Parliament belonging to the ruling Congress Party in the World Sindhi Congress: *Muslim*, 26 October 1983.
- 83. For a report on the symposium: Pakistan Times, 22 October 1983.
- 84. In April 1984, an aircraft of the Lahore Flying Club strayed into India and landed at an airstrip near Hoshiarpur. The two pilots and the aircraft were returned to Pakistan.
- 85. See the Pakistani newspaper reports in September and October 1984.
- 86. For the text of the message, see Dawn, 2 November 1984.
- 87. Text of the joint communiqué: Dawn, 8 April 1985.
- 88. Satisfied with these meetings, official and unofficial circles in the two countries began to talk about Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Pakistan. However, the crisis that developed in their relations in February–March 1986 dashed these hopes.
- 89. India lodged a complaint against Pakistan's alleged assistance to hijackers with the International Civil Aviation Organization. Earlier hijacking attempts by Sikh militants were made in September 1976 and September 1981. In August 1982, Pakistan prevented a hijacked Indian aircraft from landing at Lahore. In September 1982, Pakistan foiled another hijacking attempt.
- The Pakistani staff had to take refuge in the office of the pavilion. See Jang, 18 and 23 November 1986.
- 91. Ibid., 26 February 1986; Frontier Post, 20 March 1986.
- 92. Foreign Affairs Record (XXXII, 2 February 1986), p. 55.
- 93. Pakistan described the Indo-Afghan cooperation as 'inconsistent with the spirit of the UN resolutions on Afghanistan'. See the statement of Pakistan's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Zain Noorani, in the Senate: *Dawn*, 25 February 1986.
- 94. India's Ministry of Defence report claimed that Pakistan was giving training to Sri Lanka's military personnel following the reciprocal visits of their Presidents in April and December 1985. See *Frontier Post*, 20 March 1986; *Dawn*, 9 July 1986.
- 95. Jang, 8 September 1986; see also Dawn, 8 September 1986; Frontier Post, 18 September 1986.
- 96. Muslim, 9 October 1986; Jang, 11 October 1986.
- 97. An unsuccessful attempt to defuse tension was made when the home and foreign secretaries of the two countries held their meetings in December 1986. The foreign ministers also had a brief exchange of views on bilateral issues (including troop mobilization) at Kathmandu in January 1987 where they attended the ceremony marking the setting up of the SAARC secretariat.

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- 98. Zia-ul-Haq and Rajiv Gandhi met informally on 22 February 1987 when the former flew to India to watch the third cricket test match between Pakistan and India at Jaipur. Zia also visited the shrine of Hazrat Nizamuddin Aulia and donated Rs 100 000 for the shrine.
- 99. Pakistan lodged a protest with India in September 1986 over what it described as a breach of the obligation under the Indus Water Treaty on the part of India for not giving timely and complete information on the construction plan for the Wuller lake dam. *Muslim*, 1 October 1986. For an analysis of the dispute, see, Ijaz Hussain, *Issues in Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An International Law Perspective* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988), pp. 1–12.
- 100. Hindu International Edition, 10 December 1988.
- 101. Foreign Affairs Record (XXXV, 1, January 1989), p. 19.
- 102. Dawn Overseas Weekly, 22–28 June 1989, 29 June–5 July 1989; Hindu International Edition, 24 June 1989.
- 103. A controversy developed on the statement of Pakistan's Foreign Secretary that the two sides had agreed to redeploy their troops to the pre-Simla Agreement positions on the Siachen glacier. India's Foreign Secretary was present when this statement was made but after his return to New Delhi, the Indian government denied Pakistan's Foreign Secretary's statement. It maintained that the Army authorities would identify the positions held by their troops in 1972, and then the decision on redeployment would be made by the two governments. Pakistan stayed quiet on this interpretation.
- 104. This was the first official visit of an Indian Prime Minister since 1960, although Rajiv Gandhi visited Peshawar in January 1988 to participate in the funeral of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and Islamabad in December 1988 to attend the SAARC summit.
- 105. See the joint communiqué: Dawn Overseas Weekly, 20–26 July 1989.
- 106. Statesman Weekly, 14 April 1990; see also Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 May 1990 (V. P. Singh's interview, pp. 10-11).
- Hindu International Edition, 21 April 1990; see also Dawn, 14 April 1990;
 International Herald Tribune, 14-15 April 1990.

CHAPTER 3: THE SMALLER STATES OF SOUTH ASIA

- 1. See Chapter on Pakistan-India relations.
- 2. Bhutto, who attracted a large and enthusiastic crowd in Dhaka, expressed his desire to develop friendly relations with Bangladesh. While distancing himself from the policies of the Yahya Khan regime (1969–71), he acknowledged that the people of Bangladesh 'were subjected in 1971 to shameless repression and unspeakable horror'. He added, however, that 'the tragedy and suffering was not entirely one sided. West Pakistanis and non-Bengalis also fell victim to the madness of 1971.' For the text of Bhutto's address to the civic reception in Dhaka, see: Pakistan Horizon (XXVII, 3, 1974) pp. 192–5.
- No figures of assets and liabilities were released by Bangladesh and Pakistan.
 An unofficial Bangladesh source claimed that the Bangladesh Planning Commission assessed Bangladesh's assets at approximately 2580 million Bangla

- deshi Takkas, as against liabilities which amounted to approximately 110 million Takkas. See: Syed Serajul Islam, 'Bangladesh-Pakistan Relations: From Conflict to Cooperation', in Emajuddin Ahmed (ed.), Foreign Policy of Bangladesh (Dhaka: University Press Ltd, 1984), pp. 52–63 (see pp. 58–9).
- 4. Pakistan's Finance Minister, Dr Mubashir Hasan's statement: *Pakistan Times*, 7 July 1974; see also, ibid., 5 July 1974.
- 5. See chapter on Pakistan-India relations.
- 6. Nawa-i-Waqt, 30 June 1974.
- 7. See the statement of Finance Minister, Tajuddin Ahmed: Ibid., 11 August 1974.
- 8. Asian Recorder, 14-20 May 1975, p. 12579.
- 9. Dawn, 16 August 1975. The Pakistani media reported that the first announcement of the coup on Dhaka radio described Bangladesh as an Islamic Republic. Pakistan's announcement of recognition of the new regime carried this title and all Pakistani newspapers reported this change on 16 August. As a lot of confusion prevailed in Dhaka on the morning of 15 August, it was quite possible that an enthusiastic radio announcer used this title in the first broadcast which was monitored in Pakistan. Later announcements and official statements of the new government in Dhaka did not carry this title.
- 10. See Bhutto's message to Khandakar Moshtaque Ahmed, dated 17 August 1975: Foreign Affairs Pakistan (2, 8, August 1975), pp. 6–7.
- 11. Ibid., and Sun (Lahore), 17 August 1975.
- 12. Khandakar Moshtaque Ahmed's letter: Foreign Affairs Pakistan (2, 8, August 1975), p. 8; Dawn, 26 August 1975.
- 13. Dawn, 5 October and 12 November 1975.
- 14. A Bangladeshi bank opened its branch in Karachi after some time.
- 15. The inaugural flight had to fly from Dhaka to Dubai and then it flew into Karachi because India did not grant permission to the aircraft using India's airspace to touch down directly at Karachi. The return journey was also undertaken through the same route: Karachi-Dubai-Dhaka. See the statement of the pilot of the aircraft, Captain Tahir: Pakistan Times, 8 July 1976. Pakistan started its regular weekly air service to Dhaka in December 1976.
- 16. Dawn, 8 and 14 July 1976.
- 17. See the joint statement: Ibid., 25 July 1976.
- 18. An agreement for setting up an additional telephone circuit was signed in April 1977.
- 19. Bangladesh had approached Pakistan for assistance for transporting pilgrims to Saudi Arabia for *haj*; Pakistan presented a Boeing-707 aircraft. The railway wagons were presented while a Bangladesh railway delegation was on a visit to Pakistan. Later, Pakistan gave over 8500 tons of cement.
- General Ziaur Rehman's speech at the banquet hosted by Pakistan's President, Fazal Elahi Chaudhry: Pakistan Horizon (XXXI, 1, 1978), pp. 200–1.
- 21. Ibid., and the text of the joint communiqué: Foreign Affairs Record (4, 12, December 1977), pp. 36–9; see also the farewell message of General Ziaur Rehman: Ibid., p. 39.
- 22. Asian Recorder, 17-23 September 1983, p. 17369. Earlier, the visas were granted on an *ad hoc* basis in the absence of a formal visa agreement.
- 23. Zia-ul-Haq also visited Bangladesh in December 1985 to participate in the first SAARC summit conference.

- General Ziaur Rehman's statement: Muslim, 28 August 1980. Foreign Minister Shamsul Doha's press conference in Jeddah: Dawn Overseas Weekly, 2 June 1983.
- 25. The idea of a regional cooperation organization was first floated by General Ziaur Rehman in 1980. A Working Paper on this proposal was sent to the states of South Asia by Bangladesh's Foreign Minister, Shamsul Haq, in November 1980. For the text of the Working Paper, see: Mohammad Shamsul Haq, International Politics: A Third World Perspective (London: Oriental University Press, 1987), pp. 79–94.
- President Ershad also had a stopover meeting with Zia-ul-Haq in July 1987 at Karachi.
- Asian Recorder, 15-21 October 1986, pp. 19131-32; Pakistan Horizon (XXXIX, 3, 1986), p. 106; Mohsin Ali, 'Ershad's Visit: Firming up SAARC and Ties', Dawn, 12 August 1986.
- The Chief of the Bangladesh Awami League, Hasina Wajid, criticized General Ershad for accepting Pakistan's award.
- 29. Dawn Overseas Weekly, 6-12 April 1989.
- 30. Bangladesh protested against Benazir Bhutto's remarks after returning to Pakistan that there were little prospects of the Biharis being repatriated to Pakistan. *Jang* (London), 26 October 1989.
- 31. Asian Recorder, 19-25 November 1989, p. 20871.
- 32. Ibid.
- 33. Frontier Post, 8 March 1990; Nation, 10 March 1990.
- 34. Asian Recorder, 18-24 June 1990, p. 21201.
- 35. Dawn, 9 September 1990.
- 36. A shipping agreement was signed in August 1978. Pakistan's Shipping Minister, Mustafa Kassimali Gokal, visited Bangladesh in November 1978, and the two countries agreed to set up a joint conference of shipping lines for ensuring regular shipping services for their trade with each other and the Gulf states.
- 37. The first trade exhibition of Bangladesh was held at Karachi in April-May 1987.
- 38. Asian Recorder, 3-9 September 1979, p. 15066.
- 39. Muslim, 24 July 1984.
- 40. The idea of joint ventures pre-dated the 2nd session of the Joint Economic Commission. In 1984, a Pakistani firm sought permission to set up a joint venture in Bangladesh. This idea was openly advocated in 1985.
- 41. Dawn, 17 April 1987.
- 42. Pakistan Horizon (XLII, 1, 1989), p. 124.
- 43. See the report on the Dhaka visit of Pakistan's Minister for Commerce, Finance, Planning and Development, Dr Mahbubul Haq: *Dawn Overseas Weekly*, 28 July-3 August 1988.
- 44. Muslim, 28 July 1988.
- 45. See Asian Recorder, 24–30 September 1989, p. 20779.
- 46. For the text of the joint communiqué, see: *Pakistan Horizon* (XXVII, 4, 1974), pp. 189–91; *Pakistan Times*, 9 September 1974.
- 47. Ibid
- 48. For the text of the joint communiqué, see: Dawn, 20 December 1975.
- 49. Sri Lanka established its Tea Bureau office in Karachi in 1985, and, in 1987,

- Sri Lanka agreed to procure machinery from Pakistan in return for Pakistan's purchase of more tea.
- 50. Like the joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the visits of Mrs Bandaranaike (1974) and Bhutto (1975), the 1985 joint communiqué reiterated a similarity of views on major regional and international issues. The two sides also expressed satisfaction on their bilateral relations and agreed to expand them further. For the text of the joint communiqué, see: *Muslim*, 5 April 1985.
- 51. Muslim, 16 December 1985.
- 52. P. Venkateshwar Rao, 'Foreign Involvement in Sri Lanka', *The Roundtable* (309, January 1989), pp. 88–100; *India Today*, 31 August 1985, p. 38.
- 53. The senior military officials of the two countries undertake goodwill visits from time to time, but this practice goes back to the pre-civil strife period.
- 54. Speaking on his arrival at Islamabad, Premadasa said, 'Pakistan is our friendly country. We have been very close to each other because we have so many things in common. Over the years, [the] relations between the two countries have developed', *Dawn*, 26 March 1987.
- Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 'Crisis in Indo-Sri Lankan Ties: New Delhi Action Politically Motivated', Nation, 6 June 1987.
- 56. Dawn, 15 January 1988.
- For an analysis of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, see: Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 'Accord with Sri Lanka: A Permanent Role for India', Nation, 16 August 1987.
- 58. This was not the first occasion that Indo-Sri Lanka differences threatened SAARC. In May 1985, Sri Lanka announced its boycott of the third meeting of SAARC Foreign Ministers at Thimppu (Bhutan) as a protest against a statement of India's Minister of State for External Affairs on the Tamil-Sinhala conflict. Pakistan's mediation contributed to Sri Lanka's decision to change its mind.
- 59. Dawn Overseas Weekly, 27 July-2 August 1989.
- Nepal Press Digest (24, 1, 7 January 1980), p. 6; see also ibid., (24, 2, 14 January 1980), p. 15–16.
- 61. Ibid., (24, 3, 21 January 1980), p.23.
- 62. King Birendra also undertook a two-day unofficial visit to Karachi in September 1981, and held talks with Zia-ul-Haq.
- 63. Pakistan Times, 14 November 1980.
- 64. Ibid.
- 65. Dawn Overseas Weekly, 22-28 November 1980.
- 66. The setting up of the Joint Economic Commission was agreed to in principle during Thapa's visit to Pakistan, and the agreement was signed during Zia-ul-Haq's visit to Nepal. Its first session, held in Kathmandu soon after its institution, established three sub-commissions on agriculture, industry and trade.
- 67. Muslim, 29 July 1982.
- 68. Ibid., 30 November 1984.
- 69. Dawn, 23 October 1985.
- 70. Ibid., 16 September 1985.
- While outlining its concern, Pakistan's Foreign Office expressed the hope in May 1989, that Nepal and India would settle their differences through mutual

consultations. See, *Nepal Press Digest* (33, 19, 8 May 1989), p. 164; for Pakistan's Foreign Minister's comments: Ibid., (33, 22, 29 May 1989), p. 194.

- 72. Rising Nepal, 24 June 1989.
- 73. Ibid., 29 July 1989; Nepal Press Digest (33, 31, 31 July 1989), p. 278.
- 74. Asian Recorder, 1–7 October 1989, p. 20799.
- 75. Foreign Affairs Pakistan (VI, 5, May 1979), p. 27.
- 76. See the joint communiqué: Muslim, 4 February 1984.
- 77. Ibid.
- 78. Ibid., 30 August 1984.
- 79. Ibid., 16 October 1985.
- 80. Dawn, 19 July 1984.
- 81. Muslim, 13 July 1984.
- 82. Ibid., 17 December 1985; Dawn, 16 & 18 December 1985.

CHAPTER 4: ISLAM AND FOREIGN POLICY

- 1. S. M. Burke, *Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972), p. 116.
- 2. M. Rafique Afzal (ed.), Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Millet Liaquat Ali Khan 1941-51 (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1967), p. 432.
- See the Directive Principles of State Policy/Principles of Policy in Pakistan's Constitutions of 1956, 1962, and 1973.
- 4. S. M. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 204.
- 5. See Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 'Pakistan: Ideology and Foreign Policy', Asian Affairs: An American Review (Spring 1983), pp. 48-59.
- Nasser did not attend the summit conference. Egypt was represented by Anwar Sadat. After Nasser's death in 1970, Sadat assumed the presidency and Egypt began to play an active role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).
- 7. Rizvi, op. cit.
- 8. The Muslim world was generally sympathetic towards Pakistan's predicament caused by the civil strife in East Pakistan (1971) and the Indo-Pakistan war (November-December 1971). They avoided public condemnation of Pakistan's military action in East Pakistan and expressed support for its unity and territorial integrity. Some of these states extended open diplomatic support to Pakistan once the Indo-Pakistan war broke out while others maintained a tilt towards Pakistan; still others adopted a neutral posture urging Pakistan and India to cease fire.
- 9. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, 'In Search of an Identity: Islam and Pakistan's Foreign Policy', in Adeed Dawisha (ed.), *Islam in Foreign Policy* (London & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 68–83.
- See Dawn, 16 and 17 May 1990. For Saudi views, see Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal's address to the 19th conference of the OIC foreign ministers at Cairo; the OIC Secretary General, Dr Hamid al-Ghabid, called for a plebiscite in Kashmir: Viewpoint, 9 August 1990, p. 26.
- 11. Dawn, 20 May 1990.

- 12. Ibid., 5 August 1990; Viewpoint, 9 August 1990, pp. 14-15, 26.
- 13. In 1973, Bhutto deplored 'the repressive measures' against Muslims in the Philippines and hoped that the government of the Philippines would adopt measures to solve this problem. *Pakistan Times*, 28 March 1973; a leader of the Moro Liberation Front visited Pakistan in August 1987 on the invitation of Jamaat-i-Islami.
- 14. For the text of letters to the presidents of Egypt and Syria, and the UN Secretary General, see *Pakistan Times*, 9 October 1973; see also ibid., 8 & 10 October 1973.
- 15. Bhutto's press conference: ibid., 21 October 1973.
- Feroz Ahmed, 'Pakistan: The New Dependence', Race and Class (XVIII, 1, Summer 1976), pp. 3–22. Pakistan Economic Survey, an annual publication of Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, gives detailed data on external economic assistance.
- 17. Marvin G. Weinbaum and Gautam Sen, 'Pakistan enters the Middle East', *Orbis* (22, 3, Fall 1978), pp. 595-612.
- 18. These figures have been adopted from Pakistan's official publication, *Pakistan's Relations with the Islamic States*, a review released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 1977. For its text, see *Pakistan Horizon* (XXX, 1, 1977), pp. 217–36.
- 19. Pakistan and Gulf Economist, 10-16 June 1989, p. 34.
- 20. The Baluch nationalists, especially the Baluch Students Organization (BSO), were opposed to Baluch recruitment to the Oman Army. One of the BSO activists was hanged to death in 1981 after being convicted by a Pakistani military court for his involvement in an armed attack on an Omani recruiting team on a visit to Baluchistan. In 1987, Oman decided to gradually retire the Pakistani Baluchs from its army, Dawn, 17 April 1987. This did not affect the Protocol of Technical Cooperation which enabled Oman to make use of military training facilities in Pakistan.
- 21. Nation, 27 October 1988.
- 22. See the interview of Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, Shaharyar Khan: *Jang* (London), 20–21 October 1990; General Mirza Aslam Beg's statement; *Dawn*, 16 August 1990; see also *Independent*, 14 August 1990.
- 23. Independent, 20 August 1990. Pakistan's Foreign Minister (Yaqub Khan), and Acting Prime Minister (Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi) visited/consulted these states separately after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
- Pakistan expressed deep concern over Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and argued that the use of force for settling international disputes was unacceptable. *Jang* (London), 3 August 1990.

CHAPTER 5: THE UNITED STATES

- Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, 'American Policy in South Asia: Interests and Objectives', in Stephen P. Cohen (ed.), The Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspectives (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), pp. 119–33.
- Leo E. Rose, 'The Superpowers in South Asia: A Geostrategic Analysis', Orbis (22, 2, Summer 1978), pp. 395–413.
- 3. The United States-China communiqué: Pakistan Times, 28 February 1972.

- Arshad Zaman, 'Economic Relations between Pakistan and the United States: Aid, Trade and North South Issues', in Leo E. Rose & Noor A. Husain (eds), United States-Pakistan Relations (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1985), pp. 56–59 (see table 2 on p. 60).
- 5. For details, see Mehrunnisa Ali, 'Pakistan and the United States', *Pakistan Horizon* (XXVII, 1, 1974), pp. 71–5; and 'Pakistan-United States Relations: The Next Phase', ibid., (XXXI, 2 & 3, 1978), pp. 32–56.
- 6. See Bhutto's statement: Pakistan Times, 20 December 1971.
- 7. Nixon's Fourth Foreign Policy Report, May 1973.
- 8. Nixon's remarks while welcoming Bhutto to the White House. *Pakistan Times*, 19 September 1973.
- The joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of Bhutto's visit to the United States in February 1975. For text, see *Pakistan Horizon* (XXVIII, 1, 1975), pp. 167–8; see Ford's statement: *Dawn*, 7 February 1975; see also Ford's message to Bhutto when the former assumed Presidency: ibid., 11 August 1974.
- Kissinger's address to the CENTO Ministerial Council: Pakistan Times, 24 May 1975.
- 11. Pakistan Times, 11 June 1972, and 25 January 1972.
- 12. Ibid., 14 February 1972; Dawn, 16 February 1972.
- 13. The first US embargo on South Asia was imposed in 1965 after the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan war. In March 1966, the United States agreed to sell 'non-lethal' military equipment. A further revision of the embargo was made in April 1967, when the United States agreed to cash sales of spare parts of the military equipment previously supplied to Pakistan and India on 'a case by case basis'. It was made clear that there would be no restoration of military assistance in the shape of grants. In 1970, the United States made a 'one time exception' to enable Pakistan to place an order of 300 APCs and a small number of combat aircraft. However, no aircraft were actually supplied and the APCs were delivered in 1973.
- Bhutto said in September 1974 that if the United States persisted in refusing to supply weapons to Pakistan, his government would consider withdrawing from CENTO: Nawa-i-Waqt, 14 September 1974.
- 15. Dawn, 15 March 1973; Asian Recorder, 16-22 April 1973, p. 11335.
- 16. See the text of the joint communiqué: Pakistan Times, 1 November 1974. Earlier, in October 1974, Aziz Ahmad, Pakistan's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Defence, visited the United States and called on President Ford to urge him to lift the embargo.
- 17. Bhutto's statement: Dawn, 7 February 1975.
- 18. For the text of the joint communiqué, see *Pakistan Horizon* (XXVIII, 1, 1975), pp. 167 –8.
- 19. See the text of the US statement announcing the withdrawal of the arms embargo: *Pakistan Times*, 26 February 1975; see also a statement of Joseph Sisco, US Under Secretary of State: *Dawn*, 24 February 1975.
- 20. Dawn, 26 February 1975; see also Patriot (New Delhi) 14 February 1975.
- 21. See the statement of T. N. Kaul, India's ambassador to the United States: *Asian Recorder*, 9–15 April 1975, p. 12534.
- 22. See Kissinger's statement: Dawn, 27 February 1975.
- 23. Bhutto's letter to Indira Gandhi: ibid., 29 April 1975.

- 24. Dawn, 11 August 1976.
- 25. On his way back from Canada, Bhutto stopped-over in New York in February 1976, and had a meeting with Kissinger. This was soon after France had agreed in Principle to supply a reprocessing plant to Pakistan. Kissinger and Bhutto discussed the nuclear issue in general but it was not until April 1976 that the US began to tighten the screws on Pakistan.
- Bhutto accused the United States of financing opposition agitation. Washington Post, 21 May 1977; New York Times, 3 June 1977; Kausar Niazi, Aur Line Cut Gai (Urdu) (Lahore: Jang Publications, 1989), p. 69.
- 27. See the US ambassador to Pakistan, Arthur W. Hummel's speech in December 1978: *Pakistan Horizon* (XXXII, 1 & 2, 1979), pp. 326–9 (see p. 329); see also the statement of the spokesman of Pakistan's Foreign Office: ibid., (XXXI, 2 & 3, 1978), p. 167. Food and economic assistance in the pipeline was not affected by this decision.
- 28. Washington Post, 4 June 1977. The United States suggested that Pakistan could still seek other aircraft inferior to A-7.
- 29. International Herald Tribune, 21 april 1977; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 23 September 1977, p. 28568.
- 30. See Agha Shahi, 'Pakistan's Relations with the United States', in Hafeez Malik (ed.), Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan (London: Macmillan Press, 1987), p. 167.
- 31. *The Guardian*, 4 November 1978; *Asian Recorder*, 19–25 November 1978, p. 14615.
- 32. See the press release of the United States embassy at Islamabad: *Pakistan Horizon* (XXXII, 1 & 2, 1979), p. 168.
- 33. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser*, 1977–81 (New York: Farrar-Straus-Giroux, 1983), p. 133.
- 34. The United States made it clear that he aid cut-off had no connection with the execution of Bhutto. See *New York Times*, 7 April 1979.
- 35. Washington Post, 9 April 1979; The Guardian, 9 April 1979.
- 36. Philadelphia Inquirer, 22 November 1979; New York Times, 23 & 25 November 1979.
- 37. See the Parliamentary Secretary's reply to a question in the National Assembly: *Dawn*. 14 October 1985.
- 38. For details of these measures, see Zalmay Khalilzad, 'The United States and the War in Afghanistan', in Rose and Husain, op. cit., 1985, pp. 174–95.
- 39. For the text of the address, see Facts on File, 25 January 1980, pp. 42–3.
- 40. *MAG Weekly* (Karachi), 18–24 February 1982, p. 4.
- 41. The 1959 Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation was not presented to the US Senate for approval, and, therefore, it did not have the status of a formal treaty.
- 42. Washington Post, 31 December 1979; New York Times, 2 January 1980.
- 43. New York Times, 18 January 1980; Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 February 1980.
- 44. Ibid., 6 March 1980; Dawn Overseas Weekly, 15 March 1980.
- 45. Dawn Overseas Weekly, 16 February 1980.
- 46. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship* (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 103.

- See Zia-ul-Haq's statement: New York Times, 18 January 1980; see also ibid.,
 January & 16 July 1980.
- 48. Dawn, 4 & 5 October 1980.
- See the statement of the US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig: Muslim, 21 March 1981; see also New York Times, 5 March 1981; Muslim, 24 October 1981; Reagan's comments in a press conference in Washington: Nawa-i-Waqt, 19 June 1981; Mushahid Hussain, 'Pakistan-American Relations', Muslim, 28 & 29 April 1981.
- 50. See Agha Shahi's statements and the summary of the Pakistan-US joint statement: *Muslim*, 3 & 4 May 1981, 16 June 1981, 1 July 1981; *Nawa-i-Wagt*, 22 June 1981.
- 51 Muslim, 7 August 1981.
- 52. See the text of the joint statement issued at the conclusion of military talks between Pakistan and the US: ibid., 18 July 1981.
- 53. Ibid., 18 December 1981. A US Fact Finding Team, comprising the staff members of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, visited Pakistan in October 1981 to assess the political situation as well as to get an idea of public response to the US aid offer. It reported positively on the subject. In January 1982, a Congressional delegation visited Pakistan. Other important visits included two delegations of US businessmen (November–December 1981), the World Bank President A. W. Clausen (January 1982). In February 1982, Reagan formally waived the application of the Symington-Glenn amendment on Pakistan.
- 54. For details, see Forward Together: United States Economic aid to Pakistan (Islamabad: USIS & USAID, 1985), p. 36.
- 55. For details, see the two articles on the aid relationship by Herbert G. Hagerty and Arshad Zaman in Noor A. Husain and Leo E. Rose (eds), *Pakistan-US Relations* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988), pp. 237–65.
- 56. Ibid., p. 254.
- 57. Facts on File, 18 September 1981, p. 668; see also ibid., 19 June 1981, p. 410.
- 58. The United States had agreed to supply the first six F-16 aircraft by the end of 1982. However, when Pakistan came to know that the first batch of these aircraft did not have an advanced electronic system (ALR-69 radar system), it refused the delivery and demanded its installation. After some arguments between the two governments, the US agreed to make the required changes, and the first six F-16 aircraft were handed over to Pakistan in early 1983. The last batch of F-16s was delivered in Spring 1986.
- 59. See Dawn, 2 April 1987; Khabar-o-Nazar (Urdu bulletin of USIS, Islamabad), June 1987. The increased American interest in building roads and other basic amenities in the coastal areas of Baluchistan (i.e. Makran) and the improvement of aircraft landing facilities was interpreted by unofficial circles in Pakistan as preparatory work for granting bases to the US. This was denied by the government of Pakistan time and again.
- 60. See the statement of the Director of USAID published in *Khabar-o-Nazar*, October 1987. This was in addition to the regular exchange programmes, other official visits, and a military exchange programme.
- 61. This includes his visits to the UN headquarters in New York. As he also met

- with senior officials of the US Department of State during these visits, they have been courted as visits to the US.
- Zia-ul-Haq also visited New York in October 1985 in connection with the UN General Assembly session, and met with several world leaders, including Reagan.
- 63. Sun (Baltimore), 8 December 1982; New York Times, 8 December 1982.
- 64. For the text of the agreement setting up the Joint Commission, see *Pakistan Horizon* (XXVI, 1, 1983), pp. 164–6.
- 65. These included General Charles Gabriel (1983); General Robert Kingston (1984) General John Vassey (1984). For visits during 1985–7, see nn. 76 and 80. Two retired generals also visited Pakistan in 1985: Walter Vernon and Alexander Haig. Three American officers were given military awards by Pakistan. These were Generals Charles Gabriel and John Adams Wickham (Nishan-i-Imtiaz), Brigadier Claude Ivey (Sitara-i-Imtiaz).
- Lawrence Lifschultz, 'The US-Pakistan Strategic Relationship', Muslim,
 October 1986; Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 December 1985,
 pp. 24-5; see also Muslim, 6 November 1986.
- Pakistan's Foreign Office maintained that there was nothing unusual in the visit of *Enterprise* because the ships of friendly countries often visited Pakistani ports, Ibid., 21 March 1986.
- 68. See the US Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger's statement during his visit to Pakistan: *Nation*, 17 October 1987.
- 69. Pakistan submitted a formal request for the purchase of the AWACS aircraft in May 1987. Earlier, in April 1987, Junejo requested Reagan in a letter for the supply of the said aircraft. *Nation*, 28 April 1987; *Muslim*, 1 June 1987.
- 70. Important American visits between January 1985 and March 1986 included, 1985: Admiral James Watkins (January), Michael Armacost (March), Verne Orr (May), Jon R. Thomas (June), Allen Walis (November), Richard Murphy (November), General John Adams Wickham (December), January–March 1985: General George Crist (January), Edward Messe (March), William Schneider (March). Congressional delegations, retired/ex-officials and others are not included in the list. A number of Pakistani federal ministers, especially the Foreign Minister (from visits in 1985 only), and Secretary General Ministry of Defence visited the US during the same period. Zia-ul-Haq met with Reagan in October 1985.
- 71. For details, see Muslim, 25 March 1986.
- 72. Ibid.
- 73. Ibid., 18 July 1986; see also the joint statement: ibid. 20 July 1986.
- 74. Important American visits between April 1988 to January 1988 included, April-December 1986: Michael Armacost (April), Ann Worbleski (June), Ms Baily (September), James Philips (October), Casper Weinberger (October), General George Crist (October), Peter Allegeier (November), Edward Aldridge (November). 1987: Michael Armacost (January and August), Allen Wales (February), Ann Worbleski (September), General Robert Russ (February), Admiral William Crowe (March), General George Crist (June), Admiral Carlisle Trost (September). January 1988: Michael Armacost, Richard Armitage. Congressional delegations and visits of individual Congressmen/Senators are not included.

- 75. Observer (London), 1 March 1987; see also chapter on Pakistan's nuclear policy.
- 76. Arshad Pervaiz was sentenced to five years' imprisonment by a court in Philadelphia. This judgement was reversed in April 1990 and he was acquitted. *Dawn*, 15 April 1990.
- 77. The statement of Pakistan's Foreign Minister on an Adjournment Motion in the Senate: *Muslim*, 4 August 1987.
- 78. Indian journalist, Kuldip Nayar, admitted that A. Q. Khan did not actually say that Pakistan had a bomb, but he maintained that such a conclusion could be inferred from what he told him. See his column in *Sunday*, 22–28 March 1987, p. 9.
- See the debate on the Adjournment Motion in Pakistan's Senate on 3 August 1987, and the statements of political leaders and comments in newspapers.
- 80. Muslim, 4 August 1987.
- 81. Ibid., 25 August 1987.
- 82. *Nation*, 18 December 1987.
- 83. Since the new assistance package resumed in January 1988, its dates are often given as 1988–93.
- 84. Department of State Bulletin (88, 2133, April 1988), p. 80.
- 85. Ibid
- 86. Muslim, 25 March 1986; Arshad Zaman, 'The New Multi-year Aid Program: The Pakistani View', in Husain and Rose, op. cit., 1988, p. 254.
- 87. See Zia-ul-Haq's interview to an Indian correspondent: Nawa-i-Waqt, 19 February 1984; Agha Shahi's statement: Muslim, 3 May 1981; Agha Shahi, 'US Aid Package and Issue of Quid-pro-quo', Dawn, 10 December 1985; by the same author, Pakistan's Security and Foreign Policy (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988), pp. 217-19, 231-4.
- 88. For details, see chapter on Afghanistan.
- 89. Pakistan Times Overseas Weekly, 17 April 1988.
- 90. Dawn Overseas Weekly, 18-24 August 1988; see also ibid., 4-10 August 1988.
- Zia-ul-Haq's aircraft crashed on a return flight after he inspected the firepower display of the American M-1 Abrams tank. Those killed with him in the aircrash included, among others, Arnold Raphel, US ambassador to Pakistan, and Brigadier General Herbert Wassom, US Defence Attaché.
- 92. Dawn Overseas Weekly, 1-7 September 1988.
- 93. In July 1988, before the death of Zia-ul-Haq, the US House of Representatives called upon him to hold 'free and fair party based' elections by the date he himself had fixed. The resolution suggested that the holding of 'free and fair elections' and Pakistan's 'progress towards a fullfledged democracy' should also be taken into account while granting assistance to Pakistan.
- 94. The statement of Howard Schaffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Sub-committee on South Asia: Dawn Overseas Weekly, 16–22 March 1989; Thomas P. Thornton, 'The New Phase in U.S.-Pakistan Relations', Foreign Affairs (68, 3, Summer 1989), pp. 142–59.
- 95. The statement of General Mirza Aslam Beg, Chief of Army Staff: *Nation*, 26 August 1988.

- 96. The following were represented at the Consortium meeting in Paris: Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, the US, West Germany, Asian Development Bank, EEC, and the International Finance Corporation.
- 97. This was Benazir Bhutto's second meeting with George Bush after both assumed their offices. The first meeting took place in Tokyo in February 1989 where they participated in the funeral of Emperor Hirohito.
- 98. Department of State Bulletin (89, 2151, October 1989), p. 63.
- 99. Ibid., p. 64.
- 100. Dawn Overseas Weekly, 15-21 June 1989.
- 101. Ibid., 22–28 June 1989; and 20–26 July 1989. Two of the 40 F-16 aircraft obtained by Pakistan during 1983–6 were destroyed in accidents. The delivery of new F-16 aircraft was not to start before 1992.
- 102. The statement of Mrs Teresita Schaffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs: *Department of State Bulletin* (89, 2151, October 1989), pp. 85-6.
- 103. U.S. Policy Information and Texts (Bonn: USIS), (33, 5 March 1990), p. 3; Newsweek, 30 April 1990; The Statesman Weekly, 21 April 1990.
- 104. Jang (London), 9 August 1990; Dawn, 7 August 1990.
- 105. U.S. Policy Information and Texts (104, 8 August 1990), p. 10.
- 106. Newsweek, 22 October 1990.

CHAPTER 6: THE SOVIET UNION

- 'The Fundamentals of Pakistan's Foreign Policy'. A group study conducted by the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs: Pakistan Horizon (IX, 1, March 1956), pp. 37-50 (see p. 46); K. Sarwar Hasan, Pakistan and the United Nations (New York: Manhattan Publishing, 1960), p. 54; Arif Husain, Pakistan, Its Ideology and Foreign Policy (London: Frank Cass, 1966), p. 90.
- See Tahir Amin, Afghanistan Crisis: Implications and Options for Muslim World, Iran and Pakistan (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1982), pp. 89-90, and its introduction by Prof. Khurshid Ahmed, especially pp. 6-7, 10-11; Mohammad Yunus, 'Soviet Foreign Policy: Kremlin and South Asia', Pakistan and Gulf Economist, 15-21 June 1981, pp. 9-12.
- 3. Rasul Bux Rais, 'Pakistan's Relations with the Soviet Union', in Leo E. Rose and Noor A. Husain (eds), *United States-Pakistan Relations* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1985), pp. 128–39.
- Syed Riffat Husain, 'Pak-Soviet Relations Since 1947: A Dissenting Appraisal', Strategic Studies (X, 3, Spring 1987), pp. 64–88; Muhammad Azmi, 'Pakistan's Soviet Policy: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back', Asian Profile (15, 2, April 1987), pp. 167–78.
- 5. This perspective was highlighted in Pakistan in the sixties. A number of Pakistan publications *Muslim* and *Dawn* projected such views in the mid and late eighties. Some well-known retired diplomats and senior military officers also advocated the restoration of balance in foreign policy by improving ties with the Soviet Union.
- 6. For details, see Chapter 2.

- 7. Liaquat Ali Khan's speeches and statements made in the United States were published in a book entitled *Pakistan The Heart of Asia* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1950).
- 8. R. K. Jain (ed.), Soviet South Asian Relations, 1947–78, vol. 2 (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1978), pp. 4–6 (Document Nos. 1 and 2).
- S. Gopal (ed.), Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Vol. 5 (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, distributed by Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 213 (Record of Lord Mountbatten's interview with Nehru.)
- 10. Jain, op. cit., pp. 7-8 (Document No. 3).
- 11. Hafeezur Rehman Khan, 'Pakistan's Relations with the USSR', *Pakistan Horizon* (XIV, 1, 1961), pp. 33-55.
- 12. See speeches of the Soviet delegate to the Security Council on 17 January and 23 December 1952. For text, Bimal Prasad, *Indo-Soviet Relations 1947–72:*A Documentary Study (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1973), pp. 62–73; see also, Khan, op. cit., p. 55.
- 13. Zubeida Hasan, 'Pakistan's Relations with the USSR in the Sixties', *The World Today* (25, 1, January 1969), pp. 26–35.
- Soviet-supplied military equipment included, inter alia, T-54/55 tanks, MI helicopters and their spares, 130 mm guns, jeeps and trucks.
- 15. Pakistan Horizon (XXII, 2, 1969), p. 167.
- 16. See Kosygin's letter to Indira Gandhi: *Asian Recorder*, 29 July-4 August 1968, p. 8451.
- 17. Syed Riffat Husain, 'Super Power and Major Power Rivalry in South Asia: The United States, the Soviet Union and China', in Lawrence Ziring and David G. Dickason (eds), Asian Security Issues (Kalamazoo: Institute of Government & Politics, Western Michigan University, 1988), pp. 143–63.
- 18. The Soviets supplied weapons to India before and during the 1971 war and extended diplomatic support to India. Three veteos in the UN Security Council on 5, 6, and 13 December 1971 blocked a ceasefire resolution.
- Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1978), pp. 527-30.
- The United States recognized Bangladesh in April 1972, and China did so in August 1975.
- 21. See Kosygin's speech at the lunch given in honour of Bhutto: *Pakistan Times*, 18 March 1972. He argued that his government viewed the 1971 civil strife in East Pakistan as a clash of 'the forces of national liberation' and 'the forces of an anti-people military dictatorship which had joined efforts with external aggressive circles.' The Soviet Union wanted a peaceful and negotiated settlement of this problem 'on the basis of respect for the will and legitimate rights' of the people of East Bengal.
- 22. For the text of the joint communiqué: Dawn, 19 March 1972.
- 23. Ibid
- 24. *Pakistan Times*, 11 March 1973. A similar relief was given by major Western creditors later in the same year.
- 25. Pakistan Times, 23 February, 22 March, and 4 April 1973.
- 26. See Bhutto's interview: ibid., 29 March 1972.
- 27. Bhabani Sen Gupta, *The USSR in Asia* (New Delhi: Young Asia Publication, 1980), p. 100.

- 28. Ibid., pp. 103-4; Dawn, 15 March 1972; Pakistan Times, 21 March 1972.
- Dawn, 23 May 1973. This proposal was offered, once again, by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Gromyko, in his address to the UN General Assembly in September 1975: ibid., 24 September 1975; China rejected the Soviet proposal: ibid., 27 September 1975.
- 30. Bhutto's address to the National Assembly on 21 December 1973: *Pakistan Horizon* (XXVII, 1, 1974), pp. 178-9.
- 31. Dawn, 30 August 1975; see editorials in ibid., and Nawa-i-Waqt, 31 August 1975.
- 32. For the text of the joint communiqué, see: Foreign Affairs Pakistan (A publication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan), (1, 5, October 1974), pp. 8–12.
- 33. Ibid.
- 34. Pakistan Times, 14 February 1976.
- 35. Ali T. Sheikh, 'Pakistan-Soviet Relations and the Afghan Crisis', in Noor A. Husain and Leo E. Rose (eds), *Pakistan-U.S. Relations: Social, Political and Economic Factors* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988), pp. 45–74.
- 36. Muslim, 7 August 1981.
- 37. Nawa-i-Waqt, 2 February 1984.
- 38. Mehrunnisa Ali, 'Soviet-Pakistan ties since the Afghanistan crisis', Asian Survey (XXIII, 9, September 1983), pp. 1025–42; Pravda, 1 October 1985; Current Digest of the Soviet Press (hereafter CDSP) (XXXVII, 39, 23 October 1985), p. 18.
- 39. CDSP (XXXII, 5, 5 March 1980), p. 3.
- 40. Ibid., p. 4.
- 41. See Ali T. Sheikh, 'Pakistan-Soviet Relations and the Afghan Crisis', in Husain and Rose, op. cit.
- 42. *CDSP* (XXXIV, 50, 12 January 1983), p. 4; and (XXXV, 4, 23 February 1983), p. 21.
- See Dawn, 23 November 1983; Jasarat, 20 January 1984; Izvestia, 25 January & 26 October 1983; CDSP (XXXV, 4, 23 February 1983), p. 21, and (XXXV, 43, 23 November 1983), p. 24.
- 44. Yuri V. Gankovsky et. al., 'Soviet Relations with Pakistan', in Hafeez Malik (ed.), Soviet American Relations with Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan (London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 182-98.
- 45. See Frontier Post, 6 and 13 May 1987.
- 46. International Herald Tribune, 10 August 1981.
- 47. Zulfikar A. Khalid, 'What Went Wrong with Pakistan-Soviet Relations', *Asia Pacific Community* (22, Fall 1983), pp. 74–95.
- Yuri Vinogradov, 'Conflict in Sri Lanka', International Affairs (Moscow), April 1988, pp. 68–73.
- 49. Pakistan Times, 19 October 1983.
- Muslim, 21 October 1984, 11 October 1985; see also Pravda, 16 July 1985;
 CDSP (XXXVII, 28, 7 August 1985), p. 17.
- 51. Muslim, 16 and 17 July 1986. The Soviet warning was so tough that the United States asked the Soviet to keep their hands off Pakistan: International Herald Tribune, 16 July 1986; Washington Post, 21 July 1986.
- 52. International Herald Tribune, 20 September 1988; see also Pravda, 12 March

- 1987; *Izvestia*, 28 April 1987; *CDSP* (XXXIX, 10, 8 April 1987), pp. 16–17; and (XXXIX, 17, 27 May 1987), p. 13.
- 53. Nation, 1 October and 22 December 1987.
- 54. Muslim, 16 and 26 September, and 1 October 1980. While flying over Pakistani territory on the way to India in December 1980, Soviet President Brezhnev sent a message to Zia-ul-Haq, hoping that their relations would improve, facilitating the consolidation of peace and good neighbourly relations in the region.
- 55. Dawn, 26 August 1981.
- 56. See the joint statement: Muslim, 27 August 1981.
- Vitaly Smirnov, 'Soviet Foreign Policy and Pakistan', ibid., 7 November 1981.
- 58. Viewpoint, 23 September 1982, p. 16.
- Ibid., p. 6. In November 1982, Zia-ul-Haq visited Moscow to participate in the funeral of Leonid Brezhnev, and had a brief courtesy meeting with this successor, Yuri Andropov. The two sides outlined their position on Afghanistan.
- 60. Zia-ul-Haq was quoted as having replied: 'So long as I am alive this will not happen.' See, the report on his interview to the BBC in *Dawn*, 16 October 1982; *Viewpoint*, 28 October 1982, p. 7; see also, Bhabani Sen Gupta, 'Future of Soviet Pakistan Relations', *Dhaka Courier* (Dhaka), 8 July 1988, pp. 22–3.
- 61. Smirnov's interview: Nawa-i-Waqt, 20 October 1983. For more statements on this subject, see Dawn, 2 February 1984; Muslim, 2 February and 20 November 1984; Jang, 2 October 1984; Nawa-i-Waqt, 5 February and 19 November 1984, 17 February 1985; Pakistan Times, 15 February 1985.
- 62. Meherunnissa Ali, op. cit.
- 63. Yaqub Khan's meeting with the Soviet ambassador to the UN and Gromyko in November 1983 and September 1984 respectively. Gromyko warned Yaqub Khan against Pakistan's continued support to Afghan resistance.
- M. Yousaf Saeed, 'Pakistan Foreign Policy A Quarterly Review', Pakistan Horizon (XXXVIII, 2, 1985), pp. 3–18 (see p. 4); CDSP (XXXVII, 10, 3 April 1985), p. 24.
- Dawn, 15 and 21 May 1985; Muslim, 14 May 1985; Pravda, 15 May 1985;
 CDSP (XXXVII, 20, 12 June 1985), p. 14.
- Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan and the Changing Regional Scenario: Reflections of a Journalist (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988), p. 271; Muslim, 11 October 1985.
- 67. *Muslim*, 18 and 20 September 1986; *Dawn*, 19 September 1986. A court in Islamabad sentenced the accused to death in 1987.
- 68. Ibid., 26 and 28 September 1986.
- 69. See Gorbachev's press conference in New Delhi: *CDSP* (XXXVIII, 48, 31 December 1986), pp. 13–14.
- 70. Nation, 11 December 1986 and 13 December 1987.
- 71. Dawn, 12 December 1986.
- 72. Yaqub Khan's speech at a banquet hosted by Chinese Foreign Minister in Beijing: *Muslim*, 27 December 1986.
- 73. Frontier Post, 18 January 1987. The US Under Secretary of State, Michael Armacost, visited Pakistan while Kovalyew was in Islamabad.

- 74. See Muslim, 4 and 9 February 1987.
- 75. Ibid., 10 February 1987.
- 76. Dawn Overseas Weekly, 23–29 June 1988, 11–17 August 1988; Telegraph, 14 June 1988; Nation, 6 November 1988.
- 77. One of the Afghan aircraft shot down by Pakistan had a Soviet pilot, who was returned to the Soviet Union shortly after the incident in August 1988.
- 78. The United States expressed grave concern on the deployment of SS-1 Scud missiles and new combat aircraft in Afghanistan. It reiterated its support to Pakistan and the Afghan resistance. Nation, 3 November 1988; Pakistan Times, 3 November 1988; see also Yaqub Khan's letter to the President of the UN Security Council: Pakistan Times Overseas Weekly, 27 November 1988.
- Pravda, 22 August 1988; Izvestia, 1 September 1988; CDSP (XL, 34, 21 September 1988), pp. 15–17, and (XL, 35, 28 September 1988), p. 19;
 New York Times, 22 August 1988.
- 80. Dawn Overseas Weekly, 12-18 January 1989, 26 January-1 February 1989; Viewpoint, 12 January 1989.
- 81. 'The Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Activity of the USSR (April 1985 to October 1989)', A Survey prepared by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *International Affairs* (Moscow), January 1990, p. 77.
- 82. For the text of the joint statement: *Viewpoint*, 9 February 1989, pp. 9–20. The Soviets also expressed their willingness to make more aid available for steel production, power generation and mining.
- 83. International Herald Tribune, 17 March 1989.
- 84. Nasim Zehra, 'Out in the Cold', *Herald*, January 1990, pp. 40–2; *The Economist*, 1 September 1990, p. 54; *International Affairs* (Moscow), March 1990, pp. 88–92.
- 85. The statement of the spokesman of Pakistan's Foreign Office: Dawn, 5 August 1990.
- 86. Gankovsky, op. cit.
- 87. Muslim, 25 September and 5 October 1983.
- 88. This was one of the major agreements arrived at between the two countries during Pakistan's Finance Minister, Ghulam Ishaq Khan's visit to Moscow in December 1983. In 1987, the Soviets raised the number of turbines for the Multan project to four. See the statement of the Soviet Chargé d'Affairs: *Nation*, 29 July 1987.
- 89. Dawn Overseas Weekly, 12-18 January 1989.
- Abdul Majid Khan, 'Growing Economic Relations with the USSR', Muslim, 9 February 1989.
- 91. See V. Ovlev, 'Pakistan Misses Opportunities for Political Considerations: A Russian View', *Muslim*, 30 April 1987; see the statement of the head of the economic section of the Soviet embassy in Islamabad. *Nation*, 2 July 1987.
- 92. Muslim, 16 July 1987; Nation, 4 August 1987.
- 93. Muslim, 31 December 1987; Nation, 30 December 1987.
- 94. Nation, 16 June 1987.
- 95. Muslim, 21 December 1983.
- 96. Dawn Overseas Weekly, 26 May-1 June 1988.
- 97. Viewpoint, 9 February 1989, p. 9.

CHAPTER 7: CHINA

- 1. R. K. Jain (ed.), *China South Asian Relations 1947–80*, Vol. 2 (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1981), p. 7 (Document No. 6).
- 2. Anwar Hussain Syed, *China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974), pp. 61–62.
- 3. Zhou Enlai made an overnight stopover at Karachi in April 1965. Another brief stopover was made in June 1965. On both the occasions, he met with President Ayub Khan.
- 4. Pakistan Times, 24 December 1971.
- 5. See editorial in *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 24 December 1971. Similar views were expressed in articles published in this and other newspapers and magazines.
- Mohammad Ahsan Chaudhri, 'Strategic and Military Dimensions in Pakistan-China Relations', *Pakistan Horizon* (XXXIX, 4, 1986), pp. 15–28.
- 7. For the text of the joint communiqué: Pakistan Times, 3 February 1972.
- 8. Ibid., 30 August 1972.
- 9. China recognized Bangladesh on 31 August 1975, and the decision to establish diplomatic relations was made on 6 October 1975.
- 10. For details, see section on Bangladesh's recognition in chapter on India.
- 11. The Pakistan-China joint communiqué: Dawn, 15 May 1974.
- 12. For the full text of the statement, see *Pakistan Horizon* (XXVII, 2, 1974), p. 149.
- 13. For the text of Li Hsien-nien's speech at the banquet, see *Pakistan Times*, 22 April 1975; see also another statement: ibid., 24 April 1975.
- 14. See Dawn, 30 May 1976.
- 15. See the text of the Pakistan-China joint communiqué: Foreign Affairs Pakistan (3, 5, May 1976), pp. 35–8.
- 16. Though some senior military officers always accompanied Bhutto during his visits to China, it was only in 1972 and 1976 that in-depth talks were held between the senior military officers of the two countries.
- 17. For the text of Bhutto's condolence message: Foreign Affairs Pakistan (3, 1, January 1976), pp. 48–51.
- 18. Bhutto who met Mao Zedong during his visit to China in May 1976 was the last foreign dignatory received by him.
- 19. Pakistan Horizon (XXIX, 4, 1976), pp. 261, 263.
- The Chinese Vice Prime Minister's speech: Jain, op. cit., pp. 181–2 (Document No. 162).
- 21. For the text of the Chinese appeal: ibid., p. 185 (Document No. 167).
- 22. The statement of the Chinese government, issued on 30 December 1979: Beijing Review (23, 1, 7 January 1980), p. 3.
- 23. Ibid.: Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 January 1980, p. 13.
- Beijing Review (23, 4, 28 January 1980), pp. 9–10; New York Times, 30 December 1979.
- For a detailed treatment of China's response, see Yaacov Vertzberger, 'Afghanistan in China's policy', *Problems of Communism* (May–June 1982), pp. 1–23.
- 26. The US Defence Secretary, Harold Brown, visited China in January 1980 and the two sides agreed on the Afghanistan problem as well as on the need for beefing-up Pakistan's defence.

- K. Arif (ed.), China-Pakistan Relations (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1984), pp. 190-1 (Document Nos. 175 and 176).
- 28. See Hua Guo-feng's banquet speech: ibid., pp. 201–2 (Document No. 184); Jain, op. cit., pp. 201–2 (Document No. 184).
- 29. See Zia-ul-Haq's speech: ibid., pp. 202-4 (Document No. 185).
- 30. Dawn, 27 December 1980.
- 31. Muslim, 4 June 1981.
- 32. Ibid.; and Pakistan Times, 1 June 1981.
- 33. President Xiannian also made an overnight stopover in March 1986.
- 34. See the statement of China's Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs accompanying the President: *Muslim*, 9 March 1984. He said that the President was so happy with the visit that he felt himself to be 10 years younger.
- 35. Dawn, 6 March 1984.
- 36. Ibid., 24 July 1984.
- 37. Muslim, 24 November 1985.
- 38. Ibid.
- 39. Ibid., 27 December 1986.
- 40. Ibid., 23 June 1987.
- 41. Nation, 24 June 1987.
- 42. Muslim, 25 June 1987.
- 43. Beijing Review (31, 17, 25 April-1 May 1988), p. 10
- 44. Nation, 1 July 1988.
- 45. Dawn Overseas Weekly, 16-22 February 1989.
- 46. Ibid.
- 47. Keesing's Record of World Events (35, 2, February 1989), p. 36467.
- 48. Dawn Overseas Weekly, 20-26 April 1989.
- 49. Pakistan Horizon (XLII, 2 and 3, October 1976), p. 208.
- 50. Some of the important visits were: a PPP delegation led by Begum Bhutto; China's parliamentary delegation led by a Vice Foreign Minister; Pakistan's Federal Law Minister; and the Chief of Pakistan's Naval Staff.
- 51. Syed, op. cit., pp. 69-70.
- Rashid Ahmad Khan, 'China's Policy towards South Asia: A Comparative Perspective', Regional Studies (V, 1, Winter 1986/87), pp. 14–27 (see p. 18).
- 53. The joint communiqué recorded the Chinese government's 'appreciation of the attitude of the Pakistan government in seeking a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute and [it] was of the belief that [an] expeditious settlement of this question would be conducive to peace in Asia and in the world.'
- 54. Arif, op. cit., p. 44 (Document No. 44).
- 55. See, for example, Chinese Foreign Minister, Huang Hua's statement in Beijing: *Dawn*, 27 December 1980.
- 56. Jain, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 544 (Document No. 492, pp. 542-4).
- 57. Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 June 1981.
- 58. Muslim, 24 November 1985.
- 59. Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 October 1977.
- 60. Dawn, 11 December 1987.
- 61. Nation, 25 July 1987.
- 62. Major General G. S. Butt, 'Karakorm Highway A Dream comes True', in New Era of Pak-China Friendship (Islamabad: Department of Films & Pub-

- lications, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, n.d), pp. 28-33.
- 63. For an in-depth study of road construction in Pakistan's northern and other border areas, see Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, *Road and Rivals: The Political Uses of Access in the Borderlands of Asia* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989).
- 64. Butt, op. cit., p. 32.
- 65. See Dawn, 5 September 1985.
- 66. Muslim, 3 May 1986.
- 67. On his return from China in 1985, Junejo acknowledged with satisfaction that the Muslims in China were living 'happily' and they were 'freely practising their religion'. *Muslim*, 24 November 1985.

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